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Chapter 1
Introduction
Global climate change has emerged as one of the key environmental problems humanity
will face in the future. According to the IPCC (2014), “rising rates and magnitudes of
warming and other changes in the climate system, accompanied by ocean acidification,
increase the risk of severe, pervasive and in some cases irreversible detrimental impact”
(p 13). Our goal as environmental economists is to assess the magnitude of potential
damages due to climate change, and suggest policies that will prevent or reduce these
damages. Due to its enormous scale, the problem of regulating climate change contains
many complicating issues that cannot be addressed by simple models of environmental
externalities. Climate change is a global problem affecting every region of the world
in a different way. Furthermore, climate change is a process that takes a long time.
The main impacts of today’s carbon emissions will take place over centuries. Thus,
due to the slow and complex nature of this phenomenon, our knowledge of the natu-
ral processes behind climate change and its impacts on the global economy is rather
incomplete. This lack of information, in addition to the general unpredictability of
outcomes in the distant future, introduces a large degree of uncertainty that should be
accounted for when designing the optimal climate policy. Also, a significant amount
of emissions that lead to climate change comes from largely irreplaceable yet scarce
fossil fuels. While clean and renewable energy alternatives have been developed in the
past decades, more innovation is needed to reduce global fossil fuel consumption. Ad-
ditionally, the fact that the majority of the fossil fuel stocks is owned by non-western
governments with significant monopoly power further complicates matters. Lastly,
climate change has become a highly politicized topic; hence, certain policies, though
beneficial may be infeasible from a political standpoint. My dissertation seeks to ad-
dress the aforementioned range of complicating factors and shed light as to how these
facets of the climate change problem reflect on optimal policy. The remainder of this
chapter will provide a brief overview of each of these topics, and elaborate on how each
subsequent chapter fits into that context.
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The earth’s climate is a complex system which has been notoriously difficult to
model. The connection between CO2 emissions and increasing global temperature
involves a complex system with various feedback mechanisms. As these processes
take place over decades and the projected levels of CO2 are unprecedented, it is very
difficult to predict exactly how much of a temperature increase we can expect as a
result of current emissions. Calculating the value of damages that corresponds to the
warming is an even more complex problem. There are multiple channels through which
global warming can harm humanity – from increased mortality due to higher risk of
heart disease, to decreasing agricultural output, infrastructure destruction, and mass
migration due to rising sea levels. Estimating the magnitude of the damage channels is
made even more difficult by the fact that the worst damages are also likely to occur in
the future, when no one knows what humanity’s spatial distribution and technological
capabilities will be. Though many economic studies make a lot of progress towards
quantifying these damage channels (Tol, 2002; Stern, 2007; Nordhaus, 2008) all concrete
monetary values associated with specific increases in temperature are largely arbitrary
in the end. The significant uncertainties generated by our incomplete knowledge about
future climate change are then a major concern for all cost-benefit analyses of emission
reduction policies. There is extensive economic literature on how to incorporate these
uncertainties into our models and policy optimizations (Pizer, 1999; Tol, 2005; Crost
and Traeger, 2011; Pindyck, 2012). One interesting approach is to treat climate change
as a catastrophic outcome the probability of which increases in emissions (Lenton
et al., 2008; Tsur and Zemel, 2008, 2009; Karp and Tsur, 2011; Pindyck, 2013). These
studies solve the problem of determining an optimal policy to reduce the probability
of catastrophe by a certain percentage, rather than coming up with a concrete climate
damage value and comparing it to the cost of reducing emissions.
Unfortunately, one side effect of the uncertainty in regard to climate change is that
it has led to doubts (or skepticism) about climate change in the general population.
Despite scientific evidence that climate change is anthropogenic, many people, and,
what is worse, policy makers have used the uncertainty in climate change science to
argue that climate change may not in fact be caused by greenhouse gas emissions.
Climate change skepticism has been fairly prevalent in popular publications. However,
in economic literature (with a few notable exceptions, for example van Wijnbergen
and Willems (2015)) the basic assumption is that the policy maker is fully aware of
the connection between climate change and emissions. The second chapter “Climate
Change Skepticism in the Face of Catastrophe” fills this gap by formally modeling the
level of the policy maker’s skepticism as a parameter in the model. In this chapter,
I combine the concept of skepticism with the earlier described approach of modeling
climate change as a potential catastrophic outcome. The main finding is that, when
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climate damages are perceived to be potentially catastrophic, skepticism about the
man-made nature of climate change does not play a large role in driving the choice of
policies. The key policy-relevant contributions of this chapter are the emission scenarios
that are optimal for various levels of skepticism, which demonstrate that even skeptical
policy makers should favor climate change mitigation.
In addition to unknowns in climate science, there are also significant uncertainties
about humanity’s ability to reduce emissions. One key uncertainty is the future cost of
renewable energy. Currently the majority of the world’s energy is generated by fossil
fuels which contribute heavily to global greenhouse gas emissions. Phasing in clean
renewable energy is a key step toward reducing humanity’s carbon footprint. However,
significant cost-reducing innovation in the renewable energy sector needs to take place
in order for that to happen. Uncertainty about the pace of said innovation is a key
problem and thus has been a subject of several studies in environmental economics
(Baker et al., 2006; Baker and Adu-Bonnah, 2008; Bosetti and Tavoni, 2009). However,
clean innovation does not exist in a vacuum – it is endogenous, dependent on other
economic conditions, which are also uncertain.
Funding clean energy R&D is then a problem of investment under uncertainty. Re-
turns on investment in renewable energy innovation depend on overall energy demand,
government policy, prices of fossil fuels, and many other parameters all of which are
somewhat unpredictable. There is literature in economics dealing with the problem
of investment under uncertainty. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) develops the so called
“real-option” framework, in which real investments have similar properties to financial
options. In such a framework the option of delaying the investment has a certain value
that increases with uncertainty, and hence higher uncertainty reduces the level of in-
vestment. Albrizio and Costa (2012) and Chen and Tseng (2011) examine investment
into clean technology under policy uncertainty, finding evidence of such a real-option
effect. However, most existing studies have been limited to looking at investments
in carbon capture and storage (CCS) and renewable energy capacity, rather than re-
newable energy innovation. There are also general studies on clean innovation (most
prominent Acemoglu et al. (2012)), modeling investments that make clean technolo-
gies more productive, but abstracting from the details of the technology in question
and ignoring uncertainty. I contribute to both of these strands of literature (environ-
mental investment under uncertainty, and clean innovation) in my third chapter titled
“Can Fossil Fuel Price Volatility Spur Investment in Renewable Energy?”. The chapter
finds that although renewable energy innovation can serve as a hedge against volatile
prices, overall higher uncertainty leads to renewable energy firms delaying investment
in innovation and hence reducing renewable energy R&D.
An additional factor, which complicates the switch from fossil fuels to renewables,
3
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and hence climate change mitigation, is fossil fuel scarcity. While new fossil fuel reserves
have been made accessible recently due to fracking technology, ultimately fossil fuel
reserves (particularly those of oil and gas) remain finite. The problem of optimal fossil
fuel extraction has been explored extensively in economics starting with the seminal
paper of Hotelling (1931). More recent studies have combined the problem of optimal
fossil fuel extraction with that of climate change mitigation (Golosov et al., 2014; Sinn,
2008; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2012a). A key result of these recent studies is that
a stringent environmental policy can in fact end up increasing emissions, creating the
so-called “Green Paradox” effect. A future renewable energy subsidy or carbon tax
makes the oil stock less valuable to its owners, and may provide an incentive to speed
up oil extraction. The intensity of the green paradox is determined by many factors,
including whether the policy is announced in advance (Smulders et al., 2012), whether
there is the possibility of capital accumulation (van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2014),
and whether the interest rates on capital are endogenous (van der Meijden et al., 2015).
What complicates the problem further is the existence of a variety of fossil fuel
types with varying levels of scarcity, extraction cost, and carbon intensity. An extreme
case of this phenomenon is the presence of abundant and dirty coal, and scarce yet
cheap oil in the same market. Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012b) examine this case.
They outline the potential sequence of fuel regimes (oil only, oil and coal together, coal
only, and renewable only), concluding that the free market phases out oil too soon,
relying too heavily on dirty coal. The fourth chapter titled “Subsidizing Renewables in
the Presence of a Dirty Backstop” extends this study by finding the optimal renewable
subsidy, in a setting with coal as a substitute. The chapter’s main finding is that it is
only optimal to subsidize renewables once the oil stock is depleted, and that there is
no Green Paradox, in the presence of coal.
Most of the studies on fossil fuel extraction mentioned above assume that the mar-
ket for fossil fuels is perfectly competitive. However, in reality, reserves of fossil fuels
and specifically those of oil and gas, are heavily concentrated in specific nations which
can then use their monopoly power to limit supply and extract additional rents. There
are many studies examining the problem of a monopolistic oil exporter, most promi-
nently the seminal work by Dasgupta and Heal (1979). An additional issue arises when
examining how the monopolist oil exporter affects climate change mitigation. The na-
tions that own considerable oil stocks tend to not care about climate change. This
naturally lends itself to a framework of a game between an environmentalist oil im-
porter and a monopolistic exporter. Rubio and Escriche (2001), Wirl (1995), and Liski
and Tahvonen (2004) have examined such a framework, concluding that the carbon tax
can actually be used as a tariff by the importer to extract additional rents from the
monopolist, reducing emissions in the process. However, all these studies are limited
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to linear oil demand. The fifth chapter of this thesis entitled “Battle for Climate and
Scarcity Rents” extends this literature by looking at a variety of oil demand functions.
This chapter categorizes how different specifications of the importer’s oil demand af-
fect the pace of the oil extraction rate. A key finding of this study is that for certain
non-standard demand functions the monopolist has an incentive to increase extraction
resulting in worse environmental outcomes. This differs from the typical result for
linear demand.
The various areas of research described above, as well as the corresponding chap-
ters of the dissertation, while all connected to the economics of climate change, are
somewhat disparate. However, the methodology used in the chapters is similar, tying
them closer together. Thus before moving on to the specific chapters in the thesis, it
is useful to discuss the similarities in the methods used. In general, each of the topics,
from uncertainty in climate change, to innovation and fossil fuel scarcity, represents
an extra layer of model complexity. As a result of this complexity, much economic
literature, when tackling these issues, tends to simplify the models as much as possi-
ble to produce tractable analytical solutions. The papers that constitute this thesis
follow a different path. For the most part I abandon analytics and focus on numerical
approximation and simulation analysis. It is important to note that the numerical
methods used in the thesis are not new. They are widely used in macroeconomics
and finance as well as other fields. There has even been some use of these methods in
environmental economics. However, the innovation lies in applying these methods to
problems which, so far, have not been tackled by the literature as they are too complex
to obtain analytical results (such as non-linear demand in fossil fuel scarcity, fossil fuel
price volatility in renewable innovation or out of equilibrium behavior and information
mismatch in climate change policy). While the resulting solutions are less general they
allow an incorporation of an extra layer of complexity in the models and hence expand
on existing literature and move the research frontier.
The limitations of analytical methods are most visible when it comes to examining
models with uncertainty. The problems of renewable energy innovation and catas-
trophic climate change, in addition to the uncertainty inherent to these processes, lead
to significant non-linearities in modeling as well as a larger variable space, making
analytical solutions all but impossible. There have been a few recent studies which
try to examine uncertainties related to catastrophic climate change using numerical
methods (Cai et al., 2013; Lemoine and Traeger, 2014). However, there are still plenty
of interesting new insights to be explored using the power of computational techniques.
The use of numerical methods allows the second chapter to examine out-of-equilibrium
behavior (i.e. when the policy maker believes climate change is random but it is in
fact endogenous). In the third chapter the numerical calculations allow for more com-
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plex innovation dynamics as well as partial substitutability between fossil fuels and
renewables. The methods used in this study are widely used to solve DSGE models,
described in great detail by Judd (1998). The models of fossil fuel extraction studied
in the last two chapters are deterministic and thus less complex. Consequently there
are more analytical results available in existing literature. However, the numerical il-
lustrations in these studies examine more complex cases for each model and produce
key insights. In the fifth chapter, the numerical approximations are used to examine
more complex non-standard demand functions for which little can be derived analyt-
ically. One of such non-standard demand functions leads to the monopolist speeding
up initial extraction and hence damaging the environment, a case which was not found
in previous literature. Similarly, in the fourth chapter numerical optimization allows
for calculating the optimal subsidy, the main contribution of the study.
Of course numerical simulations have their limitations. The result is often driven
heavily by the assumptions about functional forms and parameters. This is why every
study in this dissertation performs some basic calibrations to real-world data when
choosing parameters. Additionally, sufficient robustness checks are performed to ensure
that specific parameter choices do not drive the nature of the result. In some cases
varying parameters in fact provides additional insights into the nature of the effect that
is studied, which is interesting in and of itself. Overall, this dissertation highlights how
existing numerical techniques can be used to tackle various issues in climate change
economics. As is demonstrated in the following chapters, numerical analysis allows for
modeling of various complexities ranging from scientific and economic uncertainty to
fossil fuel scarcity without simplifying the other features of the model too drastically.
Hence, in addition to the various policy-relevant insights presented in the paper, the
dissertation presents a case for the usefulness of numerical methods in environmental
economics.
6
Chapter 2
Climate Change Skepticism in the
Face of Catastrophe
2.1 Introduction
The problem of anthropogenic climate change is a special example of an externality,
because despite overwhelming scientific evidence of the man-made causes of climate
change, a significant portion of the population does not believe this hypothesis. In
effect, millions of consumers are generating an externality they both do not believe
they are creating nor, even if it does exist, that their actions are responsible. In this
paper I define this phenomenon as climate skepticism.
There are of course other types of climate-skeptical views, for example a belief
that temperatures are not going up at all, or a belief that climate change will not
result in severe damages. However, in this paper I focus on the skepticism about the
anthropogenic nature of climate change. Firstly, this type of climate-skepticism is
fairly prevalent specifically in one of the largest CO2 emitting nations – the United
States. According to Leiserowitz et al. (2013), while a majority of the US population
(62%) believes the temperatures are increasing, slightly less than half of the country
(49%) believes that climate change is anthropogenic. Secondly, skepticism about the
anthropogenic nature of climate change is common in the rhetoric of policy makers.
A prime example of climate skepticism is a statement by Mitt Romney, the 2012
Republican nominee for the U.S. presidency, who said at a 2011 fund-raiser at the
Consol Energy Center in Pittsburgh, PA: “My view is that I do not know what is
causing climate change on this planet. And the idea of spending trillions and trillions
of dollars to try to reduce CO2 emissions is not the right course for us”
1. Thus,
climate skepticism has been a steady presence in our society and politics, hampering
1CBS News, “Mitt Romney’s Shifting Views on Climate Change,” October, 28, 2011
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implementation of vigorous environmental policies.
It is thus important to understand the consequences of skepticism about the an-
thropogenic nature of climate change. The overwhelming scientific evidence is that
climate change is most likely driven by human activity. The magnitude of the problem
raises several important research questions about climate skepticism. What role does
climate skepticism play in uncontrolled climate change? Can we assign a monetary cost
to climate skepticism? If the cost is very large, then perhaps more resources should
be invested into convincing the population that climate change is emission-driven (cli-
mate advocacy). As most of the world’s governments are democratically elected, a less
skeptical population would result in a less skeptical policy maker. On the other hand,
we must consider the possibility, however unlikely, that the skeptics are right. What is
the true cost of a stringent environmental policy from a skeptic’s point of view?
The purpose of this paper is to explore these problems in a formal theoretical and
calibrated framework. The main contribution of this paper is explicitly accounting for
the skepticism of a policy maker in a fully calibrated general equilibrium model with
catastrophic climate change damages. Within my model I quantify the level of climate
skepticism as the probability the policy maker assigns to climate change being random
rather than emission-driven.
My paper contributes to a larger field of literature modeling structural uncertainty
about climate change. This literature considers optimal policies in the face of un-
certainty about the manifestation and impact of climate change. A simple way to
study structural uncertainty is the “sensitivity analysis” approach, using a determin-
istic model that does not include any uncertainty like DICE (Nordhaus, 1992), and
sampling the input parameters from prior distributions (formed based on expert opin-
ions). For each parameter sample the model is simulated resulting in a distribution of
the carbon cost that reflects uncertainty about climate change (Nordhaus and Popp,
1997; Stern, 2007). These studies find that the expected values of the resulting car-
bon cost distributions are much higher than in the certainty case, resulting in more
stringent policy recommendations. Most of these early studies do not explicitly include
uncertainty in their optimization. One exception is the paper of Pizer (1999) which
solves the model with uncertainty included explicitly, finding that optimal policies that
maximize expected utility are much more stringent than those optimal for the certainty
equivalent case.
This approach is fairly limited as it requires us to assume a distribution for each
climate change parameter. There are still deep uncertainties about climate change that
cannot be modeled using this strategy. As a result, recent studies adopt more sophisti-
cated approaches. Weitzman (2009) uses fat-tailed distributions of climate parameters
to demonstrate that under “deep uncertainty” about climate change, cost-benefit analy-
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sis of emissions policies is impossible. Pindyck (2012) models uncertainty about future
temperature with flexible distributions of climate damages finding that uncertainty
about temperature influences Willingness to Pay (WTP) for climate change mitigation
more than higher expected temperature levels. Hennlock (2009) uses prior distributions
similar to earlier studies but introduces ambiguity aversion, i.e., finding the optimal
policy for reducing the damage in the worst-case scenario rather than maximizing ex-
pected utility. Crost and Traeger (2011) focuses on uncertainty in climate damages,
introducing uncertainty in every period rather than ex-ante, and breaking down the
effect of uncertainty into risk aversion and inter-temporal sustainability. Just like the
studies using the simpler approach to uncertainty, all of the studies mentioned above
concur that more uncertainty leads to more stringent optimal environmental policies.
One exception to that is the paper of Athanassoglou and Xepapadeas (2012) which
finds that optimal emissions can increase with uncertainty, but only if the damage
control (adaptation) technology is very advanced.
A common feature of climate models dealing with uncertainty, which is somewhat
related to modeling climate skepticism, is learning. Models that allow for learning,
focus on the question whether it is best to reduce emissions now or to wait until
more is known about climate change. The option of “waiting until we know more”
is similar to the arguments of skeptics like Mitt Romney mentioned earlier. Most of
these studies focus on learning about “climate sensitivity” – how far temperature rises
due to an increase in greenhouse gas emissions. Kelly and Kolstad (1999) consider a
model where the true value of climate sensitivity is unknown, but can be pinned down
over time through Bayesian learning. Their model is fairly complex, and they solve
it using the same type of numerical methods as the ones used in this chapter. They
find that it will take many years to resolve the uncertainty about climate sensitivity,
leading to many years of suboptimal decisions. Leach (2007) extends these results by
allowing for uncertainty and learning about both climate sensitivity and the persistence
of greenhouse gas accumulation, finding that learning takes too long and leads to
policies that are inefficient in the long-term. The paper of van Wijnbergen and Willems
(2015) is closest to my work, as it explicitly models climate skepticism in the context
of learning about climate change. The study concludes that climate skeptics have an
incentive to reduce emissions, as emission reduction will facilitate learning about the
nature of climate change. The study justifies its conclusion by the irreversiblity of global
warming. Learning through emitting less is better than learning through emitting
more, because emitting more is irreversible. My study differs from van Wijnbergen and
Willems (2015) as I am more interested on the optimal level of emissions for various
levels of skepticism and how it is affected by catastrophic climate change. Thus I
abstract from learning keeping the level of skepticism constant, instead developing a
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more complex stochastic general equilibrium integrated assessment model. Given that
attitudes about the man-made nature of climate change are determined by political
affiliation and exposure to scientific knowledge tends to solidify existing biases rather
than decrease skepticism (McCright and Dunlap, 2011), a constant level of skepticism
is a plausible assumption.
Most of the literature on climate change uncertainty focuses on the possibility of
more severe (rapid or disastrous) climate change than is generally expected. It is
thus usually concluded that uncertainty leads to a more drastic optimal environmental
policy. My study seeks to add to this literature by going against this trend, focusing on
a potentially weaker connection between climate change and emissions. Uncertainty in
my study manifests itself as skepticism – perception of climate change as a potentially
random and uncontrollable phenomenon. Many studies in environmental economics
do implicitly consider a fully skeptical policy maker. The frequently used DICE model
(Nordhaus, 2008) uses a “Business as Usual” scenario to represent the consequences
of not doing anything about climate change (the fully climate-skeptic’s case). It is
usually assumed that in such a case, emissions will grow at the same rate as they have
over the past years. This chapter takes a more complex approach to the problem of
skepticism. Firstly, my analysis goes beyond the completely skeptical policy maker.
I explore what the optimal policy is for a moderately skeptical policy maker, who
believes that climate change may be exogenous but only with a certain probability.
Secondly, my model contains a more complex damage specification which substantially
complicates the decision of a fully skeptical policy maker.
This paper considers the case of abrupt catastrophic damage induced by climate
change. The onset of the abrupt catastrophic event is uncertain, but its probability
distribution is known. The catastrophe probability function is increasing in temper-
ature. This damage specification is used because it makes the fully skeptical policy
maker’s problem non-trivial. An abrupt climate catastrophe results in non-linear dy-
namics affecting the policy maker’s consumption and savings decisions even if he does
not believe he can control climate change through emissions. Furthermore, as stated by
the “dismal theorem” of Weitzman (2009) any cost-benefit analysis of climate change
is incomplete without considering the upper-bound of damages (the worst possible sce-
nario). Hence, the climate catastrophic event I use drives mankind to a subsistence
level of consumption. Two examples of such catastrophes are an abrupt rise in sea level
or a large increase in mortality resulting from a rapid climate shift. One key assumption
about the damage specification that drives my results is that post-catastrophic con-
sumption levels are independent of capital prior to the catastrophe. The catastrophic
damage specification I use is similar to the one used by Tsur and Zemel (2008), Tsur
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and Zemel (2009), Karp and Tsur (2011), and Tsur and Withagen (2012).2 In partic-
ular, Tsur and Zemel (2008) examines how a market economy (without social-welfare
optimization) reacts to catastrophic climate change. That study finds that a potential
catastrophe actually increases emissions because of increased discounting of the future
due to the possibility of a catastrophe. Given that there are no externalities other than
climate change, this result is the same as that of an optimal policy of a fully skeptical
policy maker. However, Tsur and Zemel only look at the long-run equilibrium of the
model. Since by my definition, a skeptical policy maker assigns a certain probability
to a possibility of random climate change, my model includes a stochastic compo-
nent, and hence I need to consider behavior outside of the steady state. As a result,
I provide a solution to the dynamic model with catastrophic climate change, leading
to different conclusions. The catastrophic climate damages specification I use is also
similar to tipping point/threshold models (Keller et al., 2004; Lemoine and Traeger,
2014), where the nature of climate damages changes after temperature exceeds some
(unknown) threshold value. While I do not explicitly model a temperature threshold,
the dynamics for the climate-aware case (increased incentive to reduce emissions) are
similar to a climate catastrophe whose probability increases in temperature.
My results are threefold. First, I find that when potential damages are catastrophic,
even a fully climate-skeptical policy does not result in unbounded climate change. A
potential catastrophe causes the policy maker to fear he will soon switch to subsistence-
level consumption. With no adaptation, capital is useless after the catastrophe occurs,
so capital is depleted, leading to a scale-back in production. This in turn leads to fewer
emissions, resulting in a slowdown in the temperature increase. Second, I find that
the additional long-run expected increase in temperature level resulting from a fully
skeptical policy is over 6 degrees Celsius, relative to the pre-industrial level (compared
to an increase of 1.5 degrees under the optimal climate-aware policy). Third, I find
that moderate skepticism (a belief that climate change is only possibly anthropogenic)
leads to emission cuts that are still fairly stringent. The catastrophic consequences
of climate change provide sufficient incentives to cut emissions even to someone who
attaches a small probability to man-made climate change. Thus, even a policy maker
who believes there is a 10% chance that climate change is anthropogenic will prefer
to cut emissions by over 50% leading to a temperature increase of 3.5 degrees Celsius
above the pre-industrial level.
The rest of this chapter is outlined as follows. Section 2.2 describes the components
of the integrated assessment model. Section 2.3 characterizes the three optimal policy
problems (fully skeptical, climate-aware, and moderately skeptical) and describes the
2Tsur and Withagen (2012) actually use a slightly different specification, allowing for adaptation
capital which decreases catastrophic damages.
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methods used to solve them. Section 2.4 presents the optimal policies, simulations of
the economy, and welfare analysis for all cases. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Model
This paper models the global environmental and economic outcomes based on whether
a social planner is climate-skeptic or climate-aware. While in reality the policy is set
through global agreements on emission standards and implemented by each individual
national government, for simplicity (as done in many other Integrated Assessment
Models), I use a representative agent framework and assume that a global policy maker
can set global consumption and CO2 emissions directly. To make modeling uncertainty
easier, I use a discrete-time infinite-horizon model.
In the economy, output is produced with capital K and fossil fuel energy X. The
production function F (K,X) has decreasing returns to scale. I make certain other
assumptions about the production function as well as the other functions in this model
in order to be able to solve them numerically. This is discussed in Section 2.3.1.
Capital depreciates at rate δ while fossil fuel has extraction cost p per unit of energy.3
Consumers own firms and consume C resulting in the intertemporal resource constraint
(2.1) Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + F (Kt, Xt)− pXt − Ct.
Emissions from fossil fuel consumption increase the CO2 concentration according to
the following law of motion
(2.2) St+1 = eXt + (1− γ)(St − Sb) + Sb,
where S is the CO2 concentration, e is the carbon intensity of fossil fuel energy, and
Sb is the pre-industrial level of CO2 concentration. CO2 concentration depreciates
through absorption at rate γ. This is of course just an approximation of the three-
reservoir carbon stock system used by Nordhaus (2008). I discuss this simplification
further when I calibrate the model with numerical parameter values.
The two expressions above are fairly common to integrated assessment models. The
modeling of climate change expectations is where my model differs. Expectations of the
future temperature increase are conditional on the skepticism of the policy maker. A
completely climate-aware policy maker (no skepticism) believes that CO2 concentration
affects the global temperature through radiative forcing. This process is represented
3I assume the fossil fuel reserves are inexhaustible. It is a necessary assumption that makes my
problem tractable, and given the vast new reserves of oil and gas that have been discovered due to
the fracking technology, the assumption is not entirely unrealistic.
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by the following law of motion:
(2.3) Tt+1 = αTt + β ln
(
St
Sb
)
+ t, t ∼ N(0, σ),
where T is the change in global temperature relative to the pre-industrial level,  is
the random shock to temperature, and σ is a measure of temperature volatility. The
climate sensitivity (equal in this case to β/(1 − α)) measures the marginal impact of
the radiative forcing mechanism on temperature. The true value of climate sensitivity
is hard to quantify due to the complexity of the carbon cycle, but I assume it is known
and certain. In addition to the climate-aware policy maker, I also introduce a climate-
skeptical policy maker, who believes with a certain probability that temperature is
random, represented by the following auto-regressive process:
(2.4) Tt+1 = φTt + ζt, ζt ∼ N(0, σζ),
where ζ is a random shock to the temperature increase with variance σζ and φ is a
measure of shock persistence in the temperature increase. There are many ways to
model skeptic expectations of the change in temperature. I use an AR(1) process to
facilitate computation. In order to reconcile such skeptic expectations with a rise of
0.75 degrees that the planet has experienced φ is set relatively close to 1. This makes
the temperature process behave more closely to a random walk, rather than a mean-
reverting process. With such a specification a large rise in temperature is probable
under the skeptic scenario. I model the level of skepticism a policy maker has by the
parameter piSK – the probability that the random climate change scenario is the true
one according to the policy maker’s beliefs. Thus the general expression for the policy
maker’s expectation of climate change is
(2.5) E(Tt+1) = pi
SK(φTt + ζt) + (1− piSK)
(
αTt + β ln
(
St
Sb
)
+ t
)
.
I model climate change damages as a catastrophic event that occurs as a result of
a shift in temperature. A real analogue of this catastrophe could be a change in the
Gulf Stream current or a rapid rise of the sea level. Another way a catastrophe could
manifest itself could be runaway climate change due to increased positive feedback in
the climate system. For example, higher temperature could lead to the melting of the
permafrost in the Siberian tundra. As a result of the meltdown, vast quantities of
green house gases contained in the permafrost are released, resulting in ever-increasing
temperatures. The average temperature quickly rises to extreme heights where large
portions of the world are unlivable and very little can grow. After the catastrophe
occurs, the world switches to a subsistence economy, where each period a small amount
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C¯ is consumed. Then the value of social welfare after the catastrophe occurs is
(2.6) ψ =
U(C¯)
1− ρ ,
where U(C) is the consumer’s utility function and ρ is the discount factor. A key
assumption made in my model is that capital accumulated prior to the catastrophe
is irrelevant in the post-catastrophic world. The justification for this process is that
the catastrophe drastically reduces the productivity of capital and, through natural
destruction, reduces the capital stock to the same low value no matter how high it was
before the catastrophe. This would lead directly to a subsistence steady state imme-
diately after the catastrophe. A more realistic solution would be to model the climate
catastrophe as a drastic reduction in the total productivity factor or the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital (due to a decrease in the world’s population). However that would
make the problem much more complex (endogenizing the continuation value), making
it less tractable. The extent to which this simplifying assumption drives my results
will be discussed further, when I describe my results in Section 2.4.
I now derive the expression for total expected social welfare. However, because my
model uses discrete time, I must first specify the sequence of events in every period. For
every period t, the representative agent first sets Ct, and Xt given Kt, St and Tt. After
this decision, catastrophe may occur. If it does occur, the representative consumer
switches to subsistence consumption. Otherwise Kt+1, St+1, and Tt+1 are set given Ct
and Xt. Thus, assuming the catastrophe occurs at time t1, the expression for social
welfare is
(2.7)
t1∑
t=0
ρtU(Ct) + ρ
t1ψ.
However the timing of the catastrophe is uncertain and endogenous, increasing with
the temperature increase. What is known to the policy maker is λ(T ) – the survival
probability. This is the probability that no catastrophe occurs for every possible value
of temperature increase T . (This is often used to model catastrophic climate change,
see for example Tsur and Zemel (2008) and Tsur and Withagen (2012)).
Thus the resulting expression for expected social welfare is
(2.8)
∞∑
t=0
ρt(U(Ct) + ψ(1− λ(Tt)))Y (t),
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where Y (t) is the total stochastic discount factor defined by:
Y (t) =
{
1 t = 0∏t−1
j=0 λ(Tj) t > 0.
The intuition behind the expression above is the following. For each period t, social
welfare is equal to the utility of consumption plus the discounted sum of subsistence
consumption for all future periods if catastrophe occurs. This welfare is then multiplied
by the discount factor Y (t) which includes the probability that the catastrophe does
not occur before t.
2.3 Solving for Optimal Policy
In this section I outline the path to solving the optimal policy problem. I first solve
the problem of optimal consumption and fossil fuel use for the extreme cases: the fully
climate-skeptical policy maker (piSK = 0) and the fully climate-aware one (piSK = 1).
The problem of a moderately skeptical policy maker (0 < piSK < 1) is similar to that
of a climate-aware one, thus I don’t describe that solution method separately.
2.3.1 The Climate-Skeptical Policy Maker
I solve the problem of the fully skeptical policy maker by assuming that climate change
is random. Recall, however, that while such a policy maker perceives temperature to be
exogenous, he is still aware of the potential of a climate catastrophe that occurs with a
probability λ(T ). To solve the fully skeptical policy maker’s problem I maximize social
welfare in (2.8) subject to constraints (2.1) and (2.4) (constraint (2.2) is irrelevant to
the fully skeptical policy maker as a change in CO2 concentration does not lead to any
consequences as far as he is concerned). Since Tt is an exogenous stochastic process,
the problem becomes a typical Ramsey problem with a twist of a randomly varying
discount factor. This problem leads us to the following conditions that the optimal
solution must follow:
U ′(Ct) = E(U ′(Ct+1)ρλ(Tt)((1− δ) + FK(Kt+1, Xt+1))),(2.9)
FX(Kt, Xt) = p.(2.10)
The first condition is similar to the standard Euler equation, requiring the current
marginal utility of consumption to be the same as the expected discounted marginal
utility of investment. The key difference from the standard Euler equation is that in
addition to the discount factor ρ, the future utility of consumption is multiplied by the
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survival probability λ(Tt). The second condition requires the marginal productivity of
fossil fuels to be equal to the fossil fuel extraction cost.
In order to solve for the optimal skeptical policy, I need to specify functional forms
for utility, production and survival probability functions. They are as follows:
U(C) = C
1−η
1−η , η > 0,(2.11)
F (K,X) = AKκXω, κ+ ω < 1, κ > 0, ω > 0,(2.12)
λ(T ) = 1− (1 + exp ( τ−T
υ
))−1
, υ > 0,(2.13)
where η, κ, ω, τ, and υ are all parameters. The CRRA utility function and Cobb-
Douglas production function are fairly standard for macroeconomic models. The elas-
ticity of substitution between capital and fossil fuels equals to 1 for the Cobb Douglas
function. It is an assumption we make for computational convenience, which does how-
ever influence the results (i.e., how easy it is to reduce emissions). However, although
the nominal emission levels may change, the main results (relative differences between
emission policies for various levels of skepticism) would be the same for a more realis-
tic Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function, thus the main message of this
study remains valid.
There is no precedent for explicitly modeling the survival probability function λ.
Though Tsur and Zemel (2008) model the climate change catastrophe in a similar
fashion, that study is focused on the long-run equilibrium and thus does not need to
specify a functional form for λ. This study on the other hand is focused on examining
the optimal policy paths for various levels of climate-skepticism. As those can only be
produced using numerical solutions, all functional forms need to be fully specified. I
choose the functional form in (2.13) because it is between 0 and 1 for all values of T and
is monotonically decreasing in T . This is justified since the survival probability should
decrease with climate change (as the probability of a climate catastrophe increases).
Substituting the utility and production functions defined in (2.11) and (2.12) into
the equations above, I arrive at the Euler equation for the skeptical policy maker:
(2.14) C−ηt = E
(
C−ηt+1ρλ(Tt)
(
(1− δ) + κAKκ−1t+1
(
pK−κt+1
Aω
) ω
ω−1
))
.
I cannot obtain a closed-form solution for C that satisfies (2.14), so I solve the
problem numerically using projection analysis. The parameter values used for the
numerical solution are presented in Table 2.1. For more details on the projection
method and the way I implemented it, see the description in Appendix 2.6.1.
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2.3.2 The Climate-Aware Policy Maker
The next step is to solve for the optimal behavior of a non-skeptical policy maker.
To do so, I maximize (2.8) under constraints (2.1) – (2.3). The Lagrangian for this
problem is as follows:
L = E[U(Ct) + (1− λ(Tt))ψ + ρλ(Tt)(U(Ct+1) + (1− λ(Tt+1))ψ + ρλ(Tt+1)Vt+2)
+ µKt (Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt − AKκt Xωt + pXt + Ct)
+ µSt (St+1 − eXt − (1− γ)(St − Sb)− Sb)
+ µTt (Tt+1 − αTt − β ln(St/Sb)− t)],
(2.15)
where µKt , µ
S
t , and µ
T
t are shadow prices of capital, atmospheric CO2 stock and tem-
perature increase respectively and
Vt+2 = E
(
U(Ct+2) + (1− λ(Tt+2))ψ +
∞∑
j=t+3
(U(Cj) + (1− λ(Tj))ψ)
j−1∏
i=t+2
ρλ(Ti)
)
.
Vt+2 represents the 2-period ahead value function. It is endogenous to the decision of
the representative agent because the next-period temperature change Tt+1 affects the
survival probability λ(Tt+1), which increases the discounting of two-period ahead utility
U(Ct+2). The first-order conditions (presented below) obtained from the Lagrangian
are more complex than the ones I obtain in the skeptic’s case:
dL
dKt+1
= µKt + ρλ(Tt)µ
K
t+1
(−(1− δ)− κAKκ−1t Xωt ) = 0,(2.16)
dL
dSt+1
= µSt + ρλ(Tt)
(
−(1− γ)µSt+1 − µTt+1
β
St
)
= 0,(2.17)
dL
dTt+1
= µTt + ρλ(Tt)(−λ′(Tt+1)ψ + ρλ′(Tt+1)Vt+2 − αµTt+1) = 0,(2.18)
dL
dCt
= C−ηt + µ
K
t = 0,(2.19)
dL
dX1t
= µKt (−ωAKκt Xω−11t + p)− µSt e = 0,(2.20)
Expressions (2.16) and (2.19) are the same as in the skeptic’s case. However, unlike
the skeptic, the climate-aware policy maker accounts for the link between emissions
and catastrophic climate change. Hence condition (2.20) is more complex, making the
shadow price of the CO2 stock endogenous in the expression that determines fossil fuel
use X. Expressions (2.17) and (2.18) specify the evolution of the shadow prices of
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the temperature increase and the CO2 stock. These two expressions demonstrate the
complexity of the climate-aware policy maker’s problem. The catastrophe probability
λ is endogenous to the policy maker’s decision, resulting in an endogenous-discounting
mechanism described in Tsur and Zemel (2008). With the discount rate endogenous,
the two-period ahead value function Vt+2 becomes endogenous in the first-order con-
dition (2.18). Because of this, I cannot simplify the first-order conditions further.
Therefore I use the value function iteration method to solve this problem. I follow
the algorithm outlined in Kelly and Kolstad (2001), specifically well suited for solving
integrated assessment models with an infinite horizon. The Bellman equation for the
problem is:
(2.21) V (Kt, St, Tt) = max
Ct,Xt
U(Ct) + (1− λ(Tt))ψ + ρλ(Tt)E(V (Kt+1, St+1, Tt+1))
Note that once I know the true expression for V finding the optimal values for the
control variables is straightforward: the problem collapses to one of constrained maxi-
mization. I use a neural-network approximation and a Newton-Rhapson algorithm to
find the best approximation for V . Then, once I know the expression for V , I use a se-
quential quadratic programming algorithm to find the optimal C and X at every point
in time and simulate the economy. For a more detailed description of the algorithm
see Appendix 2.6.2.
2.3.3 Calibration
Table 2.1: Parameter values used in the numerical solutions and simulations.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
α 0.658 A 2.87
β 1.47 φ 0.99
δ 0.5 σζ 0.185
γ 0.962 σ 0.185
η 2 ψ 0.2
κ 0.35 Sb 281
ω 0.05 υ 1.45
p 0.16 τ 10
ρ 0.9 e 36.6
Similar to many environmental economic studies, I calibrate the model so that one
period is equal to 10 years. For many parameters, I use the same calibration as in
Rezai et al. (2012) due to similarity between the models (differing only in the price of
oil and the damage specification).
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2.3.3.1 Production and Welfare Parameters
The discount factor ρ is set to 0.9, corresponding to the annual discount factor of
roughly 96%. The elasticity of inter-temporal substitution η is set to 2. The production
elasticity of capital κ is set to 0.35. I set the rate of decay of capital to 0.5, which
corresponds to about 6.7% annually. I then use current global economic data4 to
calibrate the rest of the parameters. The current capital stock is K0 = 2 (US $100
trillion), and energy consumption over the past decade is X0 = 1.1 (100 trillion kg
of oil equivalent). Global GDP over the past decade is F0 = 3.65 (US $100 trillion).
Assume up until now the world has been functioning under skeptic assumptions. Then
the cost of energy should be equal to its marginal productivity, so pX0 = ωF0. Given
that according to EIA (2010) the energy expenditure to GDP ratio is around 5%, I set
ω = F0
pX0
= 0.05. Then I solve for A using A = F0/(K
κ
0X
ω
0 ) = 2.87. I can now solve for
p = ωF0
X0
= 0.16.
2.3.3.2 Climate Parameters
The initial CO2 concentration S0 is set to 388 parts per million volume CO2 (ppmv)
(NOAA, 2010), while the pre-industrial level Sb is set to 281 ppmv. I take a barrel of oil
to be equivalent to 1/10 ton carbon and 2.13 gigaton carbon (GtC) to be equivalent to 1
ppmv. This results in e = 36.6 (ppmv per 100 kg of oil equivalent). This yields around
40 ppmv emissions for the last decade and approximately 4 ppmv or 8.32 GtC per year,
which corresponds to the real amount of CO2 emissions in 2010 (British Petroleum,
2011). However, the actual increase of CO2 concentration in 2010 was around 2.42
ppmv (NOAA, 2010), leading to a depreciation factor of (4/2.42)/388 = 0.0038 per
year, and 3.8% per decade leading to γ = 0.962. For the parameterization of the
carbon cycle, I follow Kelly and Kolstad (1999) setting α = 0.658 and β = 1.47. I
assume a rather grim catastrophic scenario for climate change (following the dismal
theorem from Weitzman (2009),which states that the upper bound of climate damages
influences the cost-benefit analysis the most). I assume that global consumption is
reduced by 90%, leading to consumption of $20 trillion per decade (i.e., C¯ = 0.2).
There is no precedent in literature for calibrating the survival probability λ. Given how
extreme the catastrophe is, I set the probability of it happening to a very low value.
This is once again in line with Weitzman’s dismal theorem, which insists that a low-
probability, high-impact scenario will dominate the cost-benefit analysis. I calibrate λ
so that the initial probability of a climate catastrophe is as low as 0.1% and so that it
will reach 50 percent when temperature rises to 10 degrees Celsius (setting τ = 10 and
υ = 1.45).
4Source: the World Bank (2012)
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2.3.4 Steady State Analysis
Before I present the optimal policy rules and dynamic simulations of the economy I
discuss the steady state solutions. Using the first-order conditions (2.9) – (2.10) and
(2.16) – (2.20), I can derive the steady state values for the climate-skeptic and climate-
aware policy makers respectively. The steady state for the skeptic’s case has a closed-
form expression and is fairly straightforward. Finding the steady state for the climate-
aware policy maker is harder, as there are no analytical first-order conditions. Using
a Newton-Rhapson method, I obtain steady state values that minimize the differences
between the left-side and the right-side of the climate-aware first-order conditions which
must hold in the steady state (derived from equations (2.16) – (2.20)). The resulting
steady state values for state and control variables (for both types of policy makers) are
presented in Table 2.2. Note that the steady state for the climate-aware policy maker
is many decades into the future, as it will take a long time for the climate system to
reach a new equilibrium. Meanwhile, if the skeptics are right, then we are never too
far from the steady state because temperature is a random variable, and every positive
shock to temperature will be eventually balanced out by a negative one. Recall that
I assumed in my calibration that the current policy is a skeptic one. As can be seen
from the steady state values, we are currently fairly close to the skeptic steady state.
Capital and consumption are slightly below steady state levels while emissions are
slightly above. The climate-aware steady state is very different from the current real-
world values. The intuition behind the numbers is as follows. The climate-aware policy
maker consumes less fossil fuel to avoid catastrophic climate change. With lower fossil
fuel usage, marginal productivity of capital decreases, hence less capital is required as
well. With less capital and fossil fuel usage, less can be produced and hence consumed.
This scaling back of production by a climate-aware policy maker will be observed when
I simulate the dynamic solution.
Table 2.2: Steady state and initial values for state and control variables for both fully
climate-skeptical and climate-aware policies.
Real World Skeptic Aware
Steady State Steady State
Capital ($ trillion) 200 215 174
Consumption ($ trillion) 245 261 225
CO2 Emissions (ppmv) 43 42.9 4.4
CO2 Concentration (ppmv) 388 1132 420
Temperature (degrees C) 0.75 0 1.65
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 The Climate-Skeptical Policy Maker
For the climate-skeptical policy maker I use projection analysis to obtain the best ap-
proximation of the optimal consumption at each level of capital and global temperature
increase. The projection method involves finding the policy function approximation
that satisfies the first-order conditions for a “grid” of state variable values (capital and
temperature in our case). The resulting approximation is the following second-order
polynomial function:
lnCt = 0.636 + 0.353 lnKt − 0.727 lnλ(Tt)(2.22)
+0.0116(lnKt)
2 − 0.140 lnKt lnλ(Tt)− 2.06(lnλ(Tt))2
Hence consumption increases with the current capital stock and decreases with the sur-
vival probability. On the one hand, more capital results in more production and hence
more consumption. On the other hand, when the catastrophe probability increases, the
cumulative discount factor (including the probability of survival) decreases, leading the
representative agent to consume more now and leave less capital for the future years.
To illustrate the solution above I plot impulse response functions (IRF), showing
how the economy reacts to a single standard deviation temperature shock in the first
period, with the initial economy in the steady state. The IRF plots are presented in
Figures 2.1 – 2.3. The intuition gained from the optimal policy function is consistent
with the impulse response function plots. With a positive shock to temperature, the
catastrophe probability increases. The policy maker fearing that a catastrophe will
occur soon, discounts the future and increases current consumption. The increase in
consumption depletes capital. Capital remains low while the temperature is above the
steady state, and so due to the scale effects of consumption with respect to capital,
consumption decreases as well. Over time, as the temperature reverts to its mean and
the risk of catastrophe falls, capital and consumption increase until they are at their
steady state levels again.
What is less clear is what happens when the skeptical policy maker is wrong and
climate change is man-made, but the optimal skeptical policy is implemented. To find
out, I use the same expression for optimal consumption in (2.22) together with the
expression (2.3) to simulate the optimal skeptical policy when climate change is an en-
dogenous process. I use the current real-world values of my state and choice variables
from Table 2.2 as starting values in my simulation. The resulting simulations are pre-
sented in Figures 2.4 - 2.7. The intuition behind the skeptical policy maker’s response
to endogenous climate change is as follows. The high level of fossil fuel consumption
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by the skeptical policy maker leads to climate change. Increased temperatures make
the policy maker fear a catastrophe (and a switch to a subsistence economy), leading
to more consumption5. However, after a while this trend is reversed. Capital is dimin-
ished as a result of increased consumption. With a smaller capital stock, the marginal
productivity of fossil fuels decreases, reducing fossil fuel emissions and stabilizing tem-
perature. It takes over 50 periods (500 years), but at the end the economy reaches
a new steady state with slightly lower capital ($174 trillion), and consumption ($243
trillion), and higher temperatures (over 6 degrees above pre-industrial levels). The
surprising conclusion from these simulations is that even a completely skeptical policy
does not result in runaway climate change. Though some climate change occurs, it
eventually hits fairly high temperature values but stabilizes. Of course, there is still a
significant welfare loss present, which will be discussed further in Section 2.4.4.
2.4.1.1 Sensitivity of Results to Assumptions
A key assumption that arguably drives the result above is that capital is worthless
after the catastrophe. This creates incentives for the skeptical representative agent to
consume rather than invest in capital as the catastrophe probability increases, hence
scaling back capital and emissions. This assumption, however, is fairly extreme. It
makes the catastrophe very close to an “end of the world” scenario, where no matter
how much capital humanity saves up beforehand, it is doomed to subsistence consump-
tion. As mentioned earlier, I opt for the more extreme catastrophe scenario mainly due
to its computational elegance. In this section I argue that this extreme catastrophe is
a decent approximation of less extreme catastrophic damage scenarios and that this
assumption does not drive my results. I do so by comparing the dynamics under my
doomsday scenario to a more realistic scenario of catastrophic climate change.
A less extreme scenario for a catastrophe would be a situation where the catastrophe
drastically reduces the Total Factor Productivity (TFP), but with all the capital still
available for use after the catastrophe. Assume that at the time of the catastrophe
the capital stock is equal to some level K¯, while the catastrophe lowers the TFP to
A = A¯. Immediately after the catastrophe, the representative agent begins consuming
the capital. Because the catastrophe has dramatically lowered productivity, capital is
not replenished and begins to diminish, until it reaches some subsistence steady state
level. The higher the level of K¯, the more the representative agent can consume in the
few years immediately after the catastrophe. Thus before the catastrophe occurs, the
representative agent has an incentive to save up more capital, so that he can consume
5This phenomenon is consistent with results of Tsur and Zemel (2008), who showed that under
a competitive solution, when consumers and firms do not observe the link between fossil fuels and
climate change, more will be consumed resulting in more climate change.
22
2.4. Results
more in the initial period after the catastrophe. One can now see that with this
less extreme scenario, as the catastrophe probability increases, there are two opposing
incentives for the skeptical policy maker. On the one hand, a catastrophe results in
more discounting and hence less saving. On the other hand, there is the incentive to
save more, so more is available to consume after the catastrophe.
The important question is which of the two incentives dominates. If the incentive
to save is insignificant relative to the incentive to deplete savings due to increased
discounting, then even under a less extreme catastrophe, the result of skeptics reducing
emissions will hold. To determine whether it is true, I examine the problem more
rigorously (see Appendix 2.6.3). The interpretation from this analysis is as follows. As
long as the decrease in productivity is relatively large and demand is relatively inelastic,
the marginal benefit of extra savings is fairly small relative to the marginal benefit of
consumption. Thus the effect of higher discounting, which increases consumption and
scales back the economy, will be higher than the incentive to save up capital for the
catastrophe. Therefore, the results for the doomsday catastrophe scenario where the
economy goes directly to subsistence consumption after the catastrophe, would still
hold under a less extreme scenario of a significant decrease in productivity due to
climate change. However for relatively milder catastrophes and more elastic demand
functions this effect is reversed (see Appendix 2.6.3 for a specific example of parameter
values for which this occurs). Skeptics increase savings to prepare for catastrophic
damages, ramping up production, which in the end increases emissions even further.
However, fully exploring these dynamics would be require a separate paper, so I leave
this task for future research.
2.4.2 The Climate-Aware Policy Maker
The key component of the solution of the climate-aware policy maker’s problem is
the policy maker’s value function approximation obtained using a value function iter-
ation algorithm. As the form of the approximation is fairly complex, the expression
is omitted. Using the obtained value function, I perform Monte Carlo simulations of
a climate-aware policy maker by maximizing the resulting welfare function to find the
welfare-maximizing consumption and fossil fuel at each point in time. The plots, rep-
resenting average values of 100 Monte Carlo simulations, are presented in Figures 2.8
– 2.11. The biggest difference between the climate-skeptic and climate-aware policy
makers is in CO2 emissions. As can be seen in Figure 2.10 the climate-aware policy
maker emits around 90% less than a skeptic one (around 4.6 ppmv compared to 42
ppmv). With fewer emissions the marginal productivity of capital decreases, so the
climate-aware representative agent spends his savings, which decreases capital by 13%
(Figure 2.9). With less capital available and fewer fossil fuels burned, less can be con-
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sumed, so consumption decreases as well (by around 10%, see Figure 2.8). Eventually
an equilibrium is reached where capital is $173 trillion, consumption is $222 trillion,
and emissions are 4.4 ppmv. Note that relative to the skeptic’s behavior in the face
of man-made climate change, long-run consumption and capital are about 10% lower,
while emissions are 90% lower. This is because reducing energy consumption (and
hence emissions) affects production much less than a reduction in capital, due to lower
marginal productivity of energy. As a result of the dramatic emission cuts, very little
climate change occurs – less than 1.5 degrees, 5 degrees lower than the long-run skep-
tic temperature level for a fully climate-skeptical policy maker when facing man-made
climate change (Figure 2.11). The intuition behind the climate-aware policy maker’s
behavior is fairly straightforward: he reduces emissions to avoid the catastrophic cli-
mate change. Burning fewer fossil fuels reduces production, scaling back output and
reducing capital and consumption.
I also simulate the optimal climate-aware policy function under the random climate
change scenario (i.e., if the skeptics are right). I do not present the simulation plots here
as they are fairly similar to the ones under anthropogenic climate change. The climate-
aware policy maker believes climate change is real, so he cuts fossil fuel emissions by
scaling down production. In the random climate scenario the shocks can be persistent,
so temperature sometimes reaches much higher values. In these cases, the policy maker
cuts emissions even more and increases consumption to match a decrease in fossil fuel
with a decrease in capital. Once temperatures go back down, capital and emissions are
restored back to the steady state.
2.4.3 Mixed Expectations - Policy Makers with Moderate Skep-
ticism Levels
The two cases presented in the previous sections – that climate change is anthropogenic
with certainty, and that human activity has no effect on our climate – are extremes.
In reality, most people and policy makers are somewhere in the middle – moderately
skeptic. Thus, it is worth examining the optimal policy of a policy maker who believes
that climate change is anthropogenic with a certain probability piSK ∈ (0, 1). The
problem of a moderately skeptical policy maker is already outlined in Section 2.2, with
the expectations for the future climate expressed in equation (2.5). I derive the solution
for policy makers with skeptic probability levels piSK = 0.1, 0.2 . . . 0.9. The solutions
are then simulated for the same initial values, for both anthropogenic climate change
and random climate change scenarios.
I summarize the results of optimal behavior for moderate levels of skepticism with
emission and temperature paths for each level of skepticism, simulated under the an-
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thropogenic climate change scenario (presented in Figures 2.12 and 2.13 respectively).
As can be seen from the plots, the moderately skeptical policy simulation results are
much closer to the climate-aware policy simulation results. For skepticism levels below
60%, annual emission levels are less than or equal to 5 ppmv, and final temperature
change relative to pre-industrial level is between 1.5 and 2 degrees Celsius. Further-
more, a skepticism level of 90% (corresponding to a 10% probability that climate change
is connected to human activity) only results in emissions of 14 ppmv per decade and a
final increase in temperature of 3.5 degrees above the pre-industrial level. The intuition
behind this result lies in the catastrophic nature of damages. Given a potential climate
catastrophe, a policy maker will do everything possible to avoid temperature rising
beyond a certain level. Thus, once global temperature reaches a certain level, even a
very low probability that curtailing emissions will lead to a reduction in temperature
is enough to justify stringent action.
2.4.4 Welfare Comparison
As can be seen from my policy simulations, the completely climate-skeptical policy
maker prefers a higher initial level of consumption (in both scenarios), but the climate-
aware one has less climate change (in the anthropogenic climate change scenario).
Using the expression in (2.8), I compute total expected discounted social welfare for
both optimal policies under both scenarios. To do so, I use Monte Carlo analysis,
running 100 simulations for each scenario and calculating the average discounted social
welfare. The results are presented below in Table 2.3.
The results indicate that in the exogenous climate change scenario the expected
welfare of the skeptic is very close to that of the climate-aware policy maker. In the
anthropogenic climate change scenario however the welfare values are fairly different.
The climate-aware policy maker dramatically cuts emissions and scales the economy
back by reducing capital. However, in the long run that policy results in less climate
change and preserves a high level of consumption in the initial periods. The climate-
skeptical policy maker, on the other hand, does not reduce emission, leading to a much
higher temperature increase. This rise in temperature increases the discount rate,
leading to a scale back in output (which also mitigates climate change). However, the
resulting mitigation is too small (as emissions are still fairly high) while consumption
and capital end up being lower than in the fully-skeptic’s case, due to the higher
probability of catastrophe and hence less saving. As a result, under the anthropogenic
climate change scenario the welfare of the climate-skeptic is significantly lower.
The main question I am trying to answer is: What is the cost of skepticism? To find
out, I compare the welfare loss of the two possible “mistakes”: picking the skeptic’s
optimal policy if the climate scientists are right versus picking the climate-aware one if
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the skeptics are right. The welfare loss of mistaken skepticism is 2.91 times as large as
that of a mistaken belief in climate change. The conclusion I draw from this result is:
given a choice between a completely skeptical policy or a completely environmentally
stringent policy, any policy maker who believes there is more than 25% chance that
climate change is real should prefer the latter.
Table 2.3: Social welfare computations for both climate-aware and climate-skeptic policies
under random and man-made climate change scenarios.
Random Climate Change Man-made Climate Change
Skeptical Policy -4.52 -7.81
Climate-Aware Policy -5.30 -5.54
To further determine how skepticism affects welfare, I examine welfare values for the
various levels of belief in anthropogenic climate change, using my mixed expectation
solutions presented in Section 2.4.3. I compute welfare for the policy simulations for
each level of skepticism for both the anthropogenic and random climate change scenario.
The plots of welfare values are presented in Figure 2.14. The results indicate that
welfare is fairly similar under a random climate change scenario regardless of skepticism
(as resulting policies are similar). Furthermore, welfare is flat under an anthropogenic
climate change scenario for skepticism levels below 60%, and decreases more slowly
for more extreme skeptics. This result reinforces a conclusion made earlier, that even
for relatively high levels of climate skepticism, a stringent environmental policy is still
preferable.
2.5 Conclusion
Despite overwhelming scientific evidence of anthropogenic climate change, many policy
makers are still skeptical about it. I study climate skepticism in a formal theoretical
framework to determine how a skeptical policy maker responds to a potential climate
catastrophe. The climate catastrophe in question is an abrupt catastrophic event,
which occurs at an uncertain time, and reduces all global consumption to a subsis-
tence level. The probability of a catastrophic event increases with global temperature.
Temperature is perceived as random by a fully climate-skeptical policy maker and
emission-driven by a climate-aware one, while moderate skeptics assign non-zero prob-
ability values to each possibility.
I find that catastrophic climate change increases the effective discount rate in the
climate-skeptic’s case. Thus, when the probability of catastrophe increases, the fully
skeptical policy maker increases consumption, diminishing savings. These diminishing
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savings will in the long-run limit the consumption of the skeptic, decreasing fossil fuel
emissions and slowing down climate change. Thus, in the face of a catastrophe, a
completely skeptical policy does not lead to unlimited climate change.
Contrary to the skeptic, a climate-aware policy maker will scale back output right
away, decreasing emissions and avoiding climate change almost entirely. The welfare
loss of that scale-back is relatively small compared to the climate change damages
resulting from a fully skeptical policy. Furthermore, the cost of unnecessary emission
cuts incurred by the climate-aware, if the completely skeptic are right, is much smaller
than the climate change damages incurred by the fully skeptical if the climate-aware are
right. Additionally, I find that due to catastrophic consequences of climate change, even
policy makers with low levels of belief in anthropogenic climate change will implement
a stringent environmental policy.
The overarching conclusion of this study is that the prospect of potentially catas-
trophic climate change leads to emission reduction regardless of the level of skepticism.
Thus a potential application of this theoretical exercise would be that more effort should
be focused on educating the public on the potential catastrophic damages of climate
change. As long as the public is convinced that climate change leads to catastrophe
they will support a stringent environmental policy regardless of how skeptical they are
of anthropogenic climate change.
I have made some restrictive assumptions in order to make the problem tractable.
One of these assumptions, as has been mentioned, is the fact that all capital is destroyed
at the time of catastrophe. I examine the consequences of this assumption in Section
2.4.1 arguing that the main result will still hold. This case would be strengthened with
a formal rigorous analysis of the skeptic problem with endogenous post-catastrophe
capital. A more general examination of the way optimal skeptical policy changes with
varying modeling assumptions, specifically the functional forms for the production,
catastrophe probability, and consumptions functions would also be a useful exercise.
Another restrictive assumption is holding piSK , the skepticism parameter, constant
over time. Hence, allowing for learning on the piSK parameter so that the agent can
change the level of skepticism with new evidence of changes in temperature would be
an interesting problem to explore. The potential for learning to mitigate the damage
to skepticism depends most on the overall volatility of temperature (which in turn
determines the pace of Bayesian learning). Existing studies have shown that learning
has little effect on mitigating wrong beliefs about climate sensitivity, precisely due
to the high degree of volatility in temperature (Kelly and Kolstad, 1999). Lastly,
studying the problem of multiple agents with various levels of skepticism as opposed
to a representative agent problem would be a more realistic model of the world. These
investigations are left for future research.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 The Projection Method Used to Solve the Climate-Skeptical
Policy Maker’s Problem
The main idea behind projection analysis is to identify a function P (Kt, Tt), which ap-
proximates the optimal consumption Cˆt. I begin by identifying a grid [KMIN , KMAX ]×
[TMIN , TMAX ] on which I want to approximate the optimal solution. In the skeptic’s
expectations case, temperature only appears in the agent’s utility functions as λ(Tt).
Hence it is reasonable to construct a grid on λ(Tt) rather than on Tt itself. I then
pick a functional form for the approximation P (Kt, λt). In this case I use an n-th
order polynomial (but more complex functions may be used as well). Then for every
grid point Kl, λ(Tm) ∈ [KMIN , KMAX ]× [λ(TMIN), λ(TMAX)], the approximate optimal
consumption level is specified by
(2.23) lnP (Kl, λ(Tm)) =
n∑
i=0
n−i∑
j=0
gij(lnKl)
i(lnλ(Tm))
j.
All that remains is to identify the coefficients gij that give the closest approximation
of optimal consumption. Let g = {gij}i,j=1,...,n be a set of coefficients identifying an
approximation of optimal consumption P g. Then, for each such coefficient set g I
can compute Error(g) (a measure of how good my approximation is), by summing
the squared difference between the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the Euler
equation (defined in (2.14)) over all grid points.
The only complication in computing Error(g) is the expectation operator. How-
ever, because the stochastic component of the climate process is normally distributed,
I can use Gaussian-Quadrature to numerically approximate the expectation operator.
Then I apply a Newton-Rhapson algorithm to find the coefficients g that minimize
Error(g) and hence give the best approximation.
2.6.2 The Value Function Iteration Method Used to Solve the
Climate-Aware Policy Maker’s Problem
My goal is to find a function V , such that it is the fixed point of the following problem:
(2.24) V (Kt, St, Tt) = max
Ct,Xt
U(Ct) + (1− λ(Tt))ψ + ρλ(Tt)E(V (Kt+1, St+1, Tt+1)).
Approximating V around a steady state value would defeat the point, as often when
solving IAMs for climate change, the steady state climate is 100 years into the future,
thus I need to know the optimal behavior far from the steady state. Purely grid-based
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methods (finding the optimal value for V at every point) would be too burdensome –
with 3 state variables and 2 control variables plus 1 stochastic component, a fine grid
would require too many grid points. Thus I turn toward a flexible function approxi-
mation of V . I still need a grid over which to fit the value function, but this grid can
be much sparser with a flexible function form.
Let Φ(Kt, St, Tt;χ) be a family of functions, parameterized by vector χ. Then the
closest approximation to V corresponds to some χ. There are many potential functional
forms for Φ. I use the following neural network approximation6:
(2.25) Φ(Kt, St, Tt;χ) =
L∑
l=0
χ1ltanh(χ2lKt + χ3lSt + χ4lλ(Tt) + χ5l) + χ6.
I use the following algorithm to find the set of parameters χ such that Φ(Kt, St, Tt;χ)
is the best approximation of V :
1. Create a grid. Pick a starting value for the value function Vj0 at every grid point
j.
2. Using a numerical solver, find χ0 such that it minimizes∑
j
(Φ(Kj, Sj, Tj;χ0)− Vj0)2.(2.26)
3. At every grid point j, find the optimal levels for control variables Cj and Xj by
maximizing
Vj,1 = max
Ct,Xt
U(Ct) + (1− λ(Tt)ψ + ρλ(Tt)E(Φ(Kt+1, St+1, Tt+1;χ0)).(2.27)
4. Find χ1 by using a numerical solver to minimize∑
j
(Φ(Kj, Sj, Tj;χ1)− Vj,1)2.(2.28)
5. Repeat steps 2 – 4, until maxj |Vj,i−Vj,i−1| ≤ ζ (where ζ is some fixed convergence
threshold).
The value function is approximated on a grid around the steady state, using a small
grid of 10 points for each state variable (N = 1000 points total). To provide sufficient
flexibility for the function, it is suggested that the size of the parameter vector χ (5L+1)
should be around
√
(N) (where N is the total number of grid points). I set L = 6 for
a total of 31 parameters.
6Same as the one used in Kelly and Kolstad (1999).
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2.6.3 Endogeneity of Post Catastrophe Capital: Sensitivity
Analysis
Most of the analysis in my study concerns the case where the pre-catastrophe level of
capital is not relevant after the catastrophe. In this section, I investigate the problem,
where the catastrophe is of a more complex nature: total factor productivity (TFP)
is lowered but all capital accumulated before the catastrophe is available for produc-
tion/consumption use. I limit my attention to the skeptical policy maker’s case as that
is the case most affected by this assumption. The analysis in this section serves as a
robustness check against the assumptions I make about the catastrophe in the rest of
the chapter.
Assume that after the catastrophe occurs the total factor productivity becomes
A = A¯. Let t¯ be the catastrophe time and K¯ be the level of capital at the time the catas-
trophe occurs. For every level of K¯ there is Kˆt¯(K¯), Kˆt¯+1(K¯) . . . and Cˆt¯(K¯), Cˆt¯+1(K¯) . . .
which represent the utility-maximizing post-catastrophe capital and consumption val-
ues, respectively. Then the expression of the climate-skeptic’s social welfare becomes
(2.29)
∞∑
t=0
ρt(U(Ct) + ψ(Kt)(1− λ(Tt)))Y (t),
where
Y (t) =
{
1 t = 0∏t−1
j=0 λ(Tj) t > 0
,
and
ψ(Kt) =
∞∑
i=t
U(Cˆi(Kt)).
Then the resulting F.O.C. are:
U ′(Ct)− (1− λ(Tt))ψ′(Kt) =(2.30)
E(U ′(Ct+1)ρλ(Tt)((1− δ) + FK(Kt+1, Xt+1))),
FX(Kt, Xt) = p.(2.31)
Recall that one of the key results in this chapter is driven by the fact that as tem-
perature increases, the skeptical representative agent consumes more due to increased
discounting. This leads the skeptic to eat through the capital, which in turn scales
back output. Using the F.O.C (2.30) - (2.31), I can examine whether that happens
when the catastrophe is less extreme. From the expression above I can derive that
(2.32)
dU ′(Ct+1)
dλ(Tt)
=
−λ(Tt)−2(U ′(Ct)− ψ′(Kt))
ρ((1− δ) + FK(Kt+1, Xt+1)) .
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As the utility function is increasing in C while λ, the survival probability function, is
decreasing in T , I can use this expression to determine how next period’s consumption
(conditional on current consumption and capital) reacts to an increase in the probabil-
ity of catastrophe/temperature increase. The sign of the expression on the right-hand
side is ambiguous. Note that if ψ′(Kt) = 0, as I have assumed in the rest of the paper,
the expression on the right-hand side is clearly negative, meaning that as the survival
probability decreases, consumption increases. This is the effect of discounting that I
have described in the main body of the chapter. However, with the introduction of
endogenous post-catastrophe capital, the effect becomes ambiguous. Still, as long as
U ′(Ct) > ψ′(Kt), the skeptic will still increase consumption as the catastrophe prob-
ability increases. The interpretation of this fact is as follows. At each point in time
the skeptic compares the marginal benefit of consuming now to the marginal benefit of
saving up capital for the day when the catastrophe occurs. As long as consumption is
preferable, then the discounting effect still holds, and my results would be valid even
with this less extreme catastrophe model.
The F.O.C.s expressed in (2.30) – (2.31) are complex, so I do not fully solve the
model here. However, I can use the F.O.C.s to numerically solve for the steady state.
I set A¯ = .75 and A = 2.13, meaning that the catastrophe leads to a 25% drop in
TFP. I further lower the coefficient of relative risk aversion to 1.1, making demand
less elastic. This leads to the post-catastrophe steady state capital of approximately
$66 trillion, and post-catastrophe steady state consumption of $110 trillion. I use
a shooting algorithm to find the optimal saddle path of capital and consumption,
and then I estimate a polynomial approximation of the marginal post-catastrophe
welfare increase ψ′(K). Then I find the new pre-catastrophe steady state capital and
consumption levels. Using these values, I test the expression in (2.32) and find that
the right-hand side of that expression is negative. Therefore one can conclude that
the “discounting incentive” can dominate the “precautionary incentive”, i.e., if at the
steady state there is an increase in temperature, the skeptical policy maker would
increase consumption fearing the catastrophe. Note, however, that this only occurs for
a relatively large catastrophe and a relatively inelastic demand specification.
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2.6.4 Simulation Plots
2.6.4.1 Skeptic Optimal Policy Simulated for the Skeptic Scenario
Figure 2.1: Impulse response plot: Simulation of the behavior of the temperature in-
crease according to skeptics for 1000 years after a single standard deviation
shock.
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Figure 2.2: Impulse response plot: Simulation of the optimal consumption path of the
skeptic for 1000 years after a single standard deviation temperature shock.
Figure 2.3: Impulse response plot: Simulation of the optimal capital path of the skep-
tic for 1000 years after a single standard deviation temperature shock.
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2.6.4.2 Skeptic Optimal Policy Simulated for the Anthropogenic Climate
Change Scenario
Figure 2.4: Monte Carlo simulations of the optimal consumption path for the skeptical
policy simulated for the anthropogenic climate change scenario for 1000
years. The plot represents an average of 100 runs.
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Figure 2.5: Monte Carlo simulation of the optimal capital path for the skeptical policy
simulated for the anthropogenic climate change scenario for 1000 years.
The plot represents an average of 100 runs.
Figure 2.6: Monte Carlo simulation of the optimal CO2 emissions path for the skep-
tical policy simulated for the anthropogenic climate change scenario for
1000 years. The plot represents an average of 100 runs.
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Figure 2.7: Monte Carlo simulations of the optimal temperature increase path for the
skeptical policy simulated for the anthropogenic climate change scenario
for 1000 years. The plot represents an average of 100 runs.
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2.6.4.3 Climate-Aware Optimal Policy Simulated for the Manmade Climate
Change Scenario
Figure 2.8: Monte Carlo simulation of the optimal consumption path for the climate-
aware policy simulated for the anthropogenic climate change scenario for
1000 years. The plot represents an average of 100 runs.
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Figure 2.9: Monte Carlo simulation of the optimal capital stock path for the climate-
aware policy simulated for the anthropogenic climate change scenario for
1000 years. The plot represents an average of 100 runs.
Figure 2.10: Monte Carlo simulation of the optimal CO2 emission path for the climate-
aware policy simulated for the anthropogenic climate change scenario for
1000 years. The plot represents an average of 100 runs.
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Figure 2.11: Monte Carlo simulation of the optimal temperature increase path for
the climate-aware policy simulated for the anthropogenic climate change
scenario for 1000 years. The plot represents an average of 100 runs.
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2.6.4.4 Optimal Policy for Mixed Expectations Simulated under anthro-
pogenic Climate Change Assumptions
Figure 2.12: Optimal CO2 emissions paths under various levels of skepticism (skeptic
probability pi between 0 and 1 at intervals of 0.1) simulated for the an-
thropogenic climate change scenario for 1000 years. The plot represents
an average of 100 simulation runs.
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Figure 2.13: Optimal temperature increase paths for policies under various levels of skep-
ticism (skeptic probability pi between 0 and 1 at intervals of 0.1) simulated for
the anthropogenic climate change scenario for 1000 years. The plot represents
an average of 100 simulation runs.
Figure 2.14: Welfare levels, computed by simulating the optimal policy for various levels
of skepticism simulated for the anthropogenic and random climate change
scenarios. Welfare is averaged over 100 simulation runs.
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Chapter 3
Can Fossil Price Volatility Spur
Investment in Renewable Energy?
3.1 Introduction
One of the keys to mitigating climate change is the switch from fossil fuels to clean,
renewable energy sources. Currently, renewables such as wind, solar, and bio-fuels are
too expensive, unable to compete with traditional, dirty, fossil fuel energy sources such
as coal and natural gas. Significant innovation in renewable energy production must
take place to make it cost efficient, in order to phase out fossil fuels and achieve siz-
able climate change mitigation. Hence, determining which environmental policies will
encourage innovation in renewable energy production is a vital task for environmental
economists.
An important factor that determines the demand for renewable energy technology
is the price of fossil fuels. The fact that natural gas and coal are relatively cheap
allows them to dominate the energy market. Higher fossil fuel prices increase demand
for renewable energy, increasing investment in renewable technologies, which produces
cost-saving innovation. Many environmental economic models assume that the market
price of fossil fuels is either static or follows some deterministic path, set by the supplier.
However, in the real world that is not the case – fossil fuel prices (in particular those
of natural gas, which has gained an increasing presence in the energy market) are
very volatile and subject to various geo-political shocks. As prices of fossil fuels affect
the production of renewables, price volatility affects investment in renewable energy
innovation. This study sets out to examine this effect.
Previous theoretical results following from “The Real Option Theory” (cf. Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994; Pindyck, 1990) tell us that uncertainty over future returns decreases
irreversible investment. Other studies connect the option value concept from financial
investment literature to the studies of option values in environmental preservation
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(Arrow and Fisher, 1974; Fisher and Hanemann, 1984; Albers, 1996; Fisher, 2000).
Blyth et al. (2007) apply this concept to investment in green energy, finding that
uncertainty about future climate policy reduces investment into more environmentally
friendly gas power plants and carbon capture and storage capacity. Fuss and Szolgayova´
(2010) similarly find that uncertainty about technological progress and fossil fuel prices
reduces investment into renewable energy capacity. However, the results in this study
are driven by high switching costs, meaning that once investment into green technology
is made, the investor commits to using this green technology. According to Shapiro
and Varian (2013), high switching costs are what makes delaying investment beneficial.
Chen and Tseng (2011) find that when investment in a new gas plant has low switching
costs and the firm can switch back to using coal if environmental policy becomes lax,
such an investment can serve as a hedge against stringent environmental regulations and
increases with environmental policy uncertainty. Albrizio and Costa (2012) compare
low and high switching cost investments in green technology and confirm that high
switching costs drive the investment reduction under uncertainty.
All of the aforementioned studies examine investment in increasing renewable en-
ergy capacity. I add to the literature by studying how fossil fuel price uncertainty af-
fects cost-saving innovation in renewables. As significant cost reduction in renewables
is needed before they can be widely adopted, examining investment in clean energy
innovation is arguably more important than investment into capacity. I contribute to
a larger literature of endogenous clean innovation or directed technical change (Ace-
moglu et al., 2012; Pittel and Bretschger, 2008; van der Meijden and Smulders, 2014).
To my knowledge, there have been no other studies on clean innovation and fossil fuel
price volatility. This problem of investment in innovation is more complex than that of
investment into capacity, as investment in renewable energy innovation has non-linear
pay offs. I study this problem using a calibrated dynamic framework, explicitly model-
ing the climate component. This is also a key contribution of the study as most of the
previously mentioned studies use rather simple models that abstract from quantifying
the environmental impacts.
As seen from previous literature, fossil fuel price volatility can have two effects. On
the one hand, there is the standard real-option effect where uncertain returns lead to a
delay in investment, until uncertainty is partially resolved. On the other hand, investing
in renewable cost reduction does not commit the firm to using renewables in case fossil
fuels are cheaper. That means that the firm can use renewables only when fossil fuels
are expensive and renewable use is profitable, making cheaper renewables serve as
a hedge against price hikes in fossil fuels. This potential for investment in cheaper
renewables to act as a hedge leads to a positive effect where returns on renewable
energy investment increase with uncertainty. My goal is to determine which of these
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two effects dominates.
My main results are as follows. First, I demonstrate that for renewable demand
that is convex in the fossil fuel price, the return on investment in innovation increases
with volatility.1 Secondly, I show through numerical analysis that the standard “real-
option” effect dominates the aforementioned positive effect of uncertainty. It is also
shown that this conclusion is fairly robust to variations in the model’s parameters,
though increasing the substitutability between fossil fuels and renewable energy can
somewhat mitigate the negative effect on renewable R&D. Thus, the volatility of fossil
fuel prices has an overall negative impact on renewable energy R&D and hence hinders
the transition to renewable energy and any emission reduction associated with this
transition. Using my calibrated model, I determine the relative size of that impact.
Lastly, I compute the environmental consequences of fossil fuel price volatility, showing
that for higher levels of volatility, lower levels of innovation in renewable energy lead
to a sizable increase in carbon emissions.
It is important to note that unlike other prominent studies in the field (cf. Fischer
and Newell, 2008), I abstract from learning-by-doing dynamics and spillover effects of
renewable energy innovation. Such dynamics would imply that one firm’s investment
in innovation benefits the entire industry, creating positive externalities to investment.
However, introducing such effects, would make the problem more complicated. Fur-
thermore, even without such dynamics, the main conclusion of this chapter is that
R&D is reduced by price volatility. Spillover effects would create positive extranalities,
leading to firms under-investing in R&D, further exasperating rather than reversing
the negative effect of volatility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 sets up the model of
the representative firm that invests in renewable energy, solves the simpler three-period
version of the model and outlines the two potential effects of fossil fuel price volatility.
Section 3.3 provides some intuition using numerical simulations of the simple model.
Section 3.4 numerically solves the infinite-horizon model and presents illustrative nu-
merical calculations that confirm earlier intuition and demonstrate how the results
change with varying parameters. Section 3.5 concludes with a summary of the results
and suggestions for further research.
1It can be argued that convexity is not an unreasonable assumption. For instance, when renewables
and fossil fuels are substitutes, convexity would hold if demand for renewables starts increasing at a
much faster pace when the price goes up.
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3.2 Model
This paper studies how volatility of the fossil fuel price affects green innovation and op-
timal climate change mitigation policy using a discrete-time infinite-horizon integrated
assessment model. I model a representative energy firm, which uses two sources for
generating electricity: natural gas G and renewables R. The choice to focus on natural
gas is motivated by the increased prominence of gas in the US energy market, while
oil has largely become too expensive to be used in energy production. I set up the
model in discrete time in order to simplify the modeling of the stochastic component of
the oil price (using normal i.i.d. shocks for uncertainty rather than utilizing stochastic
calculus). Before calculating the full infinite-horizon equilibrium solution, I examine a
three-period version of the model, similar to that of Albrizio and Costa (2012). This
is done in order to gain some intuition about the dynamics of optimal investment into
renewable energy. However even with this simplification, the model is more complex
than that of Albrizio and Costa (2012), as it examines normally distributed fossil fuel
price shocks rather than a binomial distribution of policy outcomes.
Following the pioneering paper by Gibson and Schwartz (1990), the evolution of
natural gas prices is represented by a geometric random walk:
pt = e
θt−σ2/2pt−1, θt ∼ N(0, σ).
The geometric random walk is a standard way to represent assets traded on the financial
markets in option theory literature. It is assumed that the shocks to the fossil fuel price
are permanent. An alternative specification, discussed by Geman (2007), would be to
make the shocks more transitory by introducing a degree of mean reversion. This
alternative specification is explored as part of the numerical analysis, and it is shown
that adding mean reversion does not alter the main conclusion. Because the fossil fuel
price is bounded from below, higher volatility of the price implies a higher mean trend.
In order to isolate the effect of the volatility, I adjust the trend of the natural gas price
by the −σ2/2 term. I assume natural gas is not scarce (due to recent discoveries of
abundant shale gas reserves, that is not an unreasonable assumption).
The unit cost of renewables is represented by B, a function of the renewable knowl-
edge stock Yt (B
′ < 0). Each period the firm increases the knowledge stock through
R&D represented by It, leading to the following dynamics:
Yt+1 = Yt + It, Yt > 0, It ≥ 0.
When performing research and development, the firms incur adaptation costs, hence
to increase the knowledge stock by It they need to invest C(It). Burning fossil fuels
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leads to increasing CO2 concentration St (initial level S0) which decays at rate 1− γ:
St+1 = γSt + eGt.
In this study, I do not explicitly model damages due to climate change. My focus
is the market response to fossil fuel price uncertainty, and I don’t do any cost-benefit
analysis or calculate optimal environmental policy. However, I still simulate and plot
the resulting carbon emissions in order to assess the negative environmental impact of
fossil fuel price volatility. For instance, plotting the CO2 concentration can be used
to demonstrate how fossil fuel price volatility affects our ability to meet certain CO2
targets.
In the model, electricity production is a function of natural gas and renewables
F (Rt, Gt) (F ≥ 0, FR > 0, FG > 0). Gas and renewables are not perfect substi-
tutes, resulting in simultaneous use throughout. This is a partial equilibrium model:
households derive utility directly from electricity consumption according to the utility
function U(F ).
The optimization problem of the firm for the three period version of the model is
as follows. There are only three periods: 0, 1, and 2. I assume no R&D spillovers
so that the benefit of investment in innovation is fully internalized. The firms choose
investment I, to maximize the expected sum of their discounted profits, with their
objective function equal to:
max
I0,I1
2∑
t=0
ρt(E[Π(Yt, pt)− C(It)]),
where Π is each period’s profit and is equal to
Π(Yt, pt) = U(F (R(B(Yt), pt), G(B(Yt), pt)))− ptG(B(Yt), pt)−B(Yt)R(B(Yt), pt).
As period 2 is the last one, there is no reason to further invest in renewable R&D, thus
I2 = 0.
The first-order conditions for the optimal investment are:
U ′(F )FG(Rt, Gt) = pt, for t = 0, 1, 2(3.1)
U ′(F )FR(Rt, Gt) = B(Yt), for t = 0, 1, 2(3.2)
C ′(I0) = −ρE(B′(Y1)R(B(Y1), p1) + ρE(B′(Y2)R(B(Y2), p2)|p1))(3.3)
C ′(I1) = −ρE(B′(Y2)R(B(Y2), p2)).(3.4)
Conditions (3.1) and (3.2) require the marginal productivity of each fuel to be equal
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to its marginal cost. Given fossil fuel cost p and level of knowledge stock Y , equations
(3.1) and (3.2) can be used to calculate the corresponding level of renewable demand
R(B(Y ), p) and fossil fuel demand G(B(Y ), p). The two remaining conditions give us
the optimal levels of renewable investment I0 and I1. Combining (3.3) and (3.4) leads
to the following conditions for the evolution of renewable investment:
(3.5) C ′(I0) = ρ(E[C ′(I1)]− E[B′(Y1)R1(B(Y1), p1)]).
The interpretation of (3.5) is as follows. On the left side, there is the marginal cost of
investing in renewables today, while on the right side there is the sum of the expected
discounted marginal cost of investing tomorrow and the marginal expected next period
reduction in the price of renewables. Thus the marginal benefit of investing today
(cheaper renewables tomorrow) must equal the marginal benefit of delaying the invest-
ment. This is a classic real-option result where the benefit of the investment is not
compared to its cost but rather to the cost of not delaying the investment. According
to Dixit and Pindyck (1994), this implies that increased uncertainty about returns
leads to delaying investment. The logic behind the real-option effect comes from the
idea that there is something to gain by postponing the investment until uncertainty
is at least partially resolved. In the financial markets, one would buy an option that
would enable one to purchase the asset at the current price at a later day. In the case of
investment in a project such as renewable R&D, the ability to postpone the investment
can be seen as a “real-option.” The option value then represents the potential benefit
of postponing the investment. The option value increases with uncertainty, and hence
higher uncertainty leads to larger incentives to delay investment. The benefit of invest-
ing today (i.e., the marginal benefit of cheaper renewables) is represented by the third
term in (3.5) E[B′(Y1)R1]. The approach of calculating the risk-premium presented in
Gollier (2013) can be used to analyze how the benefit of investing today changes as
fossil fuel price volatility increases. The approach involves calculating a risk premium
term, defined as the increase in price (or decrease in benefit) the representative firm is
willing to pay to get rid of uncertainty. Let ψ be the risk-premium term defined by:
(3.6) B′(Y0)R(B(Y0), (1− ψ)p0) = E(B′(Y0)R(B(Y0), p1)),
where p1 = e
θ0−σ2/2p0, θ0 ∼ N(0, σ).
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According to Gollier (2013), the risk premium ψ is equal to:2
(3.7) ψ = −0.5p1σ2Rpp(B(Y0), p1)
Rp(B(Y0), p1)
,
where Rp and Rpp are respectively the first and second derivatives of the renewable
energy demand with respect to the oil price. From the result in equation (3.7) it can
be shown that for renewable energy demand functions R(p,B(Y )) that are convex with
respect to the fossil fuel price, the benefit of renewable energy innovation increases with
uncertainty (see Appendix 3.6.1 for the full derivation).
The intuition behind the above result is as follows. First, higher volatility leads
to an increase in the likelihood of higher prices. However, as higher fossil fuel prices
increase demand for renewables, they are also beneficial for the prospects of renewable
R&D. Thus, for the return on renewable R&D, there is a negative risk premium.
Investment in renewable innovation serves as a hedge against volatile fossil fuel prices,
and the higher the uncertainty, the more valuable the hedge is. Of course, this result
requires us to assume that renewable demand is convex in the oil price. This is not an
unreasonable assumption. If renewables and fossil fuels are substitutes, convex demand
implies that as oil price increases, not only does renewable demand increase, but the
rate of increase in renewable demand increases as well. I will show in Section 3.3 that
for this model’s functional forms and calibration, renewable demand is convex.
Thus the analysis indicates that there are two potential channels for fossil fuel
price volatility to affect renewable energy innovation. The return on renewable R&D
increases with fossil price volatility, leading to potentially higher investment. How-
ever, the positive option value of investment under uncertainty, as shown in Dixit and
Pindyck (1994), indicates that there is an incentive to delay and hence reduce the in-
vestment. In the next section, I will use some preliminary numerical calculations to
illustrate the two effects, and get an initial intuition in regard to which of the two is
dominant.
3.3 Numerical Illustrations of the Positive and Neg-
ative Effects of Volatility on Innovation
Before presenting the numerical illustrations of the mechanisms that determine optimal
investment in renewable R&D, it is necessary to specify the assumptions of the model’s
functional forms and the calibration of various parameters. The model’s calibration of
2In general the expression (3.7) is an approximation of the risk premium. However Gollier (2013)
demonstrates that it is the exact value for the risk premium if the uncertain variable is log-normally
distributed, which is the case here.
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demand for energy and renewable energy R&D sis based on Fischer et al. (2013), and
Fischer and Newell (2008). I parametrize my model so that the values of state and
control variables loosely represent their real-world magnitudes. The model is calibrated
to the global market for electricity. However, as my calibration is fairly rudimentary,
I run extensive robustness checks to ensure the qualitative results of the study are not
affected by parameter values. The details for the functional forms and the calibrations
are described in Appendices 3.6.2 and 3.6.3.
I now present some preliminary numerical illustrations of the three-period-model.
These calculations confirm the two conflicting effects of uncertainty that can be gleaned
from the first-order conditions, and provide some initial intuition into which of the two
effects is dominant.
First, I illustrate the analytical result of Section 3.2, which states that fossil price
volatility increases the benefit of investing in renewable innovation when demand for
renewable energy is convex. I do so by calculating the return on investment in R&D.
Assume the firm invests amount C(I) in period zero. Then Π1, the extra profit the
firm earns in period 1, conditional on fossil fuel price p1 and initial level of knowledge
stock Y0, is equal to:
Π1(Y0, I, p1) = ρ(Π(Y0 + I, p1)− Π(Y0, p1))− C(I),
where Π(Y, p) is the energy firm’s profit as defined in Section 3.2. I compute the extra
profit from an investment of $10 Billion for a range of fossil fuel prices and plot it
in Figure 3.1. As can be seen the return on investment in period 1 is increasing and
concave in the fossil fuel price.
In order to perform a cost benefit analysis I must also calculate ROI, the expected
total return on investment I:
ROI(I) =
2∑
t=1
ρt(E[Π(Y0 + I, pt)− Π(Y0, pt)]− C(I)).
I use numerical integration to calculate the expected return for a range of investment
levels and fossil fuel price volatility levels. These results are presented in Figure 3.2.
Because the return on investment is increasing in the fossil fuel price, the expected
return also increases with volatility. This numerical result confirms the intuition from
the first-order conditions. I have also tested the necessary analytical assumption of
renewable demand convexity with respect to the fossil fuel price, confirming that it
holds fully in line with the analytical result of the previous section. Hence, investment
in R&D serves as a hedge against higher prices, as when renewables are cheaper,
more fossil fuels are replaced by renewables. Thus return on investment in renewable
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Figure 3.1: One period ahead return on investing 10 Billion USD in Renewable R&D as a
function of fossil fuel price
Figure 3.2: Expected one period ahead return on Renewable R&D for various fossil fuel
price volatility levels
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innovation increases with volatility.
However, recall the real-option argument presented in the previous section. The
decision the firm faces is not just whether to invest in period 0 or not to invest at all.
Instead the firm decides whether to invest now or delay the investment until the next
period. The firm may wish to delay investment in order to wait until some uncertainty
is resolved. A higher fossil fuel price in period 1 means an increase in the expected
price in period 2 (due to its random-walk nature) and hence more favorable conditions
for investment, and vice versa. Thus, to properly do the firm’s cost benefit analysis one
must calculate the extra benefit of investing in period 0 relative to waiting for a price
increase in period 1. Assume the firm is choosing from the following two strategies:
• Strategy 1: Invest C(I) in period 0 and nothing in period 1
• Strategy 2: Invest nothing in period 0 and invest C(I) in period 1 only if p1 > p0
(i.e, wait until a higher fossil fuel price to make renewables more profitable).
The expected profit of strategy 1, ΠS1, is the sum of the profits in the two periods with
the increased renewable knowledge stock less the cost of investment:
ΠS1(I) = E[(ρΠ(Y0 + I, p1) + ρ
2Π(Y0 + I, p2)− C(I))],
while the expected profit of strategy 2, ΠS2, is equal to:
ΠS2(I) = ρE [Π(Y0, p1)]
+Pr(p1 > p0)ρ(E [ρ(Π(Y0 + I, p2)− Π(Y0, p2))− C(I)|p1 > p0])
+Pr(p1 ≤ p0)ρE [ρΠ(Y0, p2)|p1 ≤ p0] .(3.8)
By subtracting the expected profit of strategy 2 from the expected profit of strategy
1, I obtain the marginal benefit of investing in period 0:
E(ΠS1(I)− ΠS2(I)) = E[ρ(Π(Y0 + I, p1)− Π(Y, p1))− C(I)]
+ρ2(E[Π(Y0 + I, p2)− Π(Y, p2)|p1 ≤ p0] + ρE[C(I)|p1 > p0].(3.9)
The plots in Figure 3.3 present the value of investing now for various levels of
investment and volatility (i.e., various values of σ). Unlike the expected return on
investment, the value of investing in period 0 decreases with volatility. This is due to
the fact that the profit from strategy 2 (i.e., the benefit of delaying the investment) also
increases with volatility, reducing the relative profit of strategy 1 (investing in period
0).
Simulations presented in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 thus represent the two potential effects
of fossil fuel price volatility. The first, derived analytically in Section 3.2, shows that
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Figure 3.3: Expected two period ahead return on Renewable R&D relative to waiting one
period to invest
investment in renewable energy can serve as a hedge against higher fossil fuel prices
(return on investment increases with volatility). The intuition behind this effect is that
cheaper renewables allow the energy firm to switch away from fossil fuels when they
are expensive. The more volatile the fossil fuel prices, the higher the potential loss,
and hence the more attractive the possibility to switch away from them. Therefore the
return on investment on renewable R&D increases with volatility.
The second set of simulations, however shows that volatility also increases the
attractiveness of delaying investment and that the latter effect is larger. This effect is
explained by the relative persistence of the fossil fuel price shocks. Higher prices today
imply higher prices tomorrow, even if some mean reversion is present. When the natural
gas price goes up, the energy firm knows it will likely stay high in the second period,
hence more renewables will be used, and cheaper renewables will lead to a guaranteed
profit. On the other hand, if the prices go down, they are also likely to remain there.
As very little renewable energy is used when fossil fuels are cheap, investing in making
renewables cheaper right before a price drop ends up being a very bad investment with
very little return. Hence, there is a significant incentive to wait until the prices go up
before investing (a classic result of the real-option framework). With higher volatility,
the potential shocks are larger, and so is the benefit of waiting for one such large
positive shock. Thus, the incentive to wait also increases with uncertainty, reducing
the overall investment. From the results of the simulation, one can hypothesize that
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the option value effect will dominate the hedging benefit. That means that investment
in R&D would likely decrease with uncertainty. In the next section, I will present the
numerical solutions of the infinite-horizon model which confirm this initial hypothesis.
3.4 Full Equilibrium Results
Having gained some intuition from examining a three-period-model, I now solve the
infinite-horizon version of the model. The optimal market investment in renewable
R&D is found by maximizing the total welfare:
(3.10) max
R,G,I
∞∑
t=0
ρtE(U(F (Rt, Gt))−B(Yt)Rt − ptGt − C(It)).
The Lagrangian corresponding to the optimization problem is:
(3.11) L =
∞∑
t=0
ρtE(U(F (Rt, Gt)−B(Yt)Rt− ptGt−C(It) +µt(E(Yt+1|pt)− It− Yt)],
where µt is the shadow price of the knowledge stock. Then the corresponding first-order
conditions are:
dL
dGt
= 0 ⇒ U ′(F )FG(Rt, Gt) = pt(3.12)
dL
dRt
= 0 ⇒ U ′(F )FR(Rt, Gt) = B(Yt)(3.13)
dL
dIt
= 0 ⇒ µt = −C ′(It)(3.14)
dL
dYt
= 0 ⇒ µt = ρ(E[µt+1 +B′(Yt+1)Rt+1]).(3.15)
Conditions (3.12) – (3.15) represent an interior solution. Of course that is not necessar-
ily the case – it is possible that at period 0, the optimal amount of R&D is 0, because
the price is too low or the investment cost is too high. However when I parametrize my
model, I ensure that is not the case (more on this later). Note that these conditions
are very similar to those from the three-period model (equations (3.1) – (3.4)). The
first two conditions, (3.12) and (3.13), determine the demand for the different energy
inputs, requiring the marginal productivity of each fuel to be equal to its marginal
cost. Given price p and level of knowledge stock Y , equations (3.12) and (3.13) can
be used to calculate the corresponding level of renewable and fossil fuel demand. The
two remaining conditions specify the evolution of renewable investment I and hence
knowledge stock Y . Combining (3.14) and (3.15) I obtain the Euler-Lagrange equation
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for the renewable R&D investment:
(3.16) C ′(It) = ρ(E[C ′(It+1)−B′(Yt+1)Rt+1]).
Firstly, the condition in (3.16) can be used to identify whether there is a corner solu-
tion. As long as C ′(0) < ρ(E[C ′(0)−B′(Y0)R1]) some investment in renewable energy
will take place, and the first-order conditions for the internal solution have to hold. Sec-
ondly, the condition in (3.16) is similar to condition (3.5) derived for the three-period
model. The marginal cost of investment in renewables today rather than delaying until
tomorrow is compared to the marginal benefit of investment today. Thus, both the pos-
itive effect of uncertainty on investment, derived in Section 3.2, and the negative effect
due to the attractiveness of delaying the investment will hold for the infinite-horizon
optimization problem. To determine which of these effects dominates, I use numerical
methods to compute the optimal policy rules that satisfy the first-order conditions
above.
3.4.1 Numerical Calculations
The optimal renewables demand and R&D are obtained by solving the first-order condi-
tions (3.12) – (3.15). I numerically approximate the optimal renewable R&D path that
satisfies the above conditions. I employ grid-based projection methods,3 using Cheby-
shev polynomials to approximate the profit-maximizing level of R&D as a function of
the price of fossil fuels p and renewable knowledge stock Y . Numerical integration is
used to approximate the expectations operator. A more detailed description of the
algorithm I use is presented in Appendix 3.6.4. I use the functional forms and cali-
bration that are described in Appendices 3.6.2 and 3.6.3, though I also perform some
robustness checks to determine whether the results are driven by specific parameter
values.
To determine the effect of fossil fuel price uncertainty, I numerically solve the model
for a range of volatility parameter values σ. I then perform Monte Carlo simulations of
the obtained policy rules to compare the levels of renewable demand, R&D, and carbon
emissions for different levels of price uncertainty σ. The outcomes of the simulations are
presented in Figures 3.4 – 3.9. The main result is that investment in renewable R&D
is lower for higher levels of volatility (as can be seen in Figure 3.4). The lower level of
R&D is especially pronounced in the initial periods, while during later years, the levels
of renewable R&D converge for all volatility levels. These dynamics are consistent with
the intuition that was gained from the simpler three-period model. The decrease in the
R&D is due to the real-option effect – firms delaying the investment until fossil fuels
3An in-depth description of these methods can be found in Judd (1998)
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are expensive.
Figure 3.4: Optimal renewable R&D expenditure paths for various level of natural gas price
volatility, simulated for 50 years (average of 1000 Monte Carlo runs).
At first glance, the effect of volatility seems to be almost negligible, especially for
the later periods. However, recall that these plots represent Monte Carlo averages of
renewable R&D. Averaging R&D is necessary, as individual simulations of R&D are
driven by the shocks in each simulation and are even more difficult to interpret. In
later periods, the simulation runs with very high fossil fuel prices (possible only for high
volatility levels) lead to much higher levels of renewable R&D due to the non-linear
nature of the problem. These very high levels of R&D then dominate the sample, thus
increasing the average investment levels for higher volatility as well. To investigate
the matter further, Figure 3.5 presents plots of optimal renewable R&D as a function
of the natural gas price (rather than the Monte Carlo averages as a function of time)
holding the innovation stock constant at 1, for various levels of uncertainty. Here the
effect of uncertainty is clearer and more pronounced. As can be observed the optimal
R&D is significantly lower for higher levels of volatility – an increase of volatility from
10% to 15% should lead to a decrease of R&D by around 7.5%.
Total average R&D spending is another measure of the effect of volatility, and as
can be seen in Figure 3.6, it also decreases for more volatile natural gas prices. The
decrease in R&D leads to a significantly higher average renewable cost (Figure 3.7). I
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Figure 3.5: Optimal initial renewable R&D expenditure levels as a function of natural gas
price for various level of natural gas price volatility.
also examine the environmental impact of volatile gas prices. Figure 3.8 demonstrates
that emissions are decreasing for lower levels of price uncertainty (1−5%) and increasing
for higher ones (10 − 15%). This leads to significantly higher CO2 concentration levels,
as can be seen in Figure 3.9. Although the resulting concentration is still fairly low
due to the larger use of renewables caused by the innovation, the “carbon footprint”
of fossil fuel price volatility is clearly visible. These plots allow me to make some
speculations about potential implications for environmental policy. If a government is
already subsidizing renewable R&D (as many countries across the world do), higher
levels of fossil fuel price volatility may require an increase in R&D subsidies in order
to cut down emissions. This increase in subsidies is needed to counteract the market’s
incentives to delay the clean energy investment, and push renewable energy cost even
lower so that renewables can remain competitive even when fossil fuel prices drop
significantly, as is more likely in times of higher volatility.
A potential pitfall of relying on numerical analysis is that the results can be driven
by a specific calibration. To ensure that is not the case, I have performed extensive
robustness checks, solving the model for a variety of values for every parameter. I
also checked how robust the results were to varying fossil fuel price specifications by
introducing mean-reversion in the fossil fuel price and making the shocks more tran-
sient. The main result, that volatility leads the firm to delay investment in renewable
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Figure 3.6: Total amount of R&D after fifty years for various levels of natural gas price
volatility (average of 1000 Monte Carlo runs).
Figure 3.7: Optimal renewable cost paths for various levels of natural gas price volatility,
simulated for 50 years (average of 1000 Monte Carlo runs).
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Figure 3.8: Emissons paths for various levels of natural gas price volatility simulated for 50
years (average of 1000 Monte Carlo runs).
Figure 3.9: CO2 concentration paths for various levels of natural gas price volatility simu-
lated for 50 years (average of 1000 Monte Carlo runs).
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R&D despite its potential use as a hedge against higher fossil fuel prices, remains the
same for all parameterizations. However, the parametrization of the energy production
function F (R,G) does influence the magnitude of the negative effect of uncertainty.
A particularly important parameter is the elasticity of substitution between renew-
ables and fossil fuels. In Appendix 3.6.5, I present the simulations for the calibration
where fossil fuels and renewables are more substitutable. Overall, price uncertainty
still leads firms to delay investing in renewables, and thus R&D decreases with volatil-
ity for all fossil fuel price levels (Figure 3.10). However, contrary to the results for
the original calibration, total average R&D spending increases with volatility (Figure
3.12). This result is driven by the fact that for this alternative calibration renewables
can be substituted for fossil fuels more easily. Then, for much higher natural gas prices,
it is profitable to substitute away from gas almost entirely, as long as renewables are
cheap enough. Thus investment in renewables increases much more for higher levels
of fossil fuel prices. The simulations with higher levels of price uncertainty then have
more runs with significantly higher gas prices in the later years, which in turn raises
the average total level of investment in renewables.
It is reasonable that the elasticity of substitution between energy inputs plays a role
in the attractiveness of renewable R&D. However, the level of elasticity of substitution
that leads to average total investment in renewables to increase with volatility is fairly
large, well outside the range provided by Papageorgiou et al. (2013). Furthermore,
even when it is very easy to substitute between renewables and fossil fuels, the utility
firms will still delay investment until fossil fuel prices are higher. Ergo, my results are
fairly robust to varying the calibration.
3.5 Conclusion
Over the past few decades, fossil fuel prices have become increasingly more volatile.
The goal of this study is to determine what effect this volatility has on research and
development of renewable energy technologies which compete with fossil fuels. Previ-
ous studies on the subject differ on whether uncertainty creates positive or negative
incentives for investment in renewables.
To determine the effect of the uncertainty, I solve a calibrated integrated assessment
model. I show evidence of two effects of price volatility. The first effect represents a
positive incentive for investing in clean energy: cheaper renewables can serve as a hedge
against higher prices; hence the return on investment increases with uncertainty. The
second effect represents an incentive to delay investment to the future: a classic real-
option result is that a higher level of uncertainty leads to a delay in investment until
some of the uncertainty is resolved. After solving the model numerically, I demonstrate
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that for a wide range of parameters the second effect will dominate, and hence fossil
fuel price volatility has significant negative consequences for renewable energy R&D.
This suggests that in order to meet carbon emission targets, governments may want
to increase their clean energy investment subsidies during periods of volatile fossil fuel
prices. I also demonstrate that higher levels of substitutability between renewable en-
ergy and fossil fuels can mitigate, but not reverse, the negative effect of price volatility.
In this study, I only speculate on the policy implications of my results. Hence,
a natural extension to the model would be to formally introduce a policy component
(i.e., a renewable energy subsidy, an investment subsidy, or a carbon tax) and calculate
exactly how much intervention is needed during periods of volatile fossil fuel prices in
order to prevent global climate change. Another limitation of the study is that it only
examines investment in renewable R&D and ignores investment into renewable energy
capacity. A comparison between the effects of price volatility on R&D and on capacity
investment would provide a more complete picture. It is likely that with investment
in capacity, the negative effect of uncertainty would be even more pronounced, as
investment in capacity is even more sticky: once a solar panel plant is built, the firm
has to use it.
Extending the model to general equilibrium by introducing capital accumulation is
another natural direction of research. This extension is also likely to result in a de-
crease in the attractiveness of renewable R&D. Capital accumulation would provide an
additional channel to hedge against uncertainty, which is the main benefit of renewable
innovation in my model. Another possible equilibrium extension is adding endogenous
directed technical change, similar to the work of Acemoglu et al. (2012). This would
entail introducing a variety of directions of innovation competing for limited resources
(i.e., scientists). Previous papers examining directed technical change study innovation
in clean and dirty good production. The focus of this study is slightly different, in that
innovation is a cost reduction of the clean energy input. One potential way to change
the model to a directed technical change framework would be to introduce a second
innovation channel that increases overall productivity. A negative shock to fossil fuel
prices would actually be beneficial to innovation in overall productivity, as lower costs
increase the profits of production. Thus, in the directed technical change framework,
innovation in renewables would decrease even further in times of cheap fossil fuels, as
the investment in R&D shift toward innovation in productivity.
Lastly, it would be useful to obtain empirical evidence of the effects of volatility,
especially in conjunction with introducing policy to the model, as it would allow for
more precise renewable energy policy recommendations. An example of such an analysis
is done by Kellogg (2014), who empirically calculates the effect of fossil fuel price
volatility on drilling investment, finding evidence of an investment reduction in line
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with real option theory. A similar analysis applied to renewable energy innovation
would be a natural extension to the theoretical work performed in this paper. I leave
these extensions of my work for future research.
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Derivation of the Positive Effect of Volatility
In this section, I demonstrate that convexity of renewables demand with respect to the
fossil fuel price is a sufficient condition for return on renewable R&D to be increasing
with uncertainty. First, assume the more likely case that renewables and fossil fuel
prices are substitutes, therefore demand for renewables increases with the fossil fuel
price. Given that R(p) is convex, and that demand increases with fossil fuel price,
Rp > 0, Rpp > 0. Therefore, the risk-premium term ψ calculated using equation (3.7),
is negative. That means the investor is willing to take a higher fossil fuel price to
compensate for the lack of uncertainty. As renewables demand and hence the benefit
of renewable innovation is increasing in the fossil fuel price, I can conclude that higher
fossil fuel price volatility leads to higher benefit of renewable energy innovation when
fossil fuels and renewables are substitutes.
Now assume the less likely scenario that renewables and fossil fuels are comple-
ments, therefore demand for renewables decreases with the fossil fuel price. Then
Rp < 0, Rpp > 0. Then the risk premium term from (3.7) is positive, so that the
investor is willing to take a lower fossil fuel price to compensate for the lack of un-
certainty. Since renewables and fossil fuels are complements and renewable demand
decreases with the fossil fuel price, a lower fossil fuel price leads to higher demand and
higher benefit of innovation. Thus, for all renewable demand functions that are convex
in the fossil fuel price, volatility in prices leads to a higher return on innovation.
3.6.2 Functional Forms
The supply of electricity is modeled using a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
production function:
(3.17) F (R,G) = (αGβ + (1− α)Rβ) 1β ,
where 1
1−β is the elasticity of substitution and α is the share parameter. The assumption
of constant elasticity of substitution is obviously restrictive. However, in my model I
will limit my attention to moderate cost innovation in renewables, hence demand for
fossil fuels and renewables will not shift dramatically. Thus, I argue that with only
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moderate changes to input prices, elasticity remains the same, and hence constant
elasticity of substitution between renewables and fossil fuels is a reasonable assumption.
I assume a utility function of electricity consumption that leads to constant elasticity
of demand:
(3.18) U(F ) = AF
−1
 ,
where −1/ is the elasticity of marginal utility. The cost of R&D investment is also
modeled with a constant elasticity function:
(3.19) C(I) = γ0I
γ1 .
I ensure increasing marginal cost by setting γ1 > 1. This is needed to avoid a corner
solution where the utility firm immediately achieves the steady state renewable cost
via a large one-time investment.
The cost of renewables is bounded from below, and as the renewable R&D stock
increases, it approaches the lower bound according to the following expression:
(3.20) B(Y ) = χ0 + χ1
(
Y
Y0
)−χ2
.
3.6.3 Calibration
I express all of the energy prices in $100 US Dollar per Megawatt Hour (MwH). I
assume the renewable energy sector represents a composite of solar and wind energy.
Hence, to get the initial renewable energy price, I take an average of levelized energy
costs for various renewable sources weighted by their share in the energy market (data
obtained from IEA, 2010). Hence I set the initial renewable price to $90 per MwH and
natural gas price to $66 per MwH (B0 = .9, p0 = .66).
Table 3.1: Parameter values used in the numerical solutions and simulations.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
α 0.78 χ0 0.3
β 0.499 χ1 0.6
 0.343 χ2 0.25
A 10 γ0 0.1
p0 0.66 µ1 0.996
ρ 0.98 µ2 0.0232
Total revenue values are expressed in $100 Billion. To parametrize the energy
production function, I draw upon the empirical work of Papageorgiou et al. (2013),
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setting α = 0.78, β = 0.499. I set the demand adjustment factor of the electricity
market to A = 10, so that the total revenue for the electricity market is equal to $1900
Billion. Then, calibrating my production function so that the market for renewables
and fossil fuels clears under current prices, I set the elasticity of marginal utility  =
0.344.
Following renewable energy cost projections from IEA (2010), I assume that asymp-
totically the cost of renewable energy will be 1/3 of what it is today, setting χ0 = 0.3
and χ1 = 0.6 (thus setting the current renewable cost is equal to 0.9, three times the as-
symptotical cost of renewables). Following the parametrization of R&D cost in Fischer
et al. (2013), I set γ1 = 1.2. I set the discount factor to 0.98. Then I solve the model
and calibrate the remaining renewable R&D parameters γ0 and χ2 so that the resulting
renewable price path matches the road map in IEA (2010), and the initial renewable
energy R&D investment (under minimum price volatility) is around $10 Billion (IEA,
2010).
I express CO2 emissions and concentration in Gigaton Carbon (GtC). To parametrize
the CO2 concentration component, I set the current level of CO2 concentration to 828
GtC (NOAA, 2010). I assume current annual emissions are equal to 9.5 GtC (British
Petroleum, 2011) corresponding to the emissions factor of µ2 = 0.0232. However, com-
paring that to the actual CO2 concentration increase, I can calculate that about 0.38%
is lost, thus setting the rate of CO2 decay to µ1 = 0.996,
3.6.4 Numerical Solution Method – Projection Analysis
The main idea behind projection analysis is to identify a function P (Yt, pt), which ap-
proximates the optimal investment Iˆt. I begin by identifying a grid [YMIN , YMAX ] ×
[pMIN , pMAX ] on which I want to approximate the optimal solution. I then pick a
functional form for the approximation P (Yt, pt). In this case I use an n-th order poly-
nomial (but more complex functions may be used as well). Then for every grid point
Yl, pm ∈ [YMIN , YMAX ]× [pMIN , pMAX ], the approximate optimal consumption level is
specified by:
(3.21) lnP (Yl, pm) =
n∑
i=0
n−i∑
j=0
gij(lnYl)
i ln(pm)
j.
All that remains is to identify the coefficients gij that give the best approximation
of optimal investment. Let g = {gij}i,j=1,...,n be a set of coefficients identifying an
approximation of optimal investment P g. Then, for each such coefficient set g, I can
compute Error(g) (a measure of how good my approximation is), by computing the
total difference between the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the Euler equation
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(defined in (3.16)) for all grid points.
The only complication in computing Error(g) is the expectations operator. How-
ever, because the stochastic component of the climate process is normally distributed,
I can use Gaussian-Quadrature to numerically approximate expectation. Then I apply
a Newton-Rhapson algorithm to find the coefficients g that minimize Error(g) and
hence give the best approximation.
3.6.5 Results for an Alternative Calibration
Figure 3.10: Optimal initial renewable R&D expenditure levels for various levels of natu-
ral gas price volatility for a higher degree of substitutability between energy
sources.
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Figure 3.11: Optimal renewable cost paths for various levels of natural gas price volatility,
simulated for 50 years (average of 1000 Monte Carlo runs) using a higher
degree of substitutability between energy sources.
Figure 3.12: Total amount of R&D after fifty years for various levels of natural gas price
volatility (average of 1000 Monte Carlo runs) using a higher degree of substi-
tutability between energy sources.
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Subsidizing Renewables in the
Presence of a Dirty Backstop1
4.1 Introduction
Climate change is regarded as one of the most challenging issues our world has to
face. In order to avoid some of the negative consequences of climate change (IPCC,
2007; Stern, 2007) substantial climate policy is needed to curb emissions of CO2 from
not just scarce fossil fuels like oil and gas, but also from more pollution intensive and
abundant coal (Edenhofer et al., 2009).For simplicity, from here on out, we shall refer
to oil and gas as “oil”. Currently, oil is still a competitive alternative to coal. However,
looking at the world’s rising energy diet (World Bank, 2012), it is inevitable that rising
extraction costs will make oil uncompetitive relative to coal. Unless suitable environ-
mental policies are put in place to curb the use of fossil fuels and replace them with
renewables, this will be disastrous for the earth’s climate (Sinn, 2008). A substantial
carbon tax or permit system is needed to save the climate (van der Ploeg and Witha-
gen, 2014), but may be politically infeasible. It is therefore important to examine the
impact of various other climate policies. This study contributes to that goal by finding
the optimal second-best subsidy in the presence of a dirty backstop and comparing it
to the market outcome and the optimal first-best carbon tax. We also examine in de-
tail the effects of different climate damage and renewable energy cost specifications, as
well as announcement effects. Our conclusion is that even the optimal subsidy hardly
increases welfare and that for a substantial welfare improvement governments need to
turn to carbon taxes or tradeable permits.
We study a theoretical framework where utility is derived from energy, and we
assume that the three energy inputs (oil, coal and renewables) are perfect substitutes2.
1Co-authored with Jacob Janssen, VU University Amsterdam
2This assumption is made for technical convenience. For a related study where this is not the case,
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We assume oil is exhaustible with stock-dependent extraction costs, while coal and
renewables are abundant. The initial extraction cost of oil is assumed to be lower
than that of coal, but this changes over time as the stock of oil becomes smaller.
Social welfare is found by subtracting climate damages from utility, discounting and
integrating over time. Climate damages are cumulative in the emission intensity of both
coal and oil, where any natural degradation is abstracted from for technical ease. In the
long run, coal emits more CO2 than oil, but is relatively cheap; renewables are expensive
and carbon-free. In practice, there are many more severe negative externalities from
burning coal than just the exacerbation of global warming, like air pollution and a
public health burden, but we do not consider those here (Epstein et al., 2011). It
should further be noted that we do not include any technological change. This can
have two effects: development of extraction technologies might lead to faster depletion
and more emissions, whilst on the other hand, improvements in renewable energy
efficiency might lead to lower prices of renewables and thus speed up the introduction
of renewables (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Fischer and Newell, 2008).
Our work follows a long line of literature on optimal resource extraction rates with
a climate change externality. Optimal resource extraction policy has been studied for a
long time (Hotelling, 1931; Dasgupta and Heal, 1974). More recently, many studies have
considered optimal resource extraction and carbon taxation in the presence of climate
change and a renewable backstop (Hoel, 2011; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2014). The
models in these studies allow for capital accumulation, but do not include the presence
of a cheap dirty backstop. Others do include a dirty backstop, like Smulders and
van der Werf (2007), who show how restricting CO2 emissions affects resource prices
and extraction over time in a partial equilibrium model with imperfect substitution
of energy inputs. Chakravorty et al. (2008; 1997) also consider both a dirty and a
clean backstop. They extend the Hotelling theory to resources differentiated by their
pollution characteristics to examine the sequence of optimal extraction in the presence
of a carbon emission ceiling, where they find that cleaner fuels are used up earlier. A
study that comes close to ours is the one by van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012b).
They also study optimal climate policy in a setting with a cheap and a dirty backstop.
Although they analytically derive closed-form solutions for the extraction paths where
we only find ours numerically, they do not consider the optimal second-best policy. We
calibrate our parameters to real-world values, and find different regimes than van der
Ploeg and Withagen (2012b) found for their calibration of the model. Michielsen (2014)
also covers similar territory by studying the effect of a subsidy on inter-temporal carbon
leakage when a dirty backstop is present. However, that study has a much simpler
model with just two periods (which can also be interpreted as two countries) while
see Smulders and van der Werf (2007)
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we focus on a more calibrated infinite horizon model, where we calculate precisely the
timing and the level of the optimal subsidy.
Our main contribution is finding the optimal level and timing of a subsidy on
renewables when a carbon tax is politically or otherwise infeasible. We show that, given
our calibration of the model, it is optimal to subsidize renewables to just below the
price of coal, well after the market has phased out oil, but much earlier than renewables
would be introduced in the first-best outcome. We also demonstrate, that given a high
cost of renewables, this optimal subsidy is only marginally welfare improving, in sharp
contrast to the significant welfare benefit of a carbon tax. Furthermore, we examine
the case when the social planner has to announce the date of implementation of the
subsidy at the very beginning, in advance of its implementation. Previous studies have
raised concerns that such an announcement effect may lead to a Green Paradox (Sinn,
2008; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2012a; Grafton et al., 2010): a subsidy on carbon-
free renewables exacerbating global warming damages by incentivizing faster depletion
of fossil fuels. We show that, contrary to the aforementioned studies, there is no Green
Paradox when renewables are subsidized after the market phases in coal. Hence, we
find that as long as the pre-announced subsidy comes after the market phases in coal,
the early announcement has no effect on the fossil fuel extraction.
Lastly we examine the sensitivity of our results to our calibration. We study how the
optimal timing and level of subsidy changes with varying sensitivity of environmental
damages to carbon emissions (a key parameter about which there is much controversy).
We find that our results are fairly robust to these variations. The damage parameter
has to be unrealistically high for it to be optimal to introduce a subsidy on renewables
as soon as the market phases in coal. Only for extraordinary damages (twice the
number that is suggested by Nordhaus (2008)), it is optimal to subsidize renewables
below the price of coal, to induce an earlier phasing out of oil.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we describe the model.
In Section 4.3 we derive the characteristics of the social optimum and show the calibra-
tion and the optimal extraction paths of our model, whereas in Section 4.4 we study
the optimal level and introduction time of the subsidy. Section 4.5 concludes. Proofs
and numerical methods are found in the Appendix.
4.2 Model
We adopt the framework presented in van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012b). We study
both optimal resource extraction and second-best policy in a setting where coal and
renewables are phased in instead of oil or alongside oil. Fuel types are treated as perfect
substitutes and the supply of both coal and renewables is infinitely elastic. Emissions
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from burning oil and coal increase the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere. As natural
decay is extremely slow (Archer et al., 2009) and makes the problem much harder, it
is abstracted from. The CO2 stock evolves according to:
(4.1) E˙ = q(t) + ψx(t), E(0) = E0, ψ > 1,
where E, q and x denote atmospheric CO2 concentration, oil use and coal use,
respectively, and ψ is the carbon emission intensity factor of coal relative to that of oil.
The emission factor of oil is normalized to one, and the emission factor of the dirtier
coal is thus bigger than one. Utility is gained solely through the usage of energy, and
the utility function U is assumed to be concave and increasing in energy use. Further,
global warming damages, represented by the function D(E), are the only externality
considered and they are dependent on accumulated emissions of CO2 only. The cost of
energy usage is subtracted from utility. We assume that both c, the production cost of
the renewable backstop z, and b the extraction cost of the abundant coal are constant.
On the other hand the oil extraction cost G(S) is decreasing in the stock of oil (i.e.,
the less oil is left in situ the higher the extraction cost. This way, the social planner
problem reads:
(4.2) max
x(t),q(t),z(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[U(q(t)+x(t)+z(t))−G(S(t))q(t)−bx(t)−cz(t)−D(E(t))]dt,
subject to equation (4.1), x(t) ≥ 0, z(t) ≥ 0, and the oil depletion equation:
(4.3) S˙ = −q(t), S(0) = S0, q(t) ≥ 0, S(t) ≥ 0.
where ρ is the rate of time preference. Note that equation (4.3) implies that∫∞
0
q(t)dt ≤ S0. In the market equilibrium the representative agent maximizes his
surplus (utility minus energy cost), but is not aware of climate change as it is an exter-
nality. Hence, the problem of the market is defined similar to that of the social planner
problem, but with the assumption that D = 0.
The policy maker achieves the optimal (first-best) allocation by levying a tax τ on
carbon. If a carbon tax is not available, the policy maker uses a second-best policy
of subsidizing renewables. The policy maker then levies a subsidy of η(t) replacing c
by c − η(t) in the market welfare expression. The policy maker then optimizes with
respect to η(t), to find the level that maximizes social welfare.
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4.3 Social Optimum
4.3.1 Solving the Social Optimum Problem
In this section we look for an optimal allocation of energy consumption over time, a
solution to the problem described in the previous subsection. We also examine the
solution to the laissez-faire problem, and calculate the optimal level of carbon tax
needed for the market to arrive at the optimal allocation. A special case of our social
optimum with renewables is the optimal case without renewables when c→∞.
Below are the first order conditions for the social planner problem (4.2) (optimal
policy with oil, coal and renewables as options), where λ and µ are the costate variables:
U ′(q + x+ z)−G(S) ≤ λ+ µ, q ≥ 0, c.s., U ′(q + x+ z)− b ≤ φµ, x ≥ 0, c.s.,(4.4)
U ′(q + x+ z)− c ≤ 0, z ≥ 0, c.s., lim
t→∞[λ(t)S(t)− µ(t)E(t)].(4.5)
λ˙ = ρλ+G′(S)q, µ˙ = ρµ−D′(E),(4.6)
The two co-state variables λ and µ represent the shadow price of the oil stock (or the
scarcity rent) and the shadow price of the carbon stock (or the social cost of carbon),
respectively. The interpretation of the first of inequalities in (4.4) is that if the marginal
value of using oil is less than the social value of keeping oil in the ground, including the
welfare gain resulting from a reduction global warming damages, no oil is used. If oil
is used, the first expression in (4.4) holds with equality. The second expression in (4.4)
states that coal is not used if the marginal value of coal is less than its marginal global
warming cost due to increased emissions. If coal is used, its marginal utility must equal
its marginal cost, which is composed of its per unit extraction cost and the associated
marginal increase in climate damages. The rest of the first order conditions give the
dynamics of the shadow value of oil and the social cost of CO2, the market-clearing
condition for renewables, as well as the transversality condition.
Note that not all first order conditions have to hold with equality at every point
in time, but instead the optimal allocation is separated into a sequence of regimes.
Each regime is defined by which resources are being utilized in the economy (oil only,
coal only, both oil and coal or renewables only) and are characterized by which of
the first order conditions is binding. The optimal sequence of the regimes depends on
the assumptions we make about the functional forms, such as the extraction cost of
oil, as well as the calibration of our functions. In this paper we make the following
assumptions:
Assumption 1.
1. c is such that renewables are only introduced after coal is phased in (see van der
Ploeg and Withagen, 2012b),
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2. b + ψD′(E0)/ρ > G(S0) + D′(E0)/ρ (In the first period the marginal cost of
coal is greater than the marginal social cost of oil, thus ensuring that there is no
simultaneous use in the beginning),
3. ∃0 < S1 < S0 such that b+ψD′(E0 +S0−S1)/ρ = G(S1)+D′(E0 +S0−S1)/ρ (In
the social optimum, as the oil stock is depleted, at some point the social cost of oil
and coal are equal. It thus becomes optimal to use oil and coal simultaneously),
4. U ′(0) > b+ ψD′(E0 + S0 + Yˆ )/ρ, where Yˆ is defined by
G(0) = b+(ψ−1)D′(E0+S0+Yˆ )
ρ
(marginal utility of energy is high enough to warrant
production of oil or coal).
The regime sequence these assumptions lead to is outlined in the proposition below.
The main conclusion is that there only exists a coal-only phase when some oil is left in
situ in the long term.
Proposition 1. Under assumption 1, in the social optimum, with sufficiently high cost
of renewables, there is a sequence of three or four regimes: first only oil is used , then
oil and coal are used simultaneously, followed by renewables (with an optional coal-only
regime between the phasing out of oil and the phasing in of renewables). The case where
there are only three regimes occurs when
(4.7) U ′(x(t =∞)) = G(S¯) + µ(t =∞) = G(S¯) + (U ′(x(t =∞))− b)/ψ
has a positive solution for S¯, the final level of the oil stock.
Proof. See van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012b).
The first part of equation (4.7) ensures that oil is left in situ in order to avoid
further damage to the environment, while the intuition behind the second part is that
the environmental cost of phasing in coal is larger than the benefit of consuming it.
The two conditions combined give an incentive to avoid the coal-only stage and switch
to renewables after the oil-coal regime. Note that equation (4.7) has a positive solution
for S¯ when G(S) is proportional to the inverse of S. In that case, the last drop of
oil comes at infinite cost. If the oil extraction function is taken to be linear, there is
no guarantee for such a solution. The regime sequence thus differs with the shape of
G(S).
We define T1 as the time where simultaneous use begins. It follows directly from
the optimality equations that:
(4.8) b+ ψ
D′(E(T1))
ρ
= G(S(T1)) +
D′(E(T1))
ρ
,
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when simultaneous use occurs. The interpretation of this equation is that the sum
of the discounted marginal extraction/production cost and the discounted marginal
damages should be equal for coal and oil, respectively. In the social optimum, oil will
be used at the start as follows directly from our assumptions. Then, when (4.8) holds
for the first time (i.e. marginal social cost of oil becomes equal to that of coal), a switch
will occur from using oil-only to using both oil and coal. The reason simultaneous use
will occur is that as the extraction cost of oil rises, coal becomes more attractive, while
coal’s higher pollution intensity means oil will not be phased out completely either.
Let T2 be the time when the simultaneous use regime ends. As outlined in Proposi-
tion 1 there are two possibilities after T2. In the first case all oil is exhausted (S(T2) = 0)
and the coal-only phase begins. The optimal consumption of coal is then defined by
the second expression in first-order condition (4.4). In the second case some oil is still
left in situ and the economy switches to renewables. Which case occurs depends on
whether S(T2) satisfies condition (4.7). We assume that the condition holds, so that
some oil is left in situ to avoid extra climate damages, after the end of simultaneous use.
While it is not right away clear that this expression must hold, we will demonstrate
that in our calibration it does indeed. Therefore the switch time T2 at the end of the
oil-coal phase is also the time when renewables are introduced. Renewables take over
when the cost of coal plus the shadow price of carbon is equal to the cost of renewables
(or equivalently in the simultaneous use regime: the cost of oil plus the the carbon
tax):
b+ ψτ(T2) = c, where τ(t) = D
′(E(t))/ρ.
After the introduction of carbon-free renewables, the economy continues without
adding damages to the environment. The following proposition characterizes the re-
newables regime:
Proposition 2. Suppose T2 is the switch time from an oil-coal phase to the renewables-
only regime. Then D(E(t)) = ρ(c−b)
ψ
∀t > T2. Furthermore the energy consumption after
the switch to renewables is given by z(t) = (U ′)−1(c).
Proof. This follows directly from the first-order conditions. Addressing the second
statement first, z(t) = (U ′)−1(c) follows from U ′(z)−c = 0. The other statement follows
from the continuity of energy use: U ′(x(T−2 )+q(T
−
2 )) = b+ψD
′(E)/ρ = U ′(z(T+2 )) = c.
where T−2 is the point in time right before the switch to renewables, while T
+
2 is the
point in time immediately after that regime switch.
With this last proposition we have concluded the overview of the regimes in the
social optimum. These will be used to simulate the outcomes given our calibration of
this model.
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4.3.2 Solving the Laissez-Faire Equilibrium
Compared to the optimal allocation the problem of the free market is slightly simpler.
As opposed to four possible regimes in the first-best allocation there are only two
regimes in the free-market scenario.
Proposition 3. In the laissez-faire economy where it is assumed that D = 0, there is
no simultaneous use, moreover the only possible regimes are oil-only and then coal.
Proof. See Appendix 4.6.3 for the demonstration that there is no simultaneous use.
Furthermore, when D(E) = 0 Assumption 1 tells us that at the start there will be
an oil-only economy until oil is more expensive than coal, i.e. until (4.8) holds, now
reduced to G(S(T )) = b. As there is no simultaneous use regime and renewables at cost
c > b are expensive, there will only be a switch to a coal-only regime, which continues
indefinitely.
As in our calibration c > b, renewables will not be phased in in the market economy
unless a subsidy is set at at least c − b (cf. Section 4.4). Because of the continuity of
energy use we have that x(T ) = q(T ), and therefore also U ′(x(T )) = U ′(q(T )). Further,
from the first order conditions it follows that in the coal-only regime U ′(x(T )) = b and
thus the final use of oil depends on the price of coal. These conditions are sufficient to
characterize the laissez-faire regime.
4.3.3 Calibration
We use numerical methods to solve for the socially optimal and free-market allocations.
Hence, before presenting our results we must specify the functional forms and parameter
values used. To calibrate our model, we use the following functional forms:
Assumption 2. G(S) = γ1(
S0
S
)γ2, D(E) = κE2, and U(y) = αy − 1
2
βy2.
We calibrate our functional forms so that the values of variables correspond roughly
to real-world values.
Damages
According to Nordhaus (2008) climate change damages at the current point are equal
to 0.2% of GDP. According to World Bank (2012), current global GDP is $ 70 trillion,
so current damages from climate are $ 140 billion (D(E0) = 0.14). The initial level
of CO2 concentration is 338 ppmv so that E0 = 388 (NOAA, 2010). Calibrating
D(E0) =
κ
2
E20 = 0.14 leads to κ = 0.00000186
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Energy: Cost and Emissions
We follow Rezai et al. (2012) on calibrating the oil extraction cost G(S). Initial costs
are calibrated at $ 5 per barrel of oil. A barrel of oil is equivalent to 1/10 ton of
carbon, and 2.13 GtC is equal to 1 part per million volume (ppmv). We express all
prices in $ trillion per ppmv, thus γ1 = 0.1. According to IEA (2010), the extraction
cost of oil will quadruple after 500 ppmv more will be extracted. We assume S0 = 2000
ppmv so γ2 = 4.81. From the IEA (2011) statistics report on CO2 emission from fuel
combustions (see Table 1), we get that the relative emission factor for coal lies between
1.37 and 1.55. We set the relative emission factor in between those two values, ψ = 1.4.
Furthermore, we find from the IEA website (IEA, 2011) that the real fossil fuel
production prices are 1.62 dollars per 106Btu. This translates to 0.00153 dollars per
MegaJoule, or 0.0055 dollars per kWh. We express prices in $ per ppmv. However
from an energy standpoint, coal is a perfect substitute for oil. Thus when calculating
the price of coal we assume it has the same amount of grams CO2 per kWh as oil
does (670). Assuming 2.13 Gigatonnes of carbon is equivalent to one part per million
by volume in the atmosphere (Rezai et al., 2012), we get b = 0.17 trillion dollars per
ppmv.
The true renewable energy production price is difficult to estimate (as it will likely
decrease over time). We take the initial price of renewables to be around thrice the
extraction cost of coal (c = 0.51), which agrees with the findings of the Renewables
Global Status Report 2012 and the Nuclear Energy Institute (REN21, 2012; NEI, 2011).
Utility
The calibration of the utility function is arbitrary, especially in a partial equilibrium
model where utility is derived directly from fossil-fuel consumption. To calibrate the
utility function we assume that current fossil fuel consumption corresponds to the
market outcome. Therefore for the market solution initial emissions due to fossil fuels
q0 must be equal to 4.03 ppmv. Normalizing α = 1 we get β = 0.21.
4.3.4 Policy Simulations
Given the assumptions on functional forms and the calibration we solve for the socially
optimal and market outcomes using numerical methods. The resulting simulations
are displayed in Figure 4.1. A detailed description of how we arrive at our results is
found in Appendix 4.6.2. The timing of the regimes in our results is as follows. The
oil-only phase ends at T1 = 106.59 in the social optimum compared to T1 = 52.47 in
the market economy. Renewables take over at T2 = 262.37 in the social optimum. We
see that in the social optimum oil use decreases over time in the first phase, where
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coal is not used yet. This decline in oil use is caused by increasing marginal damages
of oil due to the increasing CO2 concentration, and increasing cost of oil extraction.
Once the shadow price of oil is equal to that of coal, simultaneous use begins. In this
regime, the relative cheapness of coal outweighs its bad environmental properties, as
coal is the predominant source of energy. Still the increasing environmental damages
lead to a slow decline in both coal and oil usage during this stage. As environmental
damages increase, the shadow price of coal and oil eventually becomes equal to the
price of renewables, and they are phased in. As the energy demand remains the same,
the amount of renewables used in the last regime is equal to the sum of oil and coal
used in the earlier regime. The emission stock grows at an increasing rate until the
introduction of renewables.
Note that after renewables are introduced, there is still some oil left in situ with
the final oil stock equal to S = 1629.5. This is one of the key differences between our
result and that of van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012b), that relies on more arbitrary
assumptions in the functional forms. In their paper van der Ploeg and Withagen
observe that in the social optimum all oil is exhausted, and there is a brief coal-only
regime before renewables are phased in. The difference between our results is driven
by a steeper rise in oil extraction cost in our calibration. As oil becomes more and
more expensive it is slowly substituted by coal but is never completely exhausted. We
believe that this result is closer to the real world as we have used real-world values to
calibrate the oil extraction function.
In contrast with the social-optimum, in the market outcome the economy relies
solely on oil or coal depending on which is cheaper, and more fossil fuel is burned
than in the social optimum at any given time. This result (in full agreement with
the literature on climate change economics) is explained by the fact that the market
ignores the climate change externality. Thus the higher fossil fuel consumption leads to
higher emissions, especially if the market switches to coal, where in the social optimum
the social planner phases in renewable energy instead. Note further that in the social
optimum more oil is depleted in the long term than in the market outcome. This
increase in depletion occurs because oil is cleaner than coal. Thus even when the oil
extraction cost rises above the coal extraction cost, the social planner keeps using oil
to mitigate climate change, while the market does not. Welfare comparisons can be
made, and in the market economy social welfare is 73.47 compared to 96.70 in the
social optimum. Therefore, we can conclude that the utility from higher fossil fuel
consumption is significantly outweighed by higher environmental damages, resulting in
a 25% welfare loss.
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4.4 Second-Best Policies
The first-best situation may be unattainable because a carbon tax is often politically
or otherwise unfeasible. We therefore turn to finding the optimal second-best policy
where a social planner can give a subsidy to carbon-free renewables. We assume the
social planner’s instrument is announced at any time and implements it as a “suprise”
immediately upon announcement. Later we show that in our case if the social planner
can pre-commit to a subsidy in advance we will arrive at the exact same outcome.
We emphasize that we do not look at the case where there is no commitment for the
social planner at all. For a short discussion of these issues, we refer to section 4.6.4.
Mathematically, the outcome for the second-best economy is comparable to that of the
market outcome, except that the normally constant cost of renewables c is now replaced
by the time-varying cost c − η(t), where η(t) is the level of subsidy given on carbon-
free renewable energy resources chosen such as to maximize social welfare. Because
we treat energy inputs as perfect substitutes, the market will choose the cheapest
form of energy consumption. Therefore, a subsidy will only change the energy usage
when the subsidy amount is above max(c− b, c−G(S)), (i.e, when the subsidy makes
renewables competitive with whichever fossil fuel is cheaper at the moment). As there
is no externality on carbon-free renewable energy usage, there is no reason to use any
level of subsidy higher than this level. This leads to the conclusion that if a subsidy
is implemented as a “surprise” the best level of subsidy is constant, and given by
b − c + ,  → 0, if b < G(S(T ∗)) or G(S(T ∗)) − c + ,  → 0, where T ∗ is the time of
subsidy introduction. The optimal subsidy is then solely determined by the timing of
the subsidy T ∗.
We now proceed to find the welfare maximizing timing of the subsidy. Recall
that we assume that before T ∗, the market behaves as if there is no subsidy, and
after T ∗, the market will phase in renewables. We also assume that the social plan-
ner finances the subsidy by passing the cost to the society via a lump sum tax. Let
qM(t), xM(t), SM(t), EM(t) be the market-welfare maximizing oil, coal, oil stock and
carbon stock, respectively. Furthermore define zˆ(η) as the market demand for renew-
ables as a function of the renewable subsidy, satisfying U ′(zˆ) = c−η. Then to determine
the optimal subsidy the social planner solves:
max
T ∗
∫ T ∗
0
e−ρt[U(qM(t) + xM(t))−G(SM(t))qM(t)− bxM(t)−D(EM(t))]dt(4.9)
+
∫∞
T ∗ e
−ρt[U(zˆ(η(T ∗)))−D(EM(T ∗))− czˆ(η(T ∗))]dt,
where η(T ∗) = max(c − b, c − G(SM(T ∗))). Note that the market sets the renewable
energy consumption level, assuming the subsidized cost, while actually paying the full
cost (this is due to the lump-sum tax the social planner uses to finance the subsidy).
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Using equation (4.9) the effect of introducing the subsidy at T ∗ on welfare can be
broken down into two parts. On the one hand the subsidy is beneficial as it caps the
CO2 concentration at E
M(T ∗), reducing all future increases in environmental damages
after T ∗ . On the other hand, the subsidy itself costs the society, decreasing welfare
by η(T ∗)zˆ(η(T ∗)) for every period after T ∗. The question is which of the two effects
is dominant, and at what time the difference between the positive and the negative
welfare effect of the subsidy is the largest. We cannot derive analytical expressions
for the optimal market choice variable levels and hence cannot provide an analytical
solution for the optimal subsidy. However, using the market solution we can compute
the social welfare from equation (4.9) for every possible subsidy timing T ∗ and find the
optimal subsidy introduction timing.
4.4.1 Policy Simulations
In Figure 4.3 we present a plot of total discounted welfare as a function of the timing of
the subsidy, computed using the expression (4.9). The following is the intuition behind
the effect of the subsidy’ timing on welfare. During the oil-only stage the low price of
oil makes the subsidy expensive while the environmental damages are too small. Thus
optimal policy delays until after the market phases in coal increases welfare. Even
after coal is introduced, environmental damages are still too low to justify the subsidy.
Thus the welfare-maximizing subsidy timing is at T ∗ = 164.02 - significantly after the
market introduction of coal (52.47).
Furthermore, this switch time of renewables is much earlier than the corresponding
switch time in the first-best social optimum (T = 262.37). Recall that here we assume
that the subsidy is a surprise, announced only at the time when it is implemented (we
will examine announcement effects in Section 4.6.4). Hence the policy maker does not
affect the behavior of the market before the subsidy is introduced. The result, as can
be seen in Figure 4.2, is that before the subsidy is introduced the level of oil, and more
importantly coal consumption is equal to the market outcome – significantly higher
than the first-best level. To compensate for that excess environmental damage the
policy maker uses the subsidy to phase in the renewables at a significantly earlier time
than in the first-best allocation. As a subsidy that is announced instantly cannot make
oil extraction more attractive than the usage of coal the way a carbon tax can, there
is a larger amount of oil left in situ (S = 1791).
Due to the high cost of the subsidy and hence its relatively late introduction the
welfare gained from the subsidy is fairly small: 76.56 compared to 73.33 in the laissez-
faire case, and to 96.70 in the social optimum. We thus conclude that given our
calibration, the subsidy is a fairly inefficient policy option. The high price of renewables
is what drives this result. In our calibration, the cost of renewables is triple that of coal,
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making the subsidy very expensive. As a result the subsidy is only welfare improving for
high levels of CO2 concentration. Before that level of a CO2 concentration is reached
a significant amount of damage occurs, significantly reducing welfare.
4.4.2 Announcement Effects
The “Green Paradox” announcement effect will not occur if the subsidy is introduced
after the optimal laissez-faire introduction timing for coal. This is formally summarized
in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. There is a Green Paradox if and only if the switch to renewables
happens before coal is introduced.
Proof. See Appendix 4.6.5.
As we have seen in the previous section, given our calibration it is only optimal
to introduce the subsidy after the market phases in coal. Thus in our model, neither
the positive effect of commitment nor the “Green Paradox” announcement effect is
relevant.
These results are of course conditional on our calibration. With significantly higher
climate damages or lower cost of renewables, it may be optimal to introduce the subsidy
before the market phases in coal. In that case, commitment and announcement effects
start to play a role. However, as we will demonstrate in Section 4.4.3, the parameter
values must change significantly in order for that to happen, making the above result
robust to a large range of calibrations.
4.4.3 Varying Damage Intensity and Cost of Renewables
Amongst politicians, economists and in the scientific community there is much dis-
agreement about the size of damages caused by global warming. We have used the
damage calibration of Nordhaus (2008) but there are other studies (Tol, 2002) that
report much higher values of climate damages. It is therefore important to check how
sensitive our results are to a given calibration of climate damages. We thus set out to
investigate the effect on our results of changing the climate damage intensity. In our
damage specification D(E) = κE2 the parameter κ represents the intensity of climate
damages. We look what the effect is of changing κ in a second-best setting. We plot
how the optimal switch to renewables changes with the value of κ in Figure 4.4. Here
we once again only focus on the “surprise” subsidy. However, as we will demonstrate
the values of κ for which it is optimal to introduce the subsidy before coal is phased in,
and where commitment and announcement effects start to matter, are fairly unrealistic.
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For relatively small values of κ a subsidy is put in place only after coal is introduced:
the marginal cost of emitting coal is initially still outweighed by the utility gain from
using the cheaper coal instead of the expensive renewables. In the limit for κ → 0
the optimal time of introducing the subsidy approaches infinity, which is intuitive as
we expect no subsidy is necessary when there is no environmental externality. For
relatively large values of κ we see that a subsidy is introduced at time zero: the
damages are so large that even for the initial stock of carbon in the atmosphere, it is
suboptimal to use coal. Note that for this to happen the damage specification must
be seven times as large as in Nordhaus (2008). For values of κ in between these
extremes, we see that renewables can already be introduced before the transition to
only using coal. As κ gets larger the switch happens sooner. For smaller values of κ,
renewables are introduced after the oil regime but before a switch is made to a coal-
only economy. For some values of κ the optimal switch time now remains the same.
This regime exists because the marginal damages from burning coal are more severe
than those of burning oil, and it thus requires precautionary measures to avoid the
severe damages from switching to a coal-only economy. As can be seen in Figure 4.4
in order to justify subsidizing renewables before the switch to coal κ must be at least
7 × 10−6 meaning that damages must be three times larger than what (Nordhaus,
2008) estimates them to be. Even with much uncertainty about climate damages such
large values are unlikely, and we can thus tentatively conclude that it would never be
optimal to subsidize renewables before the economy switches to coal. To do some pure
welfare analysis, consider Figure 4.6, where welfare is plotted fpr the market outcome
both with and without the subsidy for various levels of κ. We see that the welfare
gains from a subsidy are larger if the damages of global warming are larger, and the
rate at which the effect increases is also larger as damages grow.
Another parameter we examine, as it is difficult to calibrate it precisely, is the cost
of renewables. We plot in Figure 4.5 the optimal time to introduce a subsidy and hence
switch to renewables for a range of values for renewable cost c. We see that if renewables
are really cheap it is optimal to start subsidizing them right away, and as they become
more expensive this switch time increases. This makes sense as for a higher cost of
renewables a higher subsidy is needed to make them competitive. There is a region
where the optimal switch time does not change with the cost of renewables. For that
range of renewables cost, it is optimal to begin subsidizing at the precise time when the
market switches from oil to coal. This is due to the fact that it is welfare-maximizing
to never enter the coal-only phase. In order to avoid the negative externality of relying
on coal completely, a switch will be introduced even with a high cost of renewables.
The subsidy then has the same effect as a prohibitive tax on coal. As can be seen in
Figure 4.5 only for c below 0.26 is it welfare-maximizing to subsidize renewables at
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the price of oil, which means that renewables must be only 1.5 times the price of coal
to change our conclusions. This is toward the very bottom of the range of renewable
energy costs (according to IEA (2010)). Hence, it is highly likely that renewables are
still too expensive for a subsidy to be an effective environmental policy. Welfare gains
from a subsidy are shown in Figure 4.7 by plotting both the market welfare and the
second-best policy welfare at the optimal switch time for different values of the cost of
renewables c. We see that the welfare gains asymptotically approach zero as the cost
of renewables c goes up, and welfare gains from a subsidy are increasing with cheaper
renewables. The benefit of the subsidy increases more rapidly as the price of renewables
c goes down. We estimated that currently we are at c = 0.51, which, looking at the
graph, implies a lot of welfare gain can be achieved by making renewables cheaper.
Lastly, we examine which values of c and κ violate Assumption 1 which ensures a
certain regime sequence in the social-optimal scenario. The first of these assumptions
ensures that renewables are introduced only after coal in the social optimum. That
requires that the optimal starting point for simultaneous use is earlier than the optimal
starting point for renewables use. In other words T1 < T2 (or E(T1) < E(T2) since
there is no natural CO2 decay) where E(T1) is defined by
b+ ψD(E(T1))/ρ = G(S0 − (E(T1)− E0)) +D(E(T1))/ρ,
and E(T2) is defined by
c = G(S0 − (E(T2)− E0)) +D(E(T2))/ρ.
For a range of values of κ and c we calculate the levels of E(T1) and E(T2). Holding
renewables cost at our initial value c = 0.51 we find that for κ > 3.2× 10−6, E(T2) <
E(T1) and coal is never introduced. Similarly holding κ = 2 × 10−6 we find that
coal is never introduced for c < 0.42. Note that these damage parameter values are
significantly lower (and renewables cost significantly higher) than those for which the
Green Paradox occurs. Hence, we can confidently say that as long as the damage
function and cost of renewables do not violate our s for the optimal regimes, no Green
Paradox occurs for the optimal second-best policy.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study the optimal environmental policy with a clean and dirty
backstop in a model of resource extraction including environmental damages from
CO2 emissions. The importance of including a dirty backstop lies in the real-world
abundance of coal, and the impact its presence has on oil extraction and climate change.
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In addition to finding the first-best policy we focus our attention on a case when
a carbon tax is not politically feasible and the social planner can levy a renewable
energy subsidy instead.
Assuming oil is cheap at the start and renewables are expensive, we find that
depending on the calibration of the model there are two possible sequences of energy
inputs. The first is oil followed by oil-coal followed by renewables. The second is oil
followed by oil-coal, followed by coal, followed by renewables. After calibrating our
model to real-world values we find that when optimal environmental policy is pursued
the economy never switches to only coal. Instead oil and coal are burned simultaneously
until renewables are phased in. This means the ordering does not depend on just
the costs of the fuels, but on their emission coefficients as well (which determine the
relative social cost of fossil fuels). Compared to the laissez-faire outcome, renewables
are introduced in the social-optimum once the environmental damages outweigh the
benefits of the lower price of renewables.
We find that in the optimal second-best case the sequence of resource regimes is
oil then coal then renewables, and that no Green Paradox occurs as a consequence
of introducing the subsidy, when a dirty backstop is present. The optimal renewable
subsidy results in renewables being phased in after oil is phased out but significantly
earlier than in the first-best case. A subsidy results in a green welfare improvement
over the market outcome, but between the optimal subsidy and the first-best policy
there is a substantial welfare gap due to excessive coal consumption before renewables
are phased in. We thus conclude that a subsidy on renewable energy is hardly welfare
improving compared to the sizable benefit of a carbon tax.
The main policy-oriented result of this paper is that second-best policies such as
subsidies are highly inferior to the first-best carbon tax when a dirty backstop is avail-
able. The high cost of renewables makes subsidies expensive, while cheap and dirty
coal leads to excessive pollution when unchecked by a carbon tax. This paper is thus
a warning for an important mechanism: when renewables are subsidized, the market
for fossil fuels is distorted, so that the positive welfare effect will be small. Thus we
conclude that a policy maker should push for a carbon tax by any means possible and
ignore the politically convenient but highly ineffective renewables subsidy.
As there is no clear agreement on the value of some parameters in our model, we
examined whether our model is robust to variations in these parameters. Specifically,
the damage intensity level and the cost of renewables were discussed. We find that
our conclusions are somewhat sensitive to these parameter values: for relatively cheap
renewables and high climate damages it becomes optimal to subsidize renewables at
the price of oil to avoid any coal use in the economy. Hence, a subsidy becomes a more
attractive policy option if renewables decrease in cost. However, the range of these
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cost values is far below even the most optimistic current projections.
Our model is stylized, abstracting from many real-world processes such as capital
accumulation, technological change, learning by doing, or natural decay of CO2. One
possible extension would be to see how these features could affect our results. Specifi-
cally, it is unclear whether the absence of a Green Paradox would still hold if the price
of renewables could be changed through innovation and learning by doing. Another
assumption of our model lies in using a global representative agent framework. In
the real world policies such as renewable subsidies or carbon taxation are pursued by
individual national governments that trade with each other. This may lead to col-
laboration, carbon leakage or a tragedy of the commons. A model that explores this
problem in the context of strategic interaction is thus worth studying. We leave these
questions for future research.
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4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Description of Different Regimes
In this section of the Appendix we derive the differential equations governing each of
the regimes described above.
In the case when only oil is used, the F.O.C.s that have to hold are:
U ′(q)−G(S) = λ+ µ,
λ˙ = ρλ+G′(S)q, µ˙ = ρµ−D′(E).
From this it follows that the regime can be represented by three differential equations
and two boundary conditions:
q˙ = ρ(U
′(q)−G(S))−D′(E)
U ′′(q) ,
S˙ = −q, S(0) = S0,
E˙ = q, E(0) = E0,
together with the condition from the simultaneous-use regime b + ψD′(E(T1))/ρ =
G(S(T1)) + D
′(E(T1))/ρ. In the case of simultaneous use of oil and coal, all F.O.C.s
must hold with equality:
U ′(q + x)−G(S) = λ+ µ, U ′(q + x)− b = ψµ,
λ˙ = ρλ+G′(S)q, µ˙ = ρµ−D′(E).
Together these lead to:
q˙ + x˙ =
ρ(U ′(q + x)−G(S))−D′(E)
U ′′(q + x)
=
ρ(U ′(q + x)− b)− ψD′(E)
U ′′(q + x)
,
and combining these gives:
b+
ψD′(E)
ρ
= G(S) +
D′(E)
ρ
.
We can use this equation to find q(t) as a function of x(t) by taking the derivative with
respect to time. This leads to:
(4.10) q(t) =
ψ(ψ − 1)D′′(E)
ρ(−G′(S)− ψ−1
ρ
D′′(E))
x(t),
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together with the usual S˙ = −q and E˙ = q + ψx, and the continuity of energy use at
T1: q(T
+
1 ) + x(T
+
1 ) = q(T
−
1 ).
Lastly, we examine the coal-only regime, The F.O.C.’s that have to hold reduce to:
x˙ =
ρ(U ′(x)− b)− ψD′(E)
U ′′(x)
,
together with S˙ = −q and E˙ = q + ψx. If at T2 (the point in time when simultaneous
use of oil and coal ends) a coal-only phase exists, the energy continuity equation reads
q(T−2 ) + x(T
−
2 ) = x(T
+
2 ). For our calibration this only happens in the social optimum
outcome.
4.6.2 Numerical Methods
4.6.2.1 Shooting
We use a Runge-Kutta method to simulate the oil-only regime. As we do not have an
initial value of q(0) it is impossible to give starting values for a simulation. Instead,
we ’shoot’, using a guess for q(0) given some value for T1. We then check the size of:
(4.11) d = (q(T+1 ) + x(T
+
1 )− q(T−1 ))2,
to check how well the boundary equation at T1 holds. By adjusting our guess for q(0),
we can find the unique minimum where d = 0 through a minimization routine. This
then gives us the correct solution for q(0) and therefore the optimal paths of q,S and
E for all t < T1, for given T1.
4.6.2.2 Algorithm for Finding the First Best Outcome
The following algorithm was used to simultaneously solve for the switch times between
the three regimes in the first-best solution:
1. Guess the switch times T1 and T2 > T1,
2. As described above, use the Runge-Kutta method described above to find q(t), S(t), E(t)
for all t < T1. Given T1 we can use the shooting algorithm compute q(0) and the
entire paths q(t), S(t) and E(t) for t < T1.
3. At the break between the oil-only regime and the oil-coal regime, calculate
q(T+1 ), x(T
+
1 ) by using q(T
−
1 ) = q(T
+
1 ) + x(T
+
1 ) and equation (4.10).
4. In the oil-coal regime, use the Runge-Kutta method to find x(t), q(t), S(t), E(t)
for all T1 < t < T2. A more detailed account of how this is done can be found in
Appendix 4.6.2.3.
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5. For the renewables-only regime, everything is clear as z(t) = (U ′)−1(c), and
E(T2) = E(t) =
ρ(c−b)
ψκ
for all t > T2.
6. Extract x(T−2 ), q(T
−
2 ), S(T
−
2 ), Y (T
−
2 ) from the previous step, and see if x(T
−
2 ) +
q(T−2 ) = z(T
+
2 ) = (U
′)−1(c) and E(T2) =
ρ(c−b)
ψκ
hold. If not, go back to step 1 and
adjust the guesses for T1 and T2 until they hold, using a minimization algorithm
(in our case the Nelder Mead minimization algorithm (Nelder and Mead, 1965)).
Runge-Kutta Algorithm for the Oil-Coal Phase
The goal is to find x(t), q(t), S(t), E(t) for all t, T1 < t < T2. For instance, the Runge-
Kutta method uses:
q˙ + x˙ =
ρ(U ′(q + x)−G(S))−D′(E)
U ′′(q + x)
,
q(t) =
ψ(ψ − 1)D′′(E)
ρ(−G′(S)− ψ−1
ρ
D′′(E))
x(t) ≡ Θ(S)x(t),
S˙ = −q,
E˙ = q + ψx,
q(T+2 ) =
q(T−1 )
1 + Θ(S(T1))
,
x(T+2 ) =
q(T−1 )
1 + 1
Θ(S(T1))
,
and E(T2), S(T2) given from the oil-only regime.
We can approximate the solution of these equations through:
x(t+ h) + q(t+ h) ≈ x(t) + q(t) + h(x˙(t) + q˙(t)),
E(t+ h) ≈ E(t) + hE˙(t),
S(t+ h) ≈ S(t) + hS˙(t),
q(t+ h) =
x(t+ h) + q(t+ h)
1 + Θ(S(t))
,
x(t+ h) =
x(t+ h) + q(t+ h)
1 + 1
Θ(S(t))
,
and repeating N = (T2 − T1)/h times, where at each repeat t+ h is set as the new
t.
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Algorithm for Solving for the Market Economy
The algorithm for the market economy is a bit simpler than the one for the social
optimum. In the market outcome (see also Proposition 3) we have only two regimes:
oil is used for as long as it is the cheapest fuel type, and then a switch is made to coal.
This means simulation is simpler, as after the switch to coal energy use is given by
x(t) = U ′−1(b). Furthermore, we know at the switch time T , x(T ) = q(T ) = U ′−1(b).
The first-order conditions in the oil-only regime are given by:
U ′(q)−G(S) = λ,
λ˙ = ρλ+G′(S)q,
as damages are not considered in the market. Together with S(0) = S0, the system is
uniquely determined and we can solve it using Runge-Kutta methods.
Algorithm for Calculating the Second-Best Policy Simulations
For the oil-only regime finding the optimal energy consumption is more complicated.
We assumed in Assumption 1 that initially oil is cheaper than coal and renewables
G(S0) < b and G(S0) < c. It can be shown that oil and coal are not used together
(see Section 4.6.3). Likewise, there is no simultaneous use of coal and renewables.
Therefore, there are two possible scenarios:
1. First oil is used, then coal, and then renewables.
2. First oil is used, and then renewables.3
Oil is used until G(S(t)) = b or G(S(t)) = c − η(t). Let T1 be the regime switch
time (when oil is phased out). If coal is phased in after oil
q(T−1 ) = x(T
+
1 ) = U
′−1(b), S(T1) = G−1(b).
Otherwise, if renewables are phased in after oil, then
q(T−1 ) = z(T
+
1 ) = U
′−1(c− η(T1)), S(T1) = G−1(c− η(T1)).
In the first case, we know that the market will switch to renewables only if the price,
c− η is lower than the market price for coal, b. Therefore, the social planner has only
one policy choice: either set the subsidy constant at level c− b, or don’t set a subsidy
at all. In the second case, the market will switch to renewables when U ′(q) = U ′(z) or
3A special case of the second scenario is that renewables are phased in right away and oil is never
used.
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c = G(S) + λ, where λ = 0 (see van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012b)), so b = G(S).
The social planner has again only one choice, set no subsidy at all, or set it at constant
level c−G(S).
Thus we have two final conditions for the oil-only regime, conditional on which
regime comes after oil-only. Then we can use the Runge-Kutta method to find the
optimal level q(0) and simulate it forward. Given the regime sequence we can find the
optimal level of energy consumption. The regime sequence is what the policy-maker
can influence with the subsidy η(t). Let T1 be the optimal switch time between the oil
regime and the coal regime if η(t) = 0. Then, if the policy maker wants to influence
the behavior of the market, he can either:
• At some T ∗ > T1 et η(t) = c − b + ,  → 0 ∀t > T¯ replacing the coal-only with
the renewables-only regime ∀t > T ∗.
• At some point T ∗ < T1 set η(t) = c − G(S(T ∗) + ,  → 0 replacing the oil-only
with the renewables-only regime ∀t > T ∗, and avoiding coal-use entirely.
We can then use the expression for market welfare conditional on the subsidy (4.9) to
find the optimal T ∗. We calculate welfare level using the expression in (4.9) for a range
of levels of T ∗ and find the T ∗ for which that welfare is maximal.
4.6.3 Proof of no Simultaneous Use in the Market and Second
Best
Proof. If oil and coal are used together, we have:
U ′(x+ q)−G(S) = λ(4.12)
λ˙ = ρλ−G′(S)q(4.13)
U ′(x+ q) = b.(4.14)
From this it directly follows that G(S) = b, which can never be the case for more
than an instant of time as cost of oil increases with stock depletion, and b is constant.
Likewise, the conditions for the possibility of a coal-renewables regime reduce to b =
c − η, which will only occur if the social planner sets the subsidy exactly equal to
η = c − b, which will never happen as the social planner can gain a finite amount of
welfare for only infinitesimal cost of increasing the subsidy by a marginal amount,
4.6.4 Commitment Effects
We found the optimal timing for a subsidy, given that the social planner will announce
the subsidy at the time of its implementation and sticks to it. In other words, we
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assumed that the social planner commits to a subsidy from the moment it is announced
and does not renege on its promise. In this section, we allow the social-planner to
announce a subsidy schedule at time 0 and then renege on its promise. We start with
the following optimization problem for the market (for the oil-only phase), when there
is no subsidy:
max
x(t),q(t),z(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[p(t)q −G(S(t))q(t)]dt,
s.t. S˙(t) = −q(t), q(t) > 0,
H = p(t)q(t)−G(S(t))q(t)− λ(t)q(t).
Here, p(t) denotes the price of oil. From this it follows that the first-order conditions
are:
p(t) = G(S) + λ, p˙(t) = G′(S)S˙(t) + λ˙(t),
λ˙(t) = ρλ(t) +G′(S(t)q(t),
so:
p˙ = ρλ(t),
p˙(t)
p(t)
=
ρλ(t)
λ(t) +G(S(t))
=
U ′′(q(t)q(t)
U ′(q(t))
q˙(t)
q(t)
.
From this it follows that the Hotelling rule is still satisfied, and that the extraction
and consumption paths will be the same. However, this may not be the case when
we introduce a time-varying subsidy η(t) that cannot fully internalize an externality
instead of a carbon tax. Therefore, we consider the market problem with a time-varying
subsidy:
H = U(q(t) + x(t) + z(t))−G(S(t))q(t)− bx(t)− c(z(t)−D(E)− λ(t)q(t)
+µ(t)[q(t) + ψx(t)] + φ[
ρλ(t)
λ(t) +G(S(t))
p(t)]− ν1[U ′(q(t) + x(t) + z(t))− p(t)]
−ν2[U ′(q(t) + x(t) + z(t))− b]− ν3[U ′(q(t) + x(t) + z(t))− c+ η(t)],
η∗ ∈ arg max
η
H.
Here, φ is the costate on ν1, ν2, and ν3 are the Kuhn-Tucker costate variables. Now,
we find first-order conditions on the shadowprices:
λ(t) = ρλ(t)− [−G′(S(t))q(t)− φ(t) ρλ(t)
(λ(t) +G(S(t)))2
G′(S(t))p(t)],
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µ˙ = −ρµ+D′(E),
φ˙ = φρ− [ ρλ(t)φ(t)
λ(t) +G(S(t))
+ ν1] =
ρφ(t)G(S(t))
λ(t) +G(S(t))
− ν1.
The shadowprice of oil should be zero in order for commitment effects not to matter.
As we know that φ(0) = 0, we find that φ˙(0) = −ν1. Because ν1(0) 6= 0, we know that
in general φ(t) 6= 0. Because the shadowprice des not equal zero, the market response
to a time-varying subsidy will not be the same as that when the social planner has the
ability to commit to a given policy. We are aware of these issues, and for closer study
of commitment effects we direct the reader towards Kalkuhl et al. (2013) who look
at commitment and simulation in a similar setting. They find for their case that the
no-commitment government reduces the effective second-best welfare by 95%, whereas
the in the commitment outcome the second best welfare is only reduced by 7%.
4.6.5 Proof of no Green Paradox if Renewables are After Coal
Proof. Suppose the switch to renewables occurs only after the switch to coal from oil.
Then at the switch time from oil to coal, T ,
G(S(T )) = b.
This is due to the fact that in our optimization problem the representative agent makes
the optimal choice between the welfare from oil consumption (e−ρt[U(q)−G(S)q]) and
that of coal consumption (e−ρt[U(x)− bx]). Because q and x are perfect substitutes, we
know that the above condition holds at the switch time. Furthermore, we know that
S(0) = S0, and in between we have the differential equations governing the oil-only
regime:
S˙ = −q,
q˙ =
ρ(U ′(q)−G(S))
U ′′(q)
.
In conclusion, the system is defined by two coupled first order differential equations
and two boundary conditions on the time interval [0, T ]. Thus, it is not dependent on
the time of switching to renewables after introducing coal.
It remains to be proved that there is a Green Paradox if renewables are introduced
before coal is introduced. For this, we refer the reader to Proposition 4 in van der
Ploeg and Withagen (2012a).
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Figure 4.1: Comparison between the first-best and market outcomes for fossil fuel use, and
carbon and oil stocks, expressed in ppmv equivalents.
Figure 4.2: Comparison between the second-best and market outcomes for fossil fuel use,
and carbon and oil stocks, expressed in ppmv equivalents.
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Figure 4.3: Welfare as a function of the timing of subsidy introduction.
Figure 4.4: How the optimal switch time to renewables depends on carbon damage intensity
κ.
92
4.6. Appendix
Figure 4.5: How the optimal switch time to renewables depends on renewable cost c.
Figure 4.6: How the welfare gain from the renewables subsidy depends on carbon damage
intensity κ. A comparison of second-best and market outcomes for varying
levels of damage intensity.
93
CHAPTER 4. SUBSIDIZING RENEWABLES WITH DIRTY BACKSTOP
Figure 4.7: How the welfare gain from the renewables subsidy depends on renewable cost c.
A comparison of second-best and market outcomes for varying renewable cost.
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Chapter 5
Battle for Climate and Scarcity
Rents: Beyond the
Linear-Quadratic Case1
5.1 Introduction
An oil-exporting cartel such as the OPEC can exert monopoly power on the world
market, especially if the price elasticity of oil demand is not too high. This monopoly
power can result in significantly different oil extraction patterns relative to a perfectly
competitive market. A key factor which determines the effect of the exporter’s mo-
nopolist power is the nature of the importer’s oil demand, since the price elasticity
of oil demand is for most demand functions not constant. However, many studies
when modeling oil extraction either choose isoelastic demand or choose a particular
specification of the demand function (typically, linear demand) for reasons of conve-
nience/simplicity to make the models tractable. A key result in the literature on oil
extraction is that with zero extraction costs and isoelastic demand, the monopolist oil
extraction is efficient and coincides with what would prevail in a competitive market
(Stiglitz, 1976). In that case, the oil price increases according to the Hotelling rule at a
rate equal to the market rate of interest. For non-isoelastic demand, the oil price path
can be steeper or flatter, depending on the demand’s functional form. In reality there
are many factors that determine the oil demand schedule (availability of renewables,
transportation and energy use habits, etc.). Thus any simple demand specification is
not a good enough approximation of the real world. It is thus important to analyze the
robustness of results to the chosen specific functional forms for the production function
and oil demand. This allows us to break down the way various demand specifications
1Co-authored with Prof. Rick van der Ploeg (University of Oxford) and Prof. Cees Withagen (VU
University Amsterdam).
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affect the bias of the exporter’s monopoly power on the oil extraction rate and thus on
carbon emissions.
The monopolist’s oil extraction rate also plays a prominent role in the context of
climate policies. As there is no global agreement on battling climate change, increas-
ingly the developed countries are beginning to implement their own carbon emission
reduction policies, while the oil-exporting nations are opposed to such measures. There
is a range of studies modeling strategic interaction between a monopolist oil exporter
who sets the oil price and an importer who combats climate change by setting a car-
bon tax (Wirl, 1995; Tahvonen, 1995, 1996; Rubio and Escriche, 2001), surveyed in van
Long (2012). In equilibrium the oil-importing country uses the carbon tax as an import
tariff to capture some of the monopolist’s rents, while the oil-exporting country marks
up the oil price so that they can capture a part of the carbon tax revenue collected by
it.
Liski and Tahvonen (2004) explicitly analyze such strategic interactions. Their
main results are twofold: First, the subgame-perfect oil extraction path is flatter than
in the efficient outcome; second, this path is also flatter than in the pure cartel outcome
where no carbon tax is levied. Furthermore, they find that the level of damages due
to global warming has a significant effect on equilibrium dynamics. The level of dam-
ages determines whether the import tariff or the Pigouvian environmental tax is the
dominant component of the importer’s carbon tax, and hence whether the carbon tax
decreases or increases over time. The authors even find that for very high damages the
tariff component may be negative — a subsidy. However, Liski and Tahvonen (2004)
restrict their analysis to linear demand functions and parameterizations that lead to
interior solutions and thus keep some oil left in situ. As we will see, these assumptions
do end up affecting their result.
Our contribution is to investigate the generality of these results to a variety of
specifications of production functions and underlying oil demand. Our framework of
analysis is partial equilibrium, since we abstract from saving, investment and capital
accumulation and take the interest rate as given.2 Although we offer formal propo-
sitions where it is feasible, we also have to resort to numerical simulations to gain
insights. For this purpose, we use an illustrative calibration of our model to real-world
values. We obtain the following findings.
First, we find a confirmation that unlike the case of zero extraction cost, a constant
price elasticity of oil demand and no climate concerns (Stiglitz, 1976; Dasgupta and
2Van Wijnbergen(1985) and van der Meijden et al. (2015) analyze two-country general equilibrium
models with capital accumulation and international capital flows, but do not look at the strategic
interactions of policies in a differential-game framework. Jaakkola (2012) does do this, but focuses
at whether taxation of foreign interest income on oil exporter’s assets helps to overcome the Green
Paradox.
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Heal, 1979), if oil extraction costs are non-zero and increase as remaining oil reserves
diminish, monopolistic extraction is never efficient. We establish the nature of the
inefficiency for the open-loop Nash equilibrium too.
Second, we prove that for the class of HARA production functions and associated
oil demand functions the oil price is initially higher and subsequently lower in the
open-loop Nash equilibrium than in the efficient outcome. The oil extraction rate and
carbon emissions are thus initially too low and in later stages too high relative to the
efficient levels. The HARA class includes linear (Liski and Tahvonen, 2004), loglinear,
and semi-loglinear demand functions as special cases. This proof also holds for the case
of a pure cartel equilibrium where the importer cannot impose a carbon tax.
Third, we show that on the other hand a shifted loglinear demand function can
lead the oil exporter to initially price oil lower in the open-loop Nash equilibrium than
the efficient level, thus resulting in more oil extraction and climate damages. This
establishes that there exist non-HARA demand functions that yield opposite results
without violating any arbitrage conditions. Lewis et al. (1979) have demonstrated a
similar result in a context without carbon taxation: if the price elasticity of demand
increases in oil consumption, monopolistic extraction is initially faster than the efficient
rate but the corresponding oil price increase is still higher than the equilibrium rate of
return. Our study thus differs in that we allow for carbon pollution and global warming
and the consequent need for the oil-importing country to impose a carbon tax.3
Fourth, our simulation results indicate that the feedback Nash equilibrium leads
initially to flatter oil price paths than the efficient outcome. We establish numerically
that there is also a downward initial bias in oil extraction rates and carbon emissions
for the feedback Nash equilibrium. The consumer oil price increases more slowly in the
feedback Nash equilibrium than in the open-loop Nash equilibrium and our simulations
also indicate that the optimal carbon tax path will always be higher in the feedback
Nash equilibrium than in the open-loop Nash equilibrium. This occurs because in the
feedback Nash equilibrium the oil-importing region increases the carbon tax in order
to capture the scarcity rents of the oil-exporting country.
Fifth, we find that for oil demand specifications which asymptotically lead to full oil
exhaustion, the level of carbon damages does not influence the carbon tax dynamics.4
For such oil demand functions, the monopolist exporter earns significant amounts of
scarcity rent, and thus the carbon tax is used primarily as a tariff so that the importer
can capture some of these rents back. However, as the oil exporter and importer
3Wirl (2007) demonstrates that decreasing marginal elasticity of utility can boost initial emissions
in an international pollution control game, but this study has no exhaustible resource and both players
are affected by climate change.
4In most cases, studies restrict their attention to interior solutions to make them tractable, so we
provide a numerical algorithm which can be used to solve such problems.
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compete to capture each other’s rents, they raise the combined user cost of oil so high
that the resulting welfare loss to the consumers is larger than the extra gain from stolen
scarcity rents.
Finally, our simulations indicate that for a reasonable calibration of the model, no
matter how high the intensity of global warming damages, the oil-importing country
will always impose a positive import tariff on top of the carbon tax in the feedback
Nash equilibrium. Thus the result of Liski and Tahvonen (2004) that in some cases
the importer may have an incentive to subsidize oil consumption in order to ease the
burden caused by the high prices set by the oil-exporting countries does not seem to
be relevant in practice.
We must make two important provisos to our findings. The first one is that we
abstract from political economy issues. For example, oil exporters such as Saudi Ara-
bia may have a desire to charge a higher export price of oil if their populations are
sizable and need to be pacified with transfers. Saudi Arabia would then be hurt if
the oil-importing countries levy carbon taxes, especially if a lot of these are shifted to
Saudi Arabia. Also, oil-importing countries may hesitate to fully internalize the social
cost of carbon if they fear the distributional effect of regressive carbon taxes, but we
abstract from such political economy effects too. The second proviso is that we focus
on open-loop and feedback Nash equilibrium outcomes and abstract from open-loop
and feedback Stackelberg equilibrium outcomes for a supply side consisting of a cartel
of monopolistic oil exporters and a competitive fringe of smaller oil exporters.5
Although our analysis has antecedents in the economics of natural resources (e.g.,
Stiglitz, 1976; Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; Lewis et al., 1979; Tahvonen, 1995, 1996; Liski
and Tahvonen, 2004; Rubio and Escriche, 2001; Wirl, 1995), it is important to realize
that our analysis also has roots in the industrial organization and international trade
literature. For example, Brander and Spencer (1984) examine how a tariff on imports
produced by a foreign Cournot-Nash oligopoly is affected by linear and other plausible
demand specifications and Brander and Spencer (1985) also analyze how export sub-
sidies might affect the optimal import tariff and how in a context of three countries
export subsidies might affect the optimal import tariff or the nature of the Nash equi-
librium in tariffs and subsidies between the three countries. Our analysis builds on
this literature by explicitly taking account of the scarcity of fossil fuel and allowing for
both the Pigouvian as well as the import tariff motive for carbon taxation. Our work is
also related to Mra´zova´ and Neary (2013) and Xie (2000) who identify which demand
function features, especially whether demand is super- or sub-modular indicated by the
sign of the so-called super-elasticity, affect results in industrial organization and inter-
5Groot et al. (2000) show that the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium outcome may give rise to
discontinuities in the equilibrium price trajectory. Groot et al. (2003) derive the feedback Stackelberg
equilibrium outcome for the cartel-fringe model.
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national trade. These insights are more relevant in Stackelberg than in Nash set-ups,
so are of less relevance for our present analysis of the monopolists price mark-up and
the importer’s carbon tax.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 sets up the model of the oil-
importing and oil-exporting blocks of countries and discusses the differential game that
is played between them. Section 5.3 derives the open-loop Nash equilibrium outcome,
compares this with the efficient and competitive outcomes and proves that for the class
of HARA production functions the resulting oil price path is flatter and the oil extrac-
tion rate path is steeper in open-loop Nash equilibrium than in the efficient outcome.
Section 5.4 derives the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcome (also known as the
feedback Nash equilibrium). Section 5.5 offers some illustrative simulations that con-
firm our proposition on HARA production functions, provides an example of demand
for which the monopolist initially extracts more than the efficient rate, and more gen-
erally highlight the differences between the open-loop and subgame-perfect equilibrium
and the efficient and competitive outcomes. Section 5.6 concludes with a summary of
results and suggestions for further research.
5.2 The Model
Our model describes two countries or blocks of countries. One country called “In-
dustria” does not have oil, but imports R units of oil from the other country called
“Oilrabia” and uses it to produce final goods according to the concave production
function F (R) with F (0) = 0, F ′(R) > 0 and F ′′(R) < 0 for positive R. All other
factors of production (labor, land, etc.) are fixed and subsumed in the production
function. C units of final goods are bought by Industria and C∗ units by Oilrabia for
consumption purposes. A further G(S)R units of final goods are bought by Oilrabia
for extraction purposes where S is the stock of oil reserves. Marginal oil extraction
costs rise as fewer oil reserves are left and less accessible fields have to be explored,
so G′(S) < 0. Furthermore, we suppose that marginal oil extraction costs are convex,
G′′(S) > 0. Instantaneous world goods market equilibrium requires that
(5.1) F (R) = C + C∗ +G(S)R.
Oilrabia lives from its oil wealth, has monopoly power in the world market for oil,
and has utilitarian preferences.6 The government of Oilrabia has a given initial stock
of oil S0, which it manages optimally to maximize the present discounted value of its
6While utilitarian preferences may imply a variety of utility functions with different elasticities of
intertemporal substitution, for computational simplicity we assume linear utility functions.
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consumption stream which corresponds to the present value of its oil profits. We ab-
stract from private oil extraction in Oilrabia. Industria also has utilitarian preferences
and is concerned with the present value of its consumption stream. It also levies a
specific carbon tax τ to limit the damages from global warming. We are concerned
with strategic interactions between Industria and Oilrabia, where the former sets the
carbon tax and the latter sets the oil price.
5.2.1 Demand for Oil and Private Consumption in Industria
Firms in Industria operate under perfect competition and maximize profits Π = F (R)−
(p+τ)R, taking the before-tax price of oil p and the specific carbon tax τ as given. Here
profits include wage income and land rental income. We measure oil in tons of carbon,
which implies a carbon-emission coefficient of unity. The efficiency condition for an
interior solution reads F ′(R) = p + τ , where F ′(R) is the marginal product of oil. It
gives oil demand as a decreasing function of the user cost of oil, namely R = R(p+ τ).
Consumers in Industria obtain income from final goods production and get carbon tax
revenues rebated in lump-sum fashion, so that consumption is given by
C = Π + τR = F (R(p+ τ))− pR(p+ τ) ≡ C(p, τ),
Cp = −
[
1 +
τ
p+ τ
ε
]
R < 0, Cτ = − τ
p+ τ
εR < 0,(5.2)
where ε ≡ −(p + τ)R′(p + τ)/R(p + τ) > 0 is the price elasticity of oil demand. A
higher producer price of oil cuts consumption directly as oil inputs are more costly
and indirectly via the downward effect on oil demand if and only if the carbon tax
is positive. We also give the full partial derivatives of consumption with respect to
the tax and price so that we can gain more intuition about the relationship between
consumption, price, tax and the elasticity of demand.
5.2.2 The Government of Industria
The stock of carbon in the atmosphere, E, increases with carbon emissions, so that
(5.3) E˙ = R(p+ τ), E(0) = E0 given,
where we abstract from natural decay of the stock of atmospheric carbon. Global
warming damages are given by the function D(E) with D′(0) > 0, D′′(E) ≥ 0 and
D(E0 + S0) < ∞. The objective of the government of Industria at time t is to choose
the carbon tax to maximize the present discounted value of private consumption of
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different generations of households minus global warming damages:
(5.4) V (t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t) [C(p(s), τ(s))−D(E(s))] ds,
subject to the dynamics of the atmospheric stock of carbon (5.3), where ρ > 0 is
the constant rate of time preference. Linear preferences imply zero intergenerational
inequality aversion, so that social welfare across generations is utilitarian. The social
rate of time preference is used by the government of Industria to discount welfare
of future generations.7 Although all oil extraction takes place outside of Industria’s
borders, Industria’s government is able to observe the remaining oil stock S. The
dynamics of oil extraction follow from:
(5.5) S˙ = −R(p+ τ) ≥ 0, S(t) ≥ 0, S(0) = S0 given.
For all instants of time, the stock of carbon in the atmosphere is the initial stock plus
cumulative oil depletion, E(t) = E0 + S0 − S(t) so that, formally, only the stock of
atmospheric carbon or the stock of in situ oil needs to be considered as a state variable.
5.2.3 The Government of Oilrabia
The government of Oilrabia takes account of oil demand from Industria and chooses oil
prices to maximize the present discounted value from the stream of current and future
oil profits,
(5.6) V ∗(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ
∗(s−t) [p(s)R(p(s) + τ(s))−G(S(s))R(p(s) + τ(s))] ds,
subject to the dynamics of oil depletion (5.5). Here ρ∗ > 0 is Oilrabia’s rate of time
preference. We will suppose that Industria and Oilrabia employ the same rate of
time preference: ρ = ρ∗. From (5.1) and (5.2) we get Oilrabia’s consumption rate,
C∗ = F (R) − C − G(S)R = pR − G(S)R. Oilrabia’s government maximizes (5.6) or
equivalently the present value of Oilrabia’s stream of current and future consumption
levels, V ∗(t) =
∫∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)C∗(s)ds. Our general equilibrium model is similar to the two-
country model of an oil exporter and an oil importer analyzed by Liski and Tahvonen
(2004) if the production function F (R) is replaced by the utility function U(R) with
U ′ > 0 and U ′′ < 0. In their model demand for oil comes from households setting
U ′(R) = p + τ and in our model it comes from firms producing final goods setting
F ′(R) = p+ τ. Of course, their model can have U(0) < 0 whereas we have F (0) = 0.
7The social welfare function is linear in the individual utilities.
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5.3 Efficient and Open-Loop Nash Equilibria
We first consider the efficient equilibrium where a social planner maximizes the welfare
sum of both Oilrabia and Industria. We then compare it to the open-loop Nash equilib-
rium where each of the regions or countries takes the time path of the other country’s
policy as given when setting its own policy. This requires commitment to announced
policies and is distinct from the feedback Nash equilibrium where the countries cannot
pre-commit to a time path, but instead base their strategies on the remaining oil stock
S and pollution stock E. We will derive the feedback Nash equilibrium in Section 5.4.
5.3.1 Efficient Equilibrium
In the efficient equilibrium, the social planner sets the user cost of oil, which is defined
as q ≡ p + τ such that it maximizes total global consumption less the environmental
damages, subject to the resource extraction constraint in (5.5). The Hamiltonian for
the social planner is then H ≡ F (R(q)) − G(S)R(q) − D(E) − µR(q) where the co-
state variable µ corresponds to the sum of the social cost of carbon and the Hotelling
rent. We assume F ′(0) > G(S0) + D′(E0)/ρ in order to avoid the possibility of zero
extraction throughout. Indeed, if the inequality would not hold, even the marginal
revenues of low initial extraction would not cover the lowest possible sum of marginal
oil extraction cost and the social cost of carbon.
Proposition 1: It is optimal to have non-zero oil extraction rates forever in the
efficient outcome.
Proof: We can derive that for all periods when R > 0, the following second-order
differential should hold: F ′(R) = G(S) +D′(E0 +S0−S)/ρ+F ′′(R)R˙/ρ and S˙ = −R.
We also know that at the point when oil extraction is no longer profitable, the marginal
benefit of a unit of oil is equal to the sum of its extraction cost and marginal climate
damages, i.e, F ′(0) = G(S¯) + D′(E0 + S0 − S¯)/ρ where S¯ is the amount of oil that is
left in situ. Suppose that contrary to the claim of the proposition the solution for R
is positive until some final T and 0 afterwards. However, if there exists such a T ′ > T
such that R(T ′) = 0, then from the optimal conditions derived earlier as well as the
law of motion for the oil stock for all t ≤ T , R(t) = 0. Therefore the only case when
zero extraction is possible is if none occurs at all. Otherwise, assuming that the first
drop of oil is profitable to extract, in the efficient outcome it is optimal to have positive
extraction forever.
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Given proposition 1, the optimality conditions are:
(5.7)
dH
dq
= [F ′(R(q))−G(S)− µ]dR
dq
= 0 and ρµ− µ˙ = dH
dS
= D′(E)−G′(S)R.
Simplifying the optimality conditions (5.7), we can rewrite them to obtain an ordinary
differential equation for the user cost of oil q = p+ τ :
(5.8) q˙ = ρ[q −G(S)−D′(E)/ρ].
The consumer price of oil, also called the user cost of oil, can be decomposed into
two components: the producer price of oil (which increases according to the Hotelling
rule (Hotelling, 1931)) and the Pigouvian carbon tax (which is equal to the sum of
discounted marginal damages from emitting one ton of carbon). This result is fairly
straightforward and has been shown in many previous studies, but we reproduce it here
for ease of comparison with the open-loop and feedback Nash equilibrium results that
we discuss later on.
Proposition 2: The optimal oil extraction rate is monotonically decreasing over
time and vanishes only asymptotically in the efficient outcome. The corresponding
stock of oil reserves gradually falls to zero if F ′(0)−G(0) > D′(E0+S0)
ρ
(full exhaustion).
Otherwise, it diminishes to a strictly positive steady-state level (partial exhaustion).
Proof: From the optimality conditions (5.7) we can calculate how much oil is left
in situ in the long run. We first rewrite (5.7) in terms of the marginal productivity of
oil, to obtain F˙ ′(R) = ρ[F ′(R)−G(S)−D′(E0 + S0 − S)/ρ].
Note that G(S(t)) + D′(E0 + S0 − S(t)) is increasing over time, because the oil stock
is decreasing over time. This implies that the optimal extraction rate is monotonically
decreasing towards zero, otherwise there would exist t1 < t2 with R(t1) = R(t2) and
R˙(t1) < 0, R˙(t2) > 0. However that is impossible, as according to (5.8) that would
imply that G(S(t)) + D′(E0 + S0 − S(t)) would be decreasing over time. Thus to
examine the long-run steady state of the in-situ oil stock, we take the limit of equation
(5.8) as R and R˙ approach 0 and derive the following expression:
(5.9) F ′(0)−G(S) = D′(E0 + S0 − S)/ρ.
Since the extraction rate monotonically decreases towards zero, expression (5.9) thus
gives us the stock of oil at which further oil extraction is no longer profitable. The
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left-hand side gives the marginal benefit net of the cost of extracting a marginal unit of
fossil fuels while the right-hand side gives the total discounted marginal global warming
damages from doing so. We can then identify two separate cases. The first case prevails
if F ′(0)−G(0) > D′(E0+S0)
ρ
and occurs for example if F ′(0) =∞ and G(0) <∞. In this
first case, the productivity of the marginal unit of fossil fuels is so high that extraction
will always be profitable. This will lead to oil extraction that will go on forever,
the stock of oil reserves approaching zero in the limit. The second case prevails if
F ′(0) − G(S) = D′(E0+S0−S)
ρ
and has a solution in the range 0 ≤ S < S0. Then in the
long run S will be left in the ground.
The two cases described in Proposition 2 are relevant not just for the efficient
equilibrium but also for the open-loop and the feedback Nash equilibrium outcomes.
In fact, as Liski and Tahvonen (2004) demonstrate, in the long run, both the feedback
and the open-loop Nash equilibrium outcomes converge to the efficient stock of oil
reserves. Thus the amount of oil left in situ remains the same across the different
equilibrium outcomes. Which of the above two cases occurs depends on the nature of
oil demand and the parametrization.
5.3.2 Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium: Carbon Taxation in In-
dustria
We now move on to calculating the open-loop Nash equilibrium, first looking at Indus-
tria’s problem. Industria maximizes its welfare (5.4) subject to (5.2). Its current value
Hamiltonian therefore reads H ≡ F (R(p+ τ))− pR(p+ τ)−D(E)− µR(p+ τ) where
µ ≥ 0 is Industria’s social cost of carbon. The optimality conditions for the carbon
tax, the adjoint equation for the social cost of carbon and the transversality condition
are, respectively:
dH
dτ
= [F ′(R(p+ τ))p− µ]R′(p+ τ) = 0,(5.10)
ρµ− µ˙ = dH
dE
= D′(E),
limt→∞ e−ρtµ(t) = 0.
We assume that the world market price of oil is such that we have an interior solution.
This assumption will be verified in due course. The first part of (5.10) tells us that
the optimal carbon tax must be set to Industria’s social cost of carbon, τ = µ. The
third part of (5.10) is the transversality condition, which is necessary due to the char-
acteristics of our optimization problem. It follows that the second part of (5.10) can
be integrated, using the transversality condition, to give the optimal carbon tax as the
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discounted sum of all future marginal damages from global warming:
(5.11) τ(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)D′(E(s))ds, t ≥ 0.
5.3.3 Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium: Oil Pricing by Oilrabia
Oilrabia’s optimization problem is to maximize (5.6) subject to (5.5). Its current value
Hamiltonian reads H∗ ≡ [p − G(S) − λ∗]R(p + τ) where λ∗ ≥ 0 is the marginal value
of oil reserves to Oilrabia (also called the scarcity rent). The optimality conditions for
an interior solution and the transversality condition read:
dH∗
dp
= R(p+ τ) + [p−G(S)− λ∗]R′(p+ τ) = 0,
ρλ∗ − λ˙∗ = dH
∗
dS
= −G′(S)R(p+ τ), lim
t→∞
e−ρtλ∗(t) = 0.(5.12)
The first two equations of (5.12) imply that the optimal price of oil must equal the
sum of the oil extraction cost, the scarcity rent of oil and the carbon tax, all multiplied
by a monopoly mark-up:
(5.13) p+ τ =
G(S) + λ∗ + τ
1− 1/ε .
In a competitve market (ε→∞), the oil price is simply set to the sum of the extraction
cost and the scarcity rent and thus (5.13) becomes p = G(S) + λ∗. An alternative way
of writing (5.13) gives the following expression, with the market price of oil as the
monopoly mark-up on the extraction cost and the scarcity rent (the first term on the
right-hand side) plus the capture of the climate rent (the second term):
(5.14) p =
G(S) + λ∗
1− 1/ε +
τ
ε− 1 .
Capture of climate rent is more substantial if Oilrabia has more monopoly power on
the oil market, which is the case if the price elasticity of oil demand ε is relatively low.
Integrating the second part of (5.12) and using the tranversality condition gives the
scarcity rent as the present value of all future reductions in extraction costs resulting
from keeping an extra unit of oil in the earth:
(5.15) λ∗(t) = −
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)G′(S(s))R(s)ds.
Having derived the dynamics for Oilrabia’s price and Industria’s tax we now combine
them to find equilibrium conditions.
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5.3.4 Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium Outcome
It is easiest to analyze the open-loop Nash equilibrium outcome in terms of oil reserves
S and the user cost of oil q. Combining (5.12) and (5.10), the open-loop Nash outcome
is defined by the dynamic system described by equation (5.5) and
(5.16) q˙ =
ρ
[(
1− 1
ε(q)
)
q −G(S)
]
D′(E0 + S0 − S)
2− R′′(q)R(q)
R′(q)2
=
ρ
[(
1− 1
ε(q)
)
q −G(S)
]
−D′(E0 + S0 − S)
1− 1
ε(q)
+ Θ(q)
ε(q)
,
where Θ(q) ≡ qε′(q)
ε(q)
defines the elasticity of the elasticity of demand or the so-called
super-elasticity (e.g., Mra´zova´ and Neary, 2013). For isoelastic demand we have Θ = 0
and the denominator boils down to the familiar monopoly mark-up (see the first case
in Section 5.3.5). For the class of HARA production functions we have Θ(q) > 0 which
increases the denominator and tends to flatten the price path relative to the case of
isoelastic oil demand (see the second case in Section 5.3.5). There exist non-HARA
production functions for which Θ < 0 and the denominator tends to increase so that
the price path steepens relative to the case of isoelastic oil demand (see the third case
in Section 5.3.5). The efficient outcome is described by equation (5.5) and
(5.17) q˙ = ρ[q −G(S)]−D′(E0 + S0 − S),
and the competitive market outcome by equation (5.5) and
(5.18) q˙ = ρ[q −G(S)].
The cartel or monopolist outcome (where Industria does not set a carbon tax) follows
as a special case of the open-loop Nash equilibrium outcome:
(5.19) q˙ =
ρ
[(
1− 1
ε(q)
)
q −G(S)
]
1− 1−Θ(q)
ε(q)
.
Note that in any equilibrium we must have
(5.20) G(S) < p, D′(E)/ρ ≤ τ.
The first inequality is needed to have non-negative profits from oil extraction. The
second inequality follows from the fact that the carbon tax is monotonically non-
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decreasing, because if it were decreasing, it would become negative eventually, which
contradicts that there is a cost rather than a benefit associated with carbon accumu-
lation. Hence, in each of the efficient, monopolistic and competitive outcomes the user
cost of oil is increasing at a rate no greater than the social rate of discount. Another
reason for considering only such price paths is to exclude arbitrage, as pointed at by
Dasgupta and Heal (1979) for the case without extraction cost and global warming
damages.
5.3.5 Comparing the Open-Loop Nash and Efficient Equilibria
We now compare the results under the various outcomes described by (5.16), (5.17),
(5.18), and (5.19). To provide some initial insights, we consider the first case of isoe-
lastic demand as this produces the well-known benchmark result that monopolistic
extraction is efficient (Stiglitz, 1976) and thus provides a useful benchmark. If oil de-
mand is not isoelastic, we see from (5.16) that the solution becomes less trivial and
depends on the sign of the super-elasticity and thus on the degree the consumers can
substitute away from oil as the price rises, and thus how much scarcity rent the mo-
nopolist can capture. We spend the remainder determining the way in which various
production functions specifications affect equilibrium dynamics. In the second case we
generalize the benchmark case of isoelastic demand to the much more general class
of HARA production functions, which captures most of the commonly used demand
functions, and prove that for this class initial oil prices in the open-loop equilibrium
outcome are too low and later on are too high relative to the efficient outcome. We
then discuss the third case: an example of a non-HARA production function, which is
useful as such a function can give the opposite to our main result on HARA production
functions.
Case 1: Isoelastic Oil Demand
We have for this case F (R) = R
1−σ
1−σ , R = p
−1/σ, 2 − R′′R
R′2 = 1 + σ, constant elasticity
ε = 1
σ
, and Θ = 0, with 1 > σ > 0. Equation (5.16) for the user oil cost dynamics
under open-loop Nash equilibrium becomes q˙ = ρ[(1−1/ε)q−G(S)−D
′(E0+S0−S)/ρ]
1−1/ε . In (5.10)
we have shown that the open-loop Nash equilibrium tax is the Pigouvian tax which
evolves according to τ˙ = ρτ − D′(E0 + S0 − S). Hence, we get the dynamics of the
producer price of oil:
(5.21) p˙ = ρ
(
p− G(S)
1− 1/ε
)
− D
′(E0 + S0 − S)
ε− 1 .
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The last term in the right-hand side of (5.21) indicates that the oil-exporting region
uses its monopoly market power to capture a part of the climate rent by charging higher
prices. Let us now consider some special outcomes. First, if extraction costs and climate
damages are zero, (5.21) boils down to p˙ = ρp, so that the open-loop Nash equilibrium
and cartel outcomes are Pareto efficient and correspond to the competitive outcome
(cf. Stiglitz, 1976); equations (5.16), (5.18), (5.17), and (5.19) all boil down to p˙ = ρp.
Second, the open-loop Nash equilibrium is inefficient if there are extraction costs even
if there are no climate damages, as equation (5.21) boils down to p˙ = ρ
(
p− G(S)
1−1/ε
)
which only represents the efficient outcome if the oil market is competitive and ε→∞.
Third, if the world oil market is competitive, ε → ∞, equation (5.21) boils down to
the Hotelling dynamics p˙ = ρ[p−G(S)] for the producer price of oil and thus we have
q˙ = ρ[q − G(S) − D′(E0 + S0 − S)/ρ] for the dynamics of the consumer price of oil.
Hence, the return on leaving an extra unit of oil in the ground (the capital gains)
equals the interest on the net revenue from extracting and selling an extra unit of oil.
The open-loop outcome then corresponds to the efficient outcome (5.17) which then
coincides with the competitive outcome (5.18) only if damages from global warming
are zero.
Case 2: HARA Class Demand
Let us consider the class of HARA production functions. This class of production
functions is given by
(5.22) F (R) =
1− ϕ
ϕ
[(
ψR
1− ϕ + χ
)ϕ
− χϕ
]
, where ψ > 0, χ ≥ 0 and ϕ > 0.
Proposition 3: For the class of HARA production functions with elastic demand
(ε > 1) initial oil extraction along the open-loop Nash equilibrium is less than that in
the efficient equilibrium.
Proof: The demand function is R(q) = (y − χ)
(
1−ϕ
ψ
)
, where y ≡
(
q
ψ
) 1
ϕ−1
> 0.
Strictly positive demand requires (y − χ)(1 − ϕ) > 0. The price elasticity of demand
is ε(q) = y/((1 − ϕ)(y − χ)). Since we restrict analysis to elastic demand (ε > 1),
we need the condition ϕy + (1 − ϕ)χ > 0 to be satisfied. As χ ≥ 0, the inequality
ϕy+ (2−ϕ)χ > 0 must hold too. We also have R′′(q)R(q)/R′(q)2 = (2−ϕ)(y− χ)/y.
Define V N ≡ G(SN)+D′(EN)/ρ and V E ≡ G(SE)+D′(EE)/ρ, where the superscripts
N and E refer to the open-loop Nash and the efficient equilibrium, respectively.
Substituting the above expressions for ε(q), R′′(q)R(q)/R′(q)2 in terms of y andG(SN)+
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D′(EN)/ρ = V N into equation (5.16) for the open-loop Nash equilibrium, then yields:
(5.23) q˙N = ρ
[
(1− ϕ)χ+ ϕy
(2− ϕ)χ+ ϕyq
N − y
(2− ϕ)χ+ ϕyV
N
]
.
Using (5.17) and substituting G(SE) + D′(EE)/ρ = V E we get for the efficient equi-
librium:
(5.24) q˙E = ρ(qE − V E).
With the conditions and results discussed so far, we proceed with a proof by con-
tradiction. Suppose therefore, contrary to the claim of this proposition, that initial
extraction along the open-loop Nash equilibrium is larger than in the efficient equilib-
rium. Since, as has been proven by Liski and Tahvonen (2004), in the long run the
same amount of oil is cumulatively extracted for both equilibria, the initial price along
the open-loop Nash equilibrium is smaller than in the efficient equilibrium and there
must be an instant of time, T, where qN(T ) = qE(T ) = q(T ) with q˙N(T ) > q˙E(T ).
In other words, the open-loop Nash price path must intersect the efficient price path
from below and must thus be steeper at the point of intersection. So, we have from
equations (5.23) and (5.24) that
(5.25)
q˙N(T )
ρ
=
(1− ϕ)χ+ ϕy(T )
(2− ϕ)χ+ ϕy(T )q(T )−
y(T )
(2− ϕ)χ+ ϕy(T )V
N(T )
>
q˙E(T )
ρ
= q(T )− V E(T ).
Hence, using the condition ϕy+ (2−ϕ)χ > 0 discussed above, we see from (5.25) that
the inequality χq(T ) < [(2−ϕ)χ+ϕy(T )]V E(T )−y(T )V N(T ) must hold. Note that up
to time T , more oil is extracted in the open-loop Nash than in the efficient equilibrium,
and that both the extraction cost and climate damages are monotonically decreasing
in the stock of oil. Therefore, the total social cost of oil at time T must be higher
for the open loop case, i.e. V N(T ) > V E(T ). Using these last two inequalities, we get
χq(T ) < [(2− ϕ)χ+ (ϕ− 1)y(T )]V E(T ). Since the set of inequalities in (5.20) implies
that the inequality V E < q must hold, we have χq(T ) < [(2−ϕ)χ+ (ϕ− 1)y(T )]q(T ).
Given that q(T ) > 0 and χ ≥ 0, it must hold that (1−ϕ)[y(T )− χ] < 0. This violates
the first condition in the proof.
This proposition establishes that for all members of the HARA class of production
functions the extraction rates in the open-loop Nash equilibrium are initially too low
and later on are too high compared with the efficient outcome. Of course, oil prices
are then initially too high and later on too low in the open-loop Nash equilibrium.
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This result also holds for the monopolist. Indeed, if this were not the case, it would
be unprofitable for the monopolist to enter the market. In that sense monopolistic oil
barons are the conservationist’s best friend.
The class of HARA production functions has super-elasticity
Θ(q) =
χ
1− ϕ
[
(q/ψ)
1
ϕ−1 − χ
]−1
.
If χ > 0, then Θ(q) > 0 as positive marginal demand requires[
(q/ψ)
1
ϕ−1 − χ
]
(1− ϕ) > 0.
If χ = 0 then Θ(q) = 0. Thus the members of the HARA class of production functions
have a positive (or zero for the case of isoelastic demand) super-elasticity, which tends
to flatten the price path (5.16) relative to the case of isoelastic oil demand. Proposition
3 proves that the extraction rate in the open-loop Nash equilibrium is in fact slower
than the efficient rate.
It is important to realize that the class of HARA production functions is quite
general, since it includes many familiar production functions as special cases. Table
5.1 presents five special cases of the HARA production functions: quadratic, exponen-
tial, Cobb-Douglas, power and logarithmic production functions. These correspond to,
respectively, linear, semi-loglinear, isoelastic, shifted loglinear and shifted unit-elastic
oil demand specifications. For each of the HARA production functions, the associated
demand function, the elasticity and the parameter restrictions that must hold are given
in Table 5.1 too.
Section 5.5 uses the linear, semi-loglinear and isoelastic demand specifications in our
numerical simulations of the open-loop Nash equilibrium, feedback Nash equilibrium
and efficient outcomes. The simulations for shifted loglinear and shifted unit-elastic
demand specifications are not presented as they give qualitatively similar insights.
Non-HARA Class Demand
We now examine a class of non-HARA production functions with a negative super-
elasticity to show that it is possible that the open-loop Nash equilibrium is bad for the
environment. Consider
F (R) = χR +
R1−1/φ
1− 1/φ with φ > 1 and χ > 0,
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Table 5.1: Various HARA production functions
Production function Demand Function Demand elasticity Parameter Restrictions
F (R) = − 1
2
(χ− ψR)2 + 1
2
χ2
(Quadratic)
R = (χψ − q)/ψ2
(linear)
ε = q
χψ−q ϕ = 2, χ > 0, q < χψ
F (R) = 1− e−ψR
(Exponential)
R = − 1
ψ
ln
(
q
ψ
)
(semi-loglinar)
ε = −1
ln
(
q
ψ
) ϕ→ −∞, χ = 1
F (R) = 1−ϕ
ϕ
(
ψR
1−ϕ
)ϕ
(Cobb-Douglas)
R = 1−ϕ
ψ
(
q
ψ
) 1
ϕ−1
(loglinear/isoelastic)
ε = 1
1−ϕ χ = 0, ϕ > 0
F (R) = 1−ϕ
ϕ
[(R+ χ)ϕ − χϕ]
(Power)
R =
(
q
1−ϕ
) 1
ϕ−1 − χ
(shifted loglinear)
ε =
(
q
1−ϕ
) 1
ϕ−1
(1−ϕ)
[(
q
1−ϕ
) 1
ϕ−1−χ
] ϕ < 1, χ > 0, ψ = 1− ϕ
F (R) = log(R+ χ)− log(χ)
(Logarithmic)
R = 1
q
− χ
(shifted unit-elastic)
ε = 1
1−χq ϕ→ 0, ψ = 1, χq < 1
which is an alternative power production function to the one reported in Table 5.1 as
the shift occurs in the oil price rather than in oil demand. This gives rise to the shifted
loglinear oil demand curve, R = (q−χ)−φ with q > χ. It has elasticity ε =
(
q
q−χ
)
φ > 0.
The demand function has a negative super-elasticity Θ(q) = − χq
φ(q−χ) < 0. Hence
from (5.16) this tends to steepen the price path relative to the case of isoelastic oil
demand. In fact, equation (5.16) becomes
(5.26) q˙ =
ρ[(φ− 1)q + χ− φG(S)]− φD′(E0 + S0 − S)
φ− 1 .
We can rule out q˙ > ρq on the basis of arbitrage arguments (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979).
Combining q˙ ≤ ρq and the open-loop Nash equilibrium first-order conditions, we obtain
the following necessary condition: ρχ/(qφ−1)−ρ(χ−G(S)−D′(E)/ρ)/(q(φ−1)) < 0.
As damages are increasing in E and extraction costs are decreasing in S, the lowest
value of the extraction cost is at S0 and damages at E0. Therefore the necessary
condition can be transformed to:
(5.27)
1
φ− 1[χ− φ[G(S0) +D
′(E0)/ρ]] < 0.
Thus χ has to be small enough to not violate the arbitrage condition (5.26) but large
enough so that the production function differs significantly from the classic isoelastic
case (for which the monopolist extracts more slowly than the efficient rate). It is not
possible to derive precise analytical conditions for when the open-loop Nash equilibrium
is initially less conservative than the efficient outcome. Note, however, that using
conditions (5.16) and (5.5) one can numerically solve for time paths of S and q, and
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then use (5.11) to find the equilibrium carbon tax and oil price. In Section 5.5 we
perform such a numerical analysis for a variety of demand specifications and offer an
example which demonstrates that the monopolist can be less conservationist than the
efficient outcome.
In fact, our simulations establish that the open-loop Nash equilibrium outcome can
lead to a faster initial extraction rate than the efficient rate. We cannot make any
definitive conclusions, because we can also find other examples of shifted log linear
demand functions where in the open loop equilibrium the monopolist is initially more
conservative than in the efficient case.
5.4 Feedback Nash Equilibrium
We assume that both Industria and Oilrabia have perfect information on both the
remaining oil reserves and the atmospheric carbon stock at each instant of time.8
Hence, the optimal carbon tax imposed by Industria and the world market price of oil
determined by Oilrabia can both be represented as a function of merely remaining oil
reserves, since the stock of atmospheric carbon is the sum of the initial carbon stock
and all oil burnt so far. We denote the equilibrium price and the equilibrium tax by
p(S) and τ(S) and their derivatives by pS(S) and τS(S).
5.4.1 The Feedback Rule for the Optimal Carbon Tax
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for Industria is
(5.28) ρV (S) = max
τ
[F (R(p+ τ))− p(S)R(p+ τ)−D(S0 +E0−S)−VS(S)R(p+ τ)],
where V (S) is Industria’s value function. In a feedback Nash equilibrium Industria
takes the price of oil as a given function of oil reserves and atmospheric carbon p(S).
The optimality condition [F ′(R(p+τ))−p]R′(p+τ) = VS(S)R′(p+τ) gives Industria’s
feedback rule for the optimal carbon tax:
(5.29) τ = VS(S) = τ(S).
The carbon tax τ is thus set to the shadow price of the oil stock. Substituting (5.29)
into (5.28) and differentiating both sides with respect to the oil stock, we obtain the
8Other informational assumptions are possible (e.g., Industria does not have knowledge of Oilrabia’s
stock of remaining oil reserves), but we will abstract from these here.
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equation describing the dynamics of the carbon tax:
(5.30) τSR(p+ τ) = −ρτ − pS(S)R(p+ τ) +D′(S0 + E0 − S).
The carbon tax can then be decomposed as a sum of the environmental tax τE and
the import tariff τT . The environmental tax is the classic Pigouvian tax which is set
to the total discounted marginal damages from pollution while the import tariff is
the strategic component which Industria uses to steal Oilrabia’s monopoly rent. The
dynamics of these components follow from:
(5.31) τES R(p+τ) = −ρτE+D′(S0 +E0−S) and τTS R(p+τ) = −ρτT−pS(S)R(p+τ).
5.4.2 The Optimal Feedback Rule for the Oil Price
Oilrabia maximizes the present discounted value of profits from oil extraction (5.6)
subject to oil demand, carbon accumulation (5.3) and oil depletion (5.5) and given the
policy rule for Industria’s carbon tax τ(S). The HJB equation for Oilrabia is
(5.32) ρV ∗(S) = max
p
{[p−G(S)]R(p+ τ)− V ∗(S)R(p+ τ)} ,
where V ∗(S) is the value function for Oilrabia. The first-order condition gives the
optimal oil price:
(5.33) p =
G(S)− V ∗S (S)
1− 1/ε(p+ τ) +
τ
ε(p+ τ)− 1 .
The first term in the right-hand side of expression (5.33) is the monopoly mark-up on
the sum of extraction cost and the scarcity rent. The mark-up increases if oil demand
gets less elastic. The second term in the right-hand side of (5.33) depends on the size
of the carbon tax levied by Industria and reflects the extent to which Oilrabia can
capture part of Industria’s climate rent, which is easier if Oilrabia has more monopoly
power on the world oil market.
To derive the dynamics of Industria’s oil price, we substitute (5.33) into (5.32) and
differentiate both sides with respect to S leading to the following equation
(5.34) (ps + τs)R(p+ τ)
(
R(p+ τ)R′′(p+ τ)
R′(p+ τ)2
− 2
)
= ρ
[
p− p+ τ
ε(p+ τ)
−G(S)
]
.
5.4.3 Equilibrium
The feedback Nash equilibrium solves for the optimal rule for Industria (5.30) and
Oilrabia (5.34). Combining them we get the equilibrium condition for the user cost of
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oil
(5.35) qSR(q)
(
R(q)R′′(q)
R′(q)2
− 3
)
= ρ
[
q
(
1− 1
ε(q)
)
−D′(E0 + S0 − S)/ρ−G(S)
]
.
As can be seen, similar to the open-loop Nash equilibrium, the demand function spec-
ification plays a key role in the nature of the feedback Nash equilibrium. An analytic
solution is feasible if preferences and extraction cost are linear by guessing that value
functions are quadratic and solving with the method of undetermined coefficients. For
more sophisticated demand specifications, one normally needs to find a fixed point in
the policy reaction functions and value functions. However for a problem with a single
state variable there are easier solution methods.
5.4.4 Time-Domain Representation and Comparison with the
Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium Outcome
We begin by demonstrating that we can express p(S) and τ(S) as optimal paths p(t)
and τ(t), without any information loss. Formally, the feedback Nash equilibrium im-
plies that the players do not pre-commit to optimal policy paths and instead the policies
are expressed as functions of the state variable. However, an interior solution is char-
acterized by positive oil demand, i.e., R(t) > 0 for all t ≥ 0. This implies that the
oil stock S is a monotonically decreasing function of time S˙ = −R < 0. Therefore for
every instant of time t there is a corresponding unique value of S(t) ∈ (S0, 0). Thus the
solutions to the feedback equilibrium p(S(t)) and τ(S(t)) can also be expressed simply
as optimal equilibrium paths: p(t) and τ(t).
We now present the time-domain representation of the feedback equilibrium con-
ditions (5.30) and (5.34). In addition to simplifying the numerical solution of the
feedback equilibrium, expressing the optimal conditions in the time domain allows
for easier comparison with the open-loop Nash equilibrium. Utilizing −τSR = τ˙ and
−pSR = p˙ the feedback equilibrium carbon tax dynamics in (5.30) become:
(5.36) τ˙ = ρτ −D′(E0 + S0 − S)− p˙.
Compared to the open-loop Nash equilibrium carbon tax in (5.11) an extra term is
added to the feedback equilibrium expression: the change in the oil price −p˙ < 0.
Hence, the feedback carbon tax path is flatter than the open-loop one. The tax can
then be decomposed into the environmental tax τE and an import tariff τT :
(5.37) τ˙E = ρτE −D′(E0 + S0 − S), ˙τT = ρτT − p˙.
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Note that the open-loop Nash equilibrium carbon tax is the same as the environ-
mental component of the feedback Nash carbon tax. In the open-loop Nash equilibrium
Industria has to pre-commit to a tax and does not consider the response of Oilrabia –
thus simply setting the carbon tax to the sum of the discounted marginal damages. In
the feedback equilibrium Industria adds a tariff component to steal some of the scarcity
rent from Oilrabia.
We can also rewrite the feedback equilibrium condition of Oilrabia as
(5.38) p˙+ τ˙ =
ρ[(p+ τ){1− 1/ε(p+ τ)} − τ −G(S)]
2−R(p+ τ)R′′(p+ τ)/(R′(p+ τ))2 .
This expression is similar to the open-loop Nash equilibrium dynamics in (5.16). Since
in equilibrium ρτ > D′(E), we conclude the time path for the user cost of oil indeed
tends to be flatter in the feedback Nash equilibrium than in the open-loop Nash equi-
librium outcome. To make solving the equilibrium easier we combine (5.36) and (5.38),
representing the equilibrium through the dynamics of the combined user cost of oil:
q˙ =
ρ[{1− 1/ε(q)}q −G(S)−D′(E0 + S0 − S)/ρ]
3−R′(q)R′′(q)/(R′(q))2
=
ρ[{1− 1/ε(q)}q −G(S)−D′(E0 + S0 − S)/ρ]
2− 1−Θ(q)
ε
.(5.39)
Comparing (5.39) with (5.16) we see that the denominator has increased by unity and
thus the dynamics of the consumer price have a smaller derivative, which suggests that
the corresponding price path will be flatter. Of course, this does not constitute a proof
that the paths of the user cost of oil will be flatter as this would require insight into the
solution of the model. Our simulations, however, do confirm that the consumer price
path is indeed flatter in feedback Nash equilibrium than in open-loop Nash equilib-
rium. We collect some of our results on the feedback Nash equilibrium in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4: For the feedback Nash equilibrium the optimal carbon tax consists
of the sum of a Pigouvian component and an import tariff on oil from Oilrabia. The
monopoly mark-up on the sum of the extraction cost and the scarcity rent increases
if oil demand gets less elastic. Oilrabia captures part of Industria’s climate rent, and
more so if it has more monopoly power on the world oil market.
The feedback Nash equilibrium solution can now be obtained by numerically solving
(5.5) and (5.39) for the time path of S and q. From these one can calculate the time
paths for the carbon stock E = E0 + S0 − S, the carbon tax τ˙ = [q˙ + D′(E)]/ρ (from
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(5.39)) and the market price of oil p = q−τ . We can calculate the pure Pigouvian com-
ponent of the carbon tax τP (t) =
∫∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)D′(E(s))ds, upon which the tariff compo-
nent can be found as τ(t)−τP (t). The export mark-up for oil follows from p−G(S)−λ∗∗,
where the scarcity rent is calculated as λ∗∗ = − ∫∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)G(S(s))R(s)ds.
These price and tax components can then be used to demonstrate how the de-
mand specification influences the amount of monopolist rent that can be stolen by the
importer and vice versa. Solving this feedback Nash equilibrium problem is relatively
straightforward, due to the fact that our model collapses to only one state variable (the
oil stock). If instead two or more state variables were required to describe the state of
the world, we would have to explicitly solve for optimal strategies as functions of the
states. For example, if we had included atmospheric decay of carbon in our model, the
atmospheric carbon stock would no longer be the complement of the oil stock, and the
two countries would base their strategies on both stocks. Similarly, if we would have
allowed for capital accumulation in the model, the optimal strategies would also be a
function of the capital stock.
5.5 Illustrative Numerical Simulations
We supplement our analytic results by illustrating the efficient, the open-loop and
the feedback Nash equilibrium outcomes with some numerical solutions. For these
purposes we use the functional forms and calibration reported in Table 5.2. All our
emission variables are expressed in 1000 Gigatons of carbon (GtC), and prices and
costs are expressed in $1000 USD per ton Carbon (tC). We adopt a linear extraction
cost function with an initial stock of oil reserves of 10 GtC. Extraction costs rise from
an initial value of $300 to $1150 per tC when reserves are exhausted corresponding
to $30 and $115 per barrel of oil, and following the IEA (2010) long-term cost curve.
The initial carbon stock is set to 800 GtC. Global warming damages are given by
a quadratic function, with κ > 0 as the damage intensity parameter. We consider
quadratic, exponential and Cobb-Douglas production functions, which are all members
of the HARA class (see Table 5.1), as well as a non-HARA production function. They
lead to, respectively, linear, semi-loglinear, isoelastic and shifted loglinear oil demand
functions. Further calibration details are reported in Appendix 5.7.1.
In the remainder of this section we present the numerical solutions for various
demand specifications; Appendix 5.7.2 gives details of our numerical procedure. We
begin in Section 5.5.1 by replicating the results of Liski and Tahvonen (2004) by solving
the model for quadratic production functions with linear oil demand. Section 5.5.2
shows that the qualitative insights do not change for exponential production functions
with semi-loglinear oil demand.
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Table 5.2: Calibration
Functional form Parameter values
Extraction cost G(S) = γ1 + γ2(S0 − S) γ1 = 0.3, γ2 = 0.085, S0 = 10
Damages D(E) = κE2 E0 = 8, κ = 0.00004
Quadratic production
(linear demand)
F (R) = χψR− ψ2R2/2 ψ = 0.855, χ = 2.61
Exponential production
(semi-loglinear demand)
F (R) = A
ψ
(1− e−ψR) ψ = 3.672, A = .7430
Cobb-Douglas production
(isoelastic demand)
F (R) = 1−ϕ
ϕ
(
ψR
1−ϕ
)ϕ
ϕ = 0.35, ψ = 13.94
Non-HARA production
(shifted loglinear demand)
F (R) = χR + R
1−1φ
1−1/φ φ = 2.7, χ = 1
We solve the model for various levels of the damage intensity parameter κ demon-
strating that given a reasonable calibration, the damage parameter has a relatively
minor effect on the resource extraction rate. Section 5.5.3 presents the results for the
benchmark case of a Cobb-Douglas production function with loglinear or isoelastic oil
demand. Here the government of Industria in the desire to capture the exporter’s
scarcity rent raises the tariff, to which Oilrabia’s government responds by raising the
price even higher, causing ever more damage to the consumer. Section 5.5.4 discusses
the example of the non-HARA production function with shifted loglinear oil demand
discussed in Section 5.3.5 in which the monopolist initially extracts more oil than the
efficient rate.
5.5.1 Quadratic Production Function and Linear Oil Demand
We first consider the case of a quadratic production function and linear oil demand,
which is the functional form used by Liski and Tahvonen (2004). Figure 5.1 compares
time paths for oil reserves and the rate of oil extraction for the various outcomes. It
confirms that in the open-loop Nash equilibrium oil is initially extracted more slowly
than in the efficient outcome, but faster than in the feedback Nash equilibrium. How-
ever, in the long run, the stock of oil reserves converges to the same level for these three
outcomes. The user cost of oil in the open-loop Nash equilibrium outcome is initially
higher and later on lower than the efficient outcome reflecting the slower depletion
of oil reserves, thus confirming Proposition 3 and the results of Liski and Tahvonen
(2004). This bias in the extraction rate and slowing down of the depletion of the stock
of oil reserves is bigger in the feedback Nash equilibrium than in the open-loop Nash
equilibrium, thus confirming the insight of Proposition 4 that the price path in the
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feedback Nash equilibrium is flatter than in the open-loop Nash equilibrium.
Figure 5.1: Simulations with quadratic production function and linear oil demand
Table 5.3 gives the welfare for the various outcomes and indicates, not surprisingly,
that Industria does worst in the feedback Nash equilibrium outcome relative to both
open loop and efficient welfare levels. The open-loop Nash equilibrium obviously yields
higher welfare for Industria than the efficient outcome. Interestingly, Oilrabia does
better in the open-loop Nash equilibrium, where it can change its mark-up and earn
more profit on oil, than the efficient outcome where it cannot, but does worse in the
feedback Nash equilibrium where Industria can use the carbon tax as a tariff to steal
some of Oilrabia’s monopolist rents.
Table 5.3: Welfare in the various outcomes
Oil Demand Industria’s Welfare Oilrabia’s profit
Efficient Open-loop Feedback Efficient Open-loop Feedback
Linear -0.188 -0.242 -0.195 0.276 0.309 0.250
Semi-loglinear -0.183 -0.237 -0.189 0.279 0.313 0.252
Isoelastic 10.887 8.797 8.075 2.802 3.552 2.938
Figure 5.2 decomposes the feedback Nash equilibrium paths for the optimal carbon
tax set by Industria into its Pigouvian tax and its import tariff component and similarly
118
5.5. Illustrative Numerical Simulations
decomposes the optimal oil price set by Oilrabia into the scarcity rent and the export
price mark-up. The first panel of Figure 5.2 shows that the Pigouvian tax component
rises over time as the stock of atmospheric carbon rises and marginal climate damages
go up. The second panel of Figure 5.2 also indicates that the import tariff component
falls over time as the potential oil rents that can be captured decline as oil reserves
fall. Effectively, Industria uses its monopsony market power to extract rents from
Oilrabia with a high initial import tariff component that decreases over time. Since
the calibration we use assumes fairly mild damages, the import tariff component of
the carbon tax dominates the Pigouvian tax component. The third and fourth panels
of Figure 5.2 indicate that the scarcity rent falls over time and that the export price
mark-up falls over time too, since the extraction cost rises and the cartel loses its
monopoly power.
To see how the severity of climate damages affects the components of the equilib-
rium, Figures 5.3 and 5.4 report the results for high-severity climate damages. Similar
to Liski and Tahvonen (2004) we find that with medium climate damages the Pigou-
vian carbon tax component is fairly large, as indicated in the first panel of Figure 5.4.
Industria still has a little market power to extract some rents from Oilrabia and the
import tariff component is dominated by the Pigouvian component. This result can
be observed in Figure 5.4 where the import tariff (second panel) and mark-up (third
panel) are much smaller than the environmental component of the carbon tax. Note
that the larger Pigouvian tax component increases over time while the import tariff
decreases as scarcity rents converge to zero. Thus, as can be seen in the bottom right
panel of Figure 5.3, the total optimal carbon tax increases over time with high climate
damages. This contrasts with the decreasing carbon tax in Figure 5.1 when climate
damage intensity is lower and the carbon tax is primarily used as an import tariff.
However, we could not find a damage intensity that is high enough to ensure that the
optimal feedback Nash carbon tax becomes smaller than the Pigouvian tax. Instead,
for a very high climate damage intensity oil extraction becomes too harmful, and
Industria sets a prohibitive carbon tax such that no oil is extracted. This result differs
from Liski and Tahvonen (2004). Recall that in that study, for very high values of
climate damage intensity, Industria sets the carbon tax below the optimal Pigouvian
level, thus imposing an import subsidy (i.e., a negative tariff). This contradiction is
mainly driven by our calibration. Thus, for our calibration we can conclude that no
matter how high the climate damages, the importer will always add an import tariff
on top of the Pigouvian carbon tax.
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Figure 5.2: Decomposing the carbon tax and the oil price in feedback Nash equilibrium
with linear oil demand.
Figure 5.3: Simulation with linear oil demand and high climate damages
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Figure 5.4: Decomposition of the carbon tax and the oil prices for linear demand with high
climate damages
5.5.2 Exponential Production Function with Semi-Loglinear
Oil Demand
We now explore the case of an exponential production function with semi-loglinear
oil demand. Semi-loglinear and linear demand specifications lead to fairly similar
equilibrium extraction paths. The key difference is quantitative. The initial equilibrium
oil extraction rate and oil price are the same for both demand specifications, but the
amounts left in the ground differ as can be seen from Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Time at which 95% of oil is extracted and untapped oil reserves at that time
Oil Demand 95% Extraction time Untapped oil reserves
‘ Efficient Open-loop Feedback
Linear 192.3 300.4 345.8 6.295
Semi-loglinear 204.3 321.2 370.2 6.179
Isoelastic 116.3 258.6 489.7 0
Non HARA 114.5 116.8 144.6 0
As we mentioned earlier, the long-run stock of untapped oil reserves is only ap-
proached asymptotically. For all equilibrium outcomes, some extraction will take place.
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As can be seen from Table 5.4, with semi-loglinear oil demand Oilrabia leaves more oil
in situ than with linear demand. Table 5.3 indicates that with semi-loglinear demand
Industria’s welfare is still worse in the feedback Nash equilibrium than in the open-loop
Nash equilibrium and a fortiori worse than in the efficient outcome. Oilrabia’s welfare
is again worse than the efficient outcome in the feedback Nash equilibrium, but better
than the efficient outcome in the open-loop Nash equilibrium.
5.5.3 Cobb-Douglas Production Function and Isoelastic Oil
Demand
We now examine the benchmark case of a Cobb-Douglas production function giving
loglinear or isoelastic oil demand. Note that solving this case is less straightforward
than with linear and semi-loglinear oil demand, since now all oil is depleted asymptot-
ically (full exhaustion) as with loglinear oil demand the productivity of the marginal
unit of oil exceeds the extraction cost of the marginal unit of oil. In contrast, with lin-
ear and semi-loglinear oil demand some oil is left in situ (partial exhaustion). It is for
this reason that studying loglinear or isoelastic oil demand, is often avoided, with pref-
erence given to functional forms which lead to partial exhaustion and hence an interior
solution (Rubio and Escriche, 2001; Wirl, 1995). We resolve this issue with a slightly
more complicated numerical procedure (see Appendix 5.7.3) and give simulations for
isoelastic oil demand in Figures 5.5-5.6.
The main result of Liski and Tahvonen (2004) holds in the sense that the path
of the user cost of oil is less steep for both the feedback and the open-loop Nash
equilibrium than for the efficient case and that in the feedback Nash equilibrium the
stock of oil reserves is depleted more slowly than in the open-loop Nash equilibrium
and a fortiori than in the efficient outcome. The results differ in the redistribution
of rents. As mentioned earlier, with isoelastic oil demand marginal productivity of
oil is infinite at zero use, hence in the long run the price goes to infinity instead of
converging to a finite level. As the stock of oil reserves vanishes, Oilrabia increases
the price of oil, and there are always incentives for Industria to increase the tariff
on oil. We have solved for the feedback equilibrium for a range of damage intensity
levels and this result holds consistently. Hence, no matter how severe the climate
damage, the import tariff component always increases over time and always dominates
the Pigouvian tax component. Thus, with isoelastic oil demand Industria always steals
a significant amount of the Hotelling rent even for high-intensity climate damages. In
fact, the import tariff component tends to infinity in the long run as the scarcity rents
for the marginal unit of oil are infinite. Thus the import tariff benefits of the carbon
tax dominate the Pigouvian global warming benefits in the long run with isoelastic oil
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Figure 5.5: Simulations with isoelastic oil demand
demand.
The implications for Industria’s welfare, however, are ambiguous. As can be seen
from Table 5.3, with unit-elastic oil demand Industria’s welfare in the feedback Nash
equilibrium is lower than in the open-loop Nash equilibrium in contrast to the case of
linear and semi-loglinear oil demand. The intuition is that the unit-elastic oil demand
curve does not set any upper bound on the reservation price. Thus as Oilrabia and
Industria compete to maximize their rent, they set the price too high and end up
harming Industria’s consumers, thereby decreasing Industria’s welfare. This implies
that the use of the carbon tax to steal rents from the importer, is not as beneficial as
has hitherto been suggested in the literature as for certain demand specifications it can
harm the consumers in the oil-importing nation.
5.5.4 Non-HARA Production Function: Shifted Unit-Elastic
Oil Demand
We now examine the non-HARA production function discussed in Section 5.3.5 with
shifted semi-loglinear oil demand and a negative super-elasticity to investigate whether
it is possible for the bias to go in the other direction: the oil extraction rate being
initially higher for the open-loop Nash than for the efficient equilibrium. Recall that
we postulated in section 5.3.5 that χ must be small enough to satisfy the no-arbitrage
condition (5.27) but large enough to make this demand significantly different from the
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Figure 5.6: Decomposition of the carbon tax and the oil price for the feedback Nash equi-
librium with isoelastic oil demand.
isoelastic case. We have numerically solved the open-loop Nash and efficient equilibria
for a range of parameter values with φ > 1 and χ < φ(G(S0)+D
′(E0)/ρ) to find values
for which the initial rate of oil extraction is faster for the open-loop Nash equilibrium
than for the efficient outcome. One example of such parameter values is φ = 2.7 and
χ = 1. This parameterization leads to: qEFF (0) = 2.571 and qOL(0) = 2.558, where
qEFF and QOL are the initial levels of oil demand for the efficient outcome and the
open-loop Nash equilibrium, respectively. Note that the initial user cost of oil in the
open-loop Nash equilibrium is lower than in the efficient outcome. The simulation
paths for the user cost of oil for the first 100 and the first 30 years for both equilibria
are presented in Figure 5.7. We present a separate plot for the initial extraction period
as this is when the monopolist behaves differently than with HARA demand.
As Figures 5.1 and 5.5 indicate, with HARA oil demand the open-loop Nash equilib-
rium path crosses the efficient path only once. With the shifted semi-loglinear demand
example of non-HARA demand we see from the second panel of Figure 5.7 that there
are multiple crossing points. The open-loop Nash equilibrium path starts out steeper
than the efficient one and then flattens out, crossing the efficient path again. Thus
initially the open-loop Nash equilibrium price is lower than the efficient price. This
result may seem counter-intuitive: why would the oil price in the open-loop Nash equi-
librium be lower than in the competitive market outcome? The intuition lies in the
behavior of the price elasticity. Imagine that Industria’s population consists of two
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Figure 5.7: Simulations of tthe oil extraction rate and the user cost of oil with non-HARA
oil demand.
groups. The first has a fairly low reservation price for oil and can substitute away
easily while the second has a higher reservation price and cannot substitute away from
oil. For example, Industria might consist of city dwellers that can switch to public
transport and country dwellers that have to drive to work. Thus for lower oil prices,
demand is fairly elastic (city dwellers can stop using oil and switch to public transport)
but beyond a certain threshold, the elasticity of demand decreases. The monopolist
then initially sets the price slightly lower to capture some of the elastic demand (while
the extraction cost is low), and then once all the cheap oil is extracted, increases the
price to serve exclusively the more inelastic portion of demand. As a result of these
strategic dynamics, more oil is extracted initially than in the efficient case. Ergo, in
the short run the monopolistic power of Oilrabia is bad for the environment. In the
long run however the open-loop Nash equilibrium user cost of oil path is flatter than
the efficient one just as is the case with HARA preferences.
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5.6 Concluding Remarks
Curbing fossil fuel use is essential to prevent further global warming. Achievement of
this goal is complicated by the fact that reserves of fossil fuels are highly concentrated
in a few non-western oil-and gas-rich nations with considerable monopolistic power.
Previous studies (Wirl, 1995; Tahvonen, 1995, 1996; Rubio and Escriche, 2001; Liski and
Tahvonen, 2004) have argued that western oil importers might nevertheless successfully
limit fossil fuel consumption via a carbon tax. However, monopolistic exporters are
likely to respond to the carbon tax by increasing the oil price more than they would
have done in a competitive oil market, which would result in even fewer emissions. In
this way oil exporters can try to capture some of the climate rent. Additionally, the
carbon tax can be used as an import tariff to extract scarcity rents from monopolistic
oil exporters. This might further benefit the oil importing nation, but the ability of
the importer to capture the monopolist’s scarcity rents depends on the intensity of
carbon damages. However, the aforementioned studies limit their attention to linear
oil demand in order to keep the analysis tractable. The nature of demand for oil can of
course have an important effect on how consumers respond to an increase in the carbon
tax. Our paper’s aim is to examine how the specific nature of oil demand affects the
oil importer’s efforts to prevent climate change and capture the monopolist’s rents.
We analyze the problem in the framework of a dynamic game between an oil-
exporting country with monopoly power on global oil markets and an oil-importing
country which is concerned with combating climate change. We find equilibrium con-
ditions for a variety of production functions and their corresponding demand specifi-
cations. We prove that for all HARA class production functions, the open-loop Nash
equilibrium extraction will initially be slower and later on faster than the efficient rate.
As most commonly used demand specifications fall under the HARA class, this implies
that in most cases the monopolist is the conservationist’s best friend. However, we also
find a numerical example of a shifted loglinear demand function for which the open-
loop equilibrium extraction rate is initially too high. Thus there are some non-HARA
production functions for which in the open-loop equilibrium the oil-exporting country
hinders the oil-importing country’s effort to battle climate change. We also solve the
model for the feedback Nash equilibrium. Although we do not get any general analyt-
ical results, our numerical illustrations indicate that the initial feedback equilibrium
consumer price is always higher than in the open-loop Nash equilibrium, which leads
to a delay in oil extraction and carbon emissions, and hence lower damages from global
warming. This initial consumer price increase is caused by the government of the oil-
importing country using the carbon tax as a tariff to steal the oil exporter’s scarcity
rents on oil while the oil-exporting country responds by raising the oil price to steal
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back some of the climate rents of the oil-importing country. For the isoelastic produc-
tion function the resulting increase in the consumer price of oil leads to a significant
welfare loss which outweighs the gain of the captured scarcity rent.
Our main conclusion is that the demand structure plays a significant role when
determining the optimal carbon tax or import tariff for foreign oil. Given the number
of papers which choose their demand function based on computational convenience
these results serve as a cautionary tale: demand specifications chosen out of simplicity
rather than reflecting reality may make a carbon tax seem more or less beneficial in
the context of strategic interactions in regards to exhaustible resources.
While this study generalizes the results of previous studies by examining a range
of demand specifications it remains limited in its scope. For instance, the model we
examine excludes the possibility of saving and capital accumulation and less stylized
carbon cycle dynamics. Without the capital stock the economy collapses after oil runs
out, a highly unrealistic outcome. Meanwhile, without a more sophisticated model of
the carbon cycle, all CO2 that is emitted into the atmosphere stays there forever. Thus,
we end up over-estimating the amount of climate change. To remedy these problems
we would have to construct a model with additional state variables (for example, using
the two reservoirs that Golosov et al. (2014) use to model the carbon cycle). The play-
ers’ strategies would then be based on the full state space of the two CO2 reservoirs
and the oil stock. Finding the feedback equilibrium in this more complex setup would
not only make our conclusions more realistic but also provide a contribution to the
dynamic game literature through solving for a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium with
multiple state variables, one of which represents a fully-exhaustible resource. Another
interesting extension would be to introduce multiple oil exporters into the model, simi-
lar to Groot et al. (2000, 2003) and Benchekroun et al. (2009, 2010). Adding a fringe in
addition to the cartel exporter is a better model of reality and would lead to interesting
dynamics with the cartel and the fringe responding differently to the importer’s carbon
tax. We leave these extensions of our work for further research.
5.7 Appendix
5.7.1 Calibration Details
The IEA (2010) long-term cost curve for oil puts oil reserves at around 10,000 billion
barrels, with initial extraction cost between $5 and $30 per barrel and the highest cost
reserves at $115 per barrel. A barrel of oil contains 5.80 MMBTU (Million British
Thermal Units) and each MMBTU is equal to 20.31 kg CO2 (EPA, 2013), so a barrel
of oil is 115 kg of carbon or around 1/10 ton of Carbon (TC). All of our emission
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variables are expressed in 1000 Gigaton Carbon (GtC) and prices/costs are expressed
in $1000 USD/tC. Initial CO2 concentration is set to approximately 800 GtC (EPA,
2013).
We then calibrate the production functions by solving the model for a variety of
parameters and ensuring they correspond to real-world data. We calibrate the CARA
and quadratic utility production functions so that for zero damages, initial prices and
emissions are equal to their 2005 levels. We calibrate the isoelastic production function
so that initial prices and emissions are equal to their 2010 levels (demand amounts are
re-scaled to adjust for the population growth between 2005 and 2010). We set the
interest rate and the rate of time preference at 1% per annum.
5.7.2 Solving for Equilibria Numerically
The dynamic equilibrium conditions are described by differential equation (5.16) for the
open-loop Nash equilibrium and (5.34) for the feedback Nash equilibrium. Because we
have only one state variable, both problems collapse into a set of differential equations
with respect to time, so we can use the same numerical method for both equilibria. We
use a Runge-Kutta shooting algorithm, simulating the open-loop Nash and feedback
equilibrium user cost of oil using (5.16) and (5.39) respectively, and using (5.5) to
simulate the path of the oil stock. We do not know the initial value for the user cost
of oil q, so to find it we introduce a long-run steady state condition, which must hold
as time approaches infinity.
For the quadratic and exponential production functions we assume that the marginal
productivity at zero is bounded at a low enough value such that some oil is left in situ.
Thus the long-run steady state condition for the oil stock is:
(5.40) G(S) +D′(E0 + S0 − S)/ρ = F ′(0).
(For the isoelastic and non-HARA production case where the marginal productivity of
oil is infinite, the final condition becomes more complex. We describe how to derive
the final condition in section 5.7.3 below.) Since the long-run steady state described in
(5.40) is only approached asymptotically and never actually reached, we approximate
it by the conditions:
(5.41) R < ε,G(S) +D′(E0 + S0 − s)/ρ < ε,
for an arbitrary small value of ε. We use a binary search algorithm to find the initial
price q(0), which produces an oil extraction path that satisfies (5.40). We then use
(5.16) and (5.39) to back out the open-loop Nash or feedback Nash equilibrium carbon
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tax levels, respectively.
5.7.3 Solving for Equilibria with Infinite Marginal Production
at Zero
If the productivity of the marginal unit of oil is greater than the extraction cost of the
marginal unit of oil, asymptotically oil is fully exhausted albeit that we never actually
get to a point where R = 0, S = 0. Thus we must find a way to derive a different final
condition. Let oil demand growth be g(t) = R˙(t)
R(t)
. Note that as the oil price increases,
oil demand decreases so demand growth is negative. Now assume that as time goes to
infinity, the demand growth rate converges to some finite value limt→∞ g(t) = g¯ (while
we do not have a proof of this conjecture, we can show that it holds numerically). Let
T be the point in time when ˙g(t) = 0 i.e. g(T ) = g¯. Then it must hold that for all
t > T
(5.42) R(t) = eg¯(t−T )R(T ).
Substituting (5.39) in the differential equation for the oil stock (5.5) we get the condi-
tion for the stock of oil at time T :9
(5.43) S(T ) = R(T )
∫ ∞
t=T
eg¯(t−T )dt =
R(T )
−g¯ .
We can now use the same Runge-Kutta algorithm that we used for the quadratic and
exponential production function. We find time T numerically by using the Runge-
Kutta method to simulate the model until the growth rate of demand converges, and
use (5.43) as the final condition to check whether the oil extraction path satisfies the
equilibrium conditions.
9Note that the growth in oil demand is negative so we must divide by negative g¯
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Preventing global climate change is a difficult problem with many complicating factors.
This dissertation addresses several issues related to the economics of climate change,
presenting insights as to how uncertainty, renewable energy innovation, and fossil fuel
scarcity impact our environmental policy decisions.
Chapter two investigates the topic of climate change skepticism, the fact that in
spite of extensive scientific evidence, a number of people and policy makers believe that
climate change is not caused by man-made emissions. In this chapter, I construct a
model in which the level of policy makers’ skepticism is formally defined as the proba-
bility that climate change is random rather than emission-driven. Another key feature
of the study is that climate change damages are modeled as a potential catastrophe
whose probability increases with global average temperature. I then solve the model
for a variety of skepticism levels, identifying the optimal emission levels for fully-aware,
fully-skeptical and moderately-skeptical policy makers. The main finding is that the as-
sumption that damages are catastrophic has a much bigger effect on optimal emissions
than the level of skepticism. Even full skeptics should favor some emission reduction,
though unfortunately insufficient to prevent significant climate change, while moderate
skeptics (those that believe that there is a 50% chance that climate change is anthro-
pogenic) should favor emission reduction which limit temperature increases to below 2
degrees.
The third chapter also studies uncertainty in climate change economics, and focuses
on renewable energy innovation. In this study, I model the firm’s decision to invest in
developing cheaper renewables given that the prices of the fossil fuels that compete with
these renewables are highly volatile. I demonstrate that the fossil price volatility can
have two opposite effects. On the one hand, investing in making renewables cheaper
can serve as a hedge against unpredictable fossil fuel prices, such that the return
on investment increases with uncertainty. On the other hand, in uncertain market
conditions there is an incentive to delay investment until there is more information
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(i.e., until fossil fuel prices rise or drop significantly) pushing investment in renewables
down. I find that the second consideration significantly dominates the first, resulting
in an overall negative effect of volatility on renewable energy innovation.
When considering optimal policy to phase in renewables instead of dirty fossil fuels,
it is also important to consider the variety of fossil fuel types. The fourth chapter
examines the optimal renewables subsidy when multiple types of fossil fuels are present
in the market. The model considers three energy sources - dirty and abundant coal,
relatively cleaner but scarce oil, and expensive renewables. Together with my co-author
Jacob Jannsenn I use this model to calculate the optimal subsidy that a government
should implement in case the first-best tool (a carbon tax) is not available. The main
result is that the government should wait until all oil is depleted, and a fair amount
of coal has been utilized to subsidize renewables. Our results confirm other findings in
the literature that subsidies are largely ineffective in battling climate change.
Unfortunately, fossil fuels, instead of being distributed uniformly, are heavily con-
centrated in a small set of nations, giving these nations significant monopoly power
in the fossil fuel market. It is important to consider this phenomenon when thinking
about optimal climate change policy, as the regions where these fossil fuel stocks are
concentrated are not always concerned with global well-being. The fifth chapter studies
the case when the fossil fuel reserves are concentrated in one region (a monopolistic
exporter) while another region (an environmentalist importer) is concerned with cli-
mate change. Together with my co-authors, Professors Rick van der Ploeg and Cees
Withagen, I construct a framework where Oilrabia (the exporter) and Industria (the
importer) play a game, in which Oilrabia sets the price of oil while Industria sets the
carbon tax. The key focus of this study is to investigate how the nature of oil demand
in Industria affects its efforts to battle climate change and steal Oilrabia’s monopoly
rents. To achieve this goal we solve the model for a variety of demand functions. It
is demonstrated that for the HARA class demand functions, the oil exporter is the
conservationist’s best friend, with the competition between the exporter and the im-
porter increasing oil prices, and hence reducing emissions. However, a key new result
is that there are demand functions for which the monopolist actually has an incentive
to increase initial extraction causing more climate change to occur.
In addition to the theoretical findings each study contains useful quantitative in-
sights for environmental policy. The second chapter presents specific emission paths
for a variety of skepticism levels, which can serve as a tool of persuasion to moder-
ately skeptical policy-makers and voters for supporting climate change mitigation. The
third chapter suggests that in order for significant cost reduction in renewables to be
achieved, the government may need to increase renewable R&D subsidies in times of
volatile fossil fuel prices. On the other hand, the fourth chapter argues against subsi-
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dizing renewable energy directly when renewable energy competes with oil or natural
gas, pushing for a carbon tax when at all possible and only for a limited use of subsidies
to phase out dirty coal. The fifth chapter’s results serve as a cautionary tale against
making strong assumptions about oil demand in the importer country in environmen-
tal policy calculations. Hence, its main lesson for policy makers is to consider the full
demand structure when calculating the optimal carbon tax, rather than assuming a
single elasticity parameter or a simplistic linear demand function.
Although I try to address some of the complexities of the climate change problem
in my models, every one of them can be explored further leaving plenty of room for
further research. The second chapter focuses on a fairly extreme case of catastrophic
climate change damages. While some analysis is performed to test the robustness of
the results to the extreme specification of catastrophic damages, fully solving a model
with less extreme climate change damages would lead to even more understanding
about when skepticism can be damaging. A full robustness check testing how using
different functional forms (i.e. CES production function, CARA utility) affects the
incentives and ability of the moderate skeptic to prevent climate change would yield a
more complete picture of the problem. Likely these exercises will confirm some of the
findings, although for many variations the differences between the fully skeptic policy
maker and the moderately skeptic one would be less stark. Another area of further
study is to introduce learning into the model, similar to many other studies on climate
change (Kelly and Kolstad, 1999; Leach, 2007; van Wijnbergen and Willems, 2015).
Extending the model in this fashion would further determine whether skepticism can
lead to significant climate change damages, or whether learning can mitigate the initial
skepticism level (an unlikely result given the existing literature on learning in climate
economics). For the remaining three studies, the next step would be to extend the
models to general equilibrium. Adding capital accumulation and an endogenous inter-
est rate would not only produce more convincing results but also lead to a variety of
new insights. In the third chapter, capital accumulation would provide an additional
channel to hedge against uncertainty, decreasing the attractiveness of renewable energy
investment. For the fourth chapter the ability to accumulate capital, would lead to an
optimal renewable subsidy that is variable, rather than flat. Additionally for the third
chapter, a natural extension would be to add knowledge spillovers, common in the
innovation literature and even explored in some renewable energy innovation studies
(for example Fischer et al. (2013)). Furthermore, as climate change is a global prob-
lem involving multiple sovereign nations, introducing multiple agents into the models
studying skepticism and renewable energy innovation is another promising direction for
providing relevant insights. A model with multiple nations with various levels of skep-
ticism is likely to demonstrate the difficulty of achieving an international agreement
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on climate change, a particularly relevant result for climate negotiation.
Lastly, though I have briefly discussed policy implications throughout my disserta-
tion, steps can be taken to make the analysis even more policy-relevant. Most of the
studies above do not explicitly model policy decisions. Hence, formally adding policy
decision variables, and finding the optimal levels of government intervention, should
confirm the initial insights presented in the studies. This would be particularly useful
for studying renewable energy innovation, as a variety of policy measures (from inno-
vation subsidies to renewable subsidies or a carbon tax) can be examined. In this vein,
an interesting extension for the second chapter on skepticism is to determine whether
policy makers of different levels of skepticism prefer a carbon tax or a carbon permit
scheme. Another step that would increase the policy relevance of the results in this
dissertation is robust empirical analysis. While there is some calibration done in all
the models, performing an empirical study to find evidence of the effects predicted
by theory in data would significantly strengthen the policy-oriented conclusions. For
example, Kellogg (2014) empirically calculates the effect of fossil fuel price volatility
on drilling investment, finding evidence of an investment reduction in line with real
option theory. A similar empirical study finding evidence of that effect on renewable
energy R&D, would provide a compelling argument for subsidizing innovation when
fossil fuel prices are volatile. This work is left for future research.
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Samenvatting (Dutch Summary)
Klimaatverandering is uitgegroeid tot een van de belangrijkste milieuproblemen waarmee
de mensheid in de toekomst geconfronteerd zal worden. Het ontwikkelen van het juiste
beleid om klimaatverandering tegen te gaan, blijft daarom een belangrijke taak voor
milieueconomen. Vanwege de grote omvang van het probleem leidt de regulatie van
klimaatverandering tot allerlei complicaties die niet opgelost kunnen worden door ge-
bruik te maken van simpele modellen met externe milieueffecten. Ten eerste is onze
kennis van de natuurlijke processen achter de klimaatverandering en de gevolgen van
klimaatverandering voor de wereldeconomie onvolledig. Bovenop de algemene onvoor-
spelbaarheid van toekomstige uitkomsten en het feit dat klimaatverandering een proces
is dat tientallen jaren zal duren, leidt dit gebrek aan informatie tot grote onzeker-
heid waarmee rekening gehouden moet worden bij het bepalen van optimaal klimaat-
beleid. Ten tweede wordt een significant deel van de koolstofdioxide-uitstoot veroorza-
akt door het gebruik van schaarse fossiele brandstoffen waarvoor geen goede substituten
voorhanden zijn. Hoewel er de afgelopen decennia schone, vernieuwbare energiebronnen
zijn ontwikkeld, zijn er additionele innovaties benodigd om de mondiale consumptie van
fossiele brandstoffen te verlagen. Bovendien is het grootste deel van de fossiele voor-
raden in handen van niet-westerse landen met significante monopoliemacht, hetgeen de
zaak verder compliceert. Ten slotte is klimaatverandering een zeer gepolitiseerd onder-
werp geworden, waardoor sommige nuttige beleidsingrepen vanuit politiek oogpunt niet
haalbaar zijn. In mijn proefschrift probeer ik deze complexiteit aan te pakken en licht
te werpen op de consequenties die deze facetten van het klimaatprobleem hebben op
het optimale beleid. Hiertoe gebruik ik theoretische modellen met ge¨ıntegreerde milieu-
componenten. Hoewel de analyse theoretisch is, kalibreer ik al de gebruikte modellen
zodanig de parameterwaarden in overeenstemming zijn met de werkelijkheid.
De eerste twee hoofdstukken gaan over de onzekerheid met betrekking tot kli-
maatverandering. In het eerste hoofdstuk wordt ingegaan op zogenaamde ‘klimaatscep-
sis’: de overtuiging dat klimaatverandering niet door uitstoot van broeikasgassen wordt
gedreven. In dit hoofdstuk kwantificeer ik het niveau van klimaatscepsis als de kans
die een beleidsmaker toekent aan de mogelijkheid dat klimaatverandering willekeurig
is, in plaats van door de mens veroorzaakt wordt. Vervolgens bepaal ik het optimale
beleid voor verschillende niveaus van klimaatscepsis. Ik laat zien dat zo lang de geper-
cipieerde gevolgen van klimaatverandering ernstig zijn, zelfs een tamelijk sceptische
beleidsmaker stringent klimaatbeleid zou moeten voeren. Het tweede hoofdstuk richt
zich op onzekerheid op het economische vlak. In dit hoofdstuk onderzoek ik de in-
vloed van onzekere prijzen van fossiele brandstoffen op investeringen in innovaties in
vernieuwbare energie. Ik toon aan dat investeringen in het reduceren van de kosten van
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vernieuwbare energie kunnen dienen als een hedge tegen volatiele fossiele brandstof-
prijzen. Dientengevolge kan een toenemende volatiliteit van fossiele brandstofprijzen
een prikkel zijn tot private investeringen in vernieuwbare energie (zonder dat men zich
zorgen maakt over het milieu).
De laatste twee hoofdstukken belichten de interactie tussen uitputbare fossiele
brandstoffen en het bestrijden van klimaatverandering. In het derde hoofdstuk wordt
een economie met drie energiebronnen gemodelleerd: een eindige olievoorraad, een
oneindige hoeveelheid vervuilende kolen, en dure, schone, vernieuwbare energie. We
bepalen het optimale second-best beleid in de vorm van een subsidie voor vernieuw-
bare energie, uitgaande van een situatie waarin het heffen van een belasting op de
uitstoot van koolstofdioxide om politieke redenen onmogelijk is. We concluderen dat
een subsidie op vernieuwbare energie tamelijk ineffectief kan zijn en dat deze alleen
zou moeten worden ingevoerd nadat alle goedkope olie verbruikt is en energie voor-
namelijk nog wordt gehaald uit kolen. Het laatste hoofdstuk gaat over het effect van
monopoliemacht van olie-exporteurs op het klimaatbeleid van ontwikkelde landen. We
kijken naar de strategische interactie tussen een olie-exporteur die de olieprijs bepaalt,
en een milieubewuste olie-importeur die de koolstofbelasting bepaalt. In het alge-
meen concluderen we dat ‘de monopolist de beste vriend is van de milieuactivist’, daar
hogere olieprijzen leiden tot uitstel van olie-extractie. Dit effect hangt echter af van
de olievraagfunctie van de importeur. Voor bepaalde specificaties van de vraagfunctie
heeft de monopolist juist een prikkel om aanvankelijk meer olie uit de grond te halen.
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